Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 23STCV05223, Date: 2023-08-28 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV05223 Hearing Date: August 28, 2023 Dept: 32
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Jintao
yang, Plaintiff, v. MERCEDES BENZ USA, LLC;
et al., Defendants.
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Case No.: 23STCV05223 Hearing Date: August 28, 2023 [TENTATIVE]
order RE: motion TO COMPEL ARBITRATION |
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Background
Plaintiff Jintao yang (Plaintiff) commenced this lemon law action
against Defendant MERCEDES BENZ USA, LLC (Mercedes) on March 9, 2023. The
Complaint asserts causes of action for violation of the Song-Beverly Act. The causes of action arise from Plaintiff’s
purchase of a 2022 Mercedes Benz C300W (Vehicle).
Discussion
Defendant Mercedes moves to compel
Plaintiffs to submit this action to binding arbitration.
Merecedes presents a copy of the Vehicle’s
Retail Installment Sale Contract (Sale Contract) entered into by Plaintiff and Fletcher
Jones Motorcars of Fremont. (Ameripour Decl.
Ex. 2.)
Plaintiff’s causes of action fall within
the broad scope of this arbitration clause because the causes of action relate
to the purchase and condition of the Vehicle.
(See Vianna v. Doctors’ Management Co. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th
1186, 1189 (noting that “arbitration agreements should be liberally
interpreted, and arbitration should be ordered unless the agreement clearly
does not apply to the dispute in question”).)
The disposition of this motion turns on
whether Mercedes, a nonsignatory to the Sales Contract, may compel Plaintiff to
arbitrate his claims pursuant to this arbitration clause.
This court begins its analysis with a
discussion of the relevant California and federal authorities addressing
Song-Beverly motions to compel arbitration by nonsignatories.
First, in Felisilda v. FCA US LLC
(2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 486, 489, the plaintiffs sued a car manufacturer and car
dealer for violations of Song-Beverly.
The dealer moved to compel arbitration of the claims based on an
arbitration provision. (Id.) The trial court ordered arbitration of the
claims against both the dealer and manufacturer. The plaintiffs then dismissed the dealer, and
arbitrated their claims with the manufacturer.
(Id.) After the trial
court confirmed the arbitrator’s decision, the plaintiffs appealed, arguing
that the trial court could not order plaintiffs to arbitrate the claim with the
manufacturer because it was a nonsignatory to the sales contract. (Id.)
The Court of Appeal rejected this
argument. The Court explained that the
express warranties allegedly breached by the manufacturer arose from the sales
contract. (Id. at 496-97). “Because the [plaintiffs] expressly agreed to
arbitrate claims arising out of the condition of the vehicle – even against
third party nonsignatories to the sales contract – they are estopped from
refusing to arbitrate their claim against [the manufacturer].” (Id. at 497).
Then, in Ngo v. BMW of America, 23
F.4th 942, 950 (9th Cir. 2022), the plaintiff sued BMW, who manufactured the
car, but did not include the dealer.
Notably, the arbitration provision was nearly identical to the one in Felisilda.
The manufacturer then attempted to compel arbitration based on the
provision. The Court rejected this
attempt, finding equitable estoppel theory inapplicable to the
manufacturer. As the court explained:
It makes a
critical difference that the Felisildas, unlike Ngo, sued the dealership in addition
to the manufacturer. In Felisilda, it was the dealership—a signatory to
the purchase agreement—that moved to compel arbitration rather than the non-signatory
manufacturer. [Citation]…Furthermore, the Felisildas dismissed the dealership
only after the court granted the motion to compel arbitration. Accordingly, Felisilda
does not address the situation we are confronted with here, where the
non-signatory manufacturer attempted to compel arbitration on its own.
(Id. at 950).
Ngo also went on to hold that the manufacturer
was not a third-party beneficiary of the agreement. (Id. at 946.)
Most recently, the California Court of
Appeal addressed the issues in Ford Motor Warranty Cases, (“Ochoa”)
(2023) 89 Cal. App.5th 1324. In
relevant part, the Ochoa Court converged from Felisilda’s
position that “the sales contract was the source” of the warranties at issue. (Felisilda,
supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 496.) Instead, the Ochoa court concluded that
“manufacturer vehicle warranties that accompany the sale of motor vehicles
without regard to the terms of the sale contract between the purchaser and the
dealer are independent of the sale contract.” (Ochoa, supra, 89
Cal.App.5th at 621.) Thus, the court found equitable estoppel to be
inapplicable because the plaintiffs’ claims “in no way rel[ied] on the sale
contracts.” (Id.) Therefore, the Plaintiffs were not attempting “to
prevent a party from taking advantage of a contract's substantive terms while
avoiding those terms requiring arbitration,” which is the “’fundamental point’
of using equitable estoppel to compel arbitration.” (Id.)
Ochoa also disagreed with Felisilda’s
holding that a manufacturer could compel arbitration as a third-party
beneficiary of the sales contract.
Instead, it found Ngo “persuasive,” agreeing that “the sale
contracts reflect no intention to benefit a vehicle manufacturer.” (Id. at
622.)
Most recently, the California Court of
Appeal addressed the issues in Montemayor v. Ford Motor Co., No. B320477,
2023 WL 4181909 (Cal. Ct. App. June 26, 2023) (“Montemayor”), a case
certified for publication. The Montemayor
court concurred with the Ochoa and Ngo decisions.
A. Equitable Estoppel
Defendant first argues that it has
standing to compel arbitration under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
“As a general rule, only a party to an
arbitration agreement may enforce the agreement. [Citation.] However, there are
several exceptions that allow a nonsignatory to invoke an agreement to
arbitrate. [Citation.] The doctrine of equitable estoppel is one of the
exceptions. (Ibid.)” (Felisilda v.
FCA US LLC, (2020) 53 Cal. App. 5th 486, 495, review denied (Nov. 24,
2020)). Under equitable estoppel, “as
applied in ‘both federal and California decisional authority, a nonsignatory
defendant may invoke an arbitration clause to compel a signatory plaintiff to
arbitrate its claims when the causes of action against the nonsignatory are
“intimately founded in and intertwined” with the underlying contract obligations.’
[Citations.] ‘By relying on contract terms in a claim against a nonsignatory
defendant, even if not exclusively, a plaintiff may be equitably estopped from
repudiating the arbitration clause contained in that agreement.’ [Citation.] (Id.)
Defendant contends that Felisilda
controls and demands a finding of arbitrability here. (Felisilda, supra,
53 Cal. App. 5th.) Defendant recognizes that Ngo and Ochoa and
Motemayor conflict with Felisilda.
“[W]here there is more than one appellate
court decision, and such appellate decisions are in conflict…. the court
exercising inferior jurisdiction can and must make a choice between the conflicting
decisions.” (See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Ct. of Santa Clara Cnty.
(1962) 57 Cal. 2d 450, 456.)
It is apparent that the facts of the instant
case are indistinguishable from Ngo, Ochoa and Motemayor. The court finds the reasoning in Ngo, Ochoa
and Montemayor more persuasive than Felisilda.
B. Third Party
Beneficiary
Defendant also argues it can compel
arbitration as a third-party beneficiary of the RISC. To permit a third-party
action to go forward, three factors must be established: (1) the third party
would in fact benefit from the contract; (2) a motivating purpose of the
contracting parties was to provide a benefit to the third party; and (3) permitting
the third party to bring its own breach of contract action against a
contracting party is consistent with the objectives of the contract and
reasonable expectations of the third parties. (Goonewardene v. ADP, LLC
(2019) 6 Cal.5th 817, 830.)
Ngo also directly addressed the third-party
beneficiary theory and applied the Goonewardene factors. There, the Court found that BMW could not
show it would benefit from the arbitration agreement (prong 1) because “only
three parties—Ngo, the dealership, and the assignee—may compel arbitration.” (Ngo,
supra, 23 F.4th at 946.) The court recognized that the contract “defines ‘you’
as Ngo and ‘we’ as the dealership and its assignee,” and specified that
“[e]ither you or we may choose to have any dispute between us decided by
arbitration and not in court or by jury trial.” (Id.) The court found
any benefit to BMW was “peripheral and indirect.” (Id.)
Applying the second prong, the Court found
for similar reasons that it was not a “motivating purpose” of the contracting
parties to confer a benefit on BMW. And
applying the third prong, the court found extending coverage to BMW was not
consistent with “the objective of the contract.” The Court reasoned that “[n]othing in the
contract here evinces any intention that the arbitration clause should apply to
BMW. The arbitration clause's enforcement provisions are limited to the
dealership, the assignee, and Ngo. The compelling inference from this
arrangement is that the parties knew how to give enforcement powers to non-signatories
when they wished to do so but gave none to BMW.” (Id. at 948.)
Thus, applying Ngo—which controls
and to which the facts here are nearly identical—Defendant is not a third-party
beneficiary of the RISC. The result is the same under Ochoa and Montemayor.
Conclusion
Mercedes’s motion to compel arbitration is
DENIED.