Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 23STCV06271, Date: 2023-11-01 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV06271 Hearing Date: November 1, 2023 Dept: 32
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ANTON TOUTOV, Plaintiff, v. CURATIVE LABS INC., et
al., Defendants. |
Case No.: 23STCV06271 Hearing Date: November 1, 2023 [TENTATIVE]
order RE: defendants jonathan martin’s and paul scott’s
demurrer to complaint |
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BACKGROUND
On March 21, 2023, Plaintiff Anton Toutov
filed this action against Defendants Curative Labs Inc., Curative Inc.,
Jonathan Martin, and Paul Scott, asserting causes of action for (1) violation
of Penal Code section 496 and (2) conversion.
Plaintiff is a researcher, entrepreneur,
and chemist who in 2015 was recruited by Defendants Martin and Scott to join
Curative Labs Inc. (CLI) as one of the three founders. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Plaintiff
allegedly had an agreement with CLI wherein instead of a salary, Plaintiff
would receive 20% ownership and cash compensation once the company began
earning more revenue. (Id., ¶ 2.) Plaintiff worked to build every aspect
of CLI’s business and was critical to the company’s growth and success. (Id.,
¶ 3.) However, Martin and Scott were allegedly secretly depriving Plaintiff of
his payouts and resisted Plaintiff’s requests for information and transparency.
(Id., ¶¶ 5-6.) Plaintiff was allegedly ousted after he continued
demanding to be included in the company’s decision-making. (Id., ¶ 7.)
Thereafter, Martin and Scott sold CLI to Curative Inc. for millions of dollars,
which Plaintiff alleges he is entitled to. (Id., ¶ 8.) CLI is currently
a successful leader in the COVID testing business, allegedly on the back of
Plaintiff’s efforts. (Id., ¶ 11.) Martin and Scott continue to deny
Plaintiff’s interest in CLI and have refused to pay Plaintiff his alleged share
of profits. (Id., ¶ 12.)
On September 29, 2023, Martin and
Scott filed the instant demurrer to the complaint. Plaintiff filed his opposition
on October 19, 2023. Defendants filed their reply on October 25, 2023.
LEGAL STANDARD
A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether
the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering
demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water
and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer
proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper
judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) A demurrer tests
the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153
Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the
face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Ibid.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the
complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of
action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th
at 747.) A complaint will survive demurrer if it sufficiently apprises the
defendant of the issues, and specificity is not required where discovery will
clarify the ambiguities. (See Ludgate Ins. Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.
(2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 592, 608.) All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor
of the complaint. (Kruss v. Booth (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 699, 713.)
MEET AND CONFER
Before filing a demurrer or a motion to strike,
the demurring or moving party is required to meet and confer with the party who
filed the pleading demurred to or the pleading that is subject to the motion to
strike for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be reached
through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the objections to be
raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41, 435.5.) The Court notes
that Defendants have complied with the meet and confer requirement. (See Ruocco
Decl.)
DISCUSSION
A demurrer lies where “[t]here is
another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 430.10(c).) “In such a case, the defendant must show that the
parties, cause of action, and issues are identical, and the same evidence would
support the judgment in each case.” (California Union Ins. Co. v. Trinity
River Land Co. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 104, 108.) “The identity of two causes
of action is determined by a comparison of the facts alleged which show the
nature of the invasion of plaintiff's primary right.” (Bush v. Superior
Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1374, 1384.)
On December 15, 2020, Plaintiff
filed an action in federal court titled Anton Toutov v. Curative Labs Inc.,
et al. (Case No. 2:20-cv-11284). (Def.’s RJN, Ex. 1.) The federal action asserted
(1) violation of California Corporations Code section 1600 et seq., (2)
breach of fiduciary duty, (3) accounting, and (4) breach of contract. (Ibid.)
Martin and Scott are listed as defendants under the fiduciary duty and
accounting claims. The federal action alleged the same facts as the instant
action, i.e., Defendants refused to acknowledge Plaintiff’s interest in
CLI and withheld his proper share of revenues. (Ibid.)
Defendants argue that Plaintiff
cannot maintain this action in light of the federal action. Defendants contend
that both lawsuits arise from the same primary right because Plaintiff asserts
the same injury based on the same alleged wrongdoing. Defendants point out that
asserting different legal theories and seeking a different form of damages in
this action does not change the identity of the primary right involved. (See Plotnik
v. Meihaus (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1590, 1612 [“Even where there are
multiple legal theories upon which recovery might be predicated, one injury
gives rise to only one claim for relief”].)
Plaintiff argues that the causes of action
are not identical because the breach of fiduciary duty asserted in the federal
action concerned the primary right “to be free of unfair, unjust, or
inequitable conduct in the running of the corporation, including with respect
to recognition of Dr. Toutov’s equity.” (Opp. 10:26-28.) By contrast, according
to Plaintiff, the two causes of action asserted here concern the primary right “to
be free from criminal theft, including fraud by false or fraudulent
representation or pretense.” (Opp. 11:14-15.)
However, “the primary right is
simply the plaintiff's right to be free from the particular injury suffered.” (Plotnik,
supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 1612.) Here, the particular injury suffered is
the deprivation of Plaintiff’s interest in CLI and the corresponding share of
revenue. Whether this constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty (as asserted in
the federal complaint), or theft (as asserted in this complaint), is merely a
distinction in “the legal theory on which liability for that
injury is premised.” (Ibid; see also Slater v. Blackwood (1975)
15 Cal.3d 791, 794-95 [holding that plaintiff’s first action based on statute
invoked the same primary right as second action based on common law].) Although
Penal Code section 496 provides for treble damages which are unavailable in
common law breach of fiduciary duty claims, “the relief is no part of the cause
of action.” (Branson v. Sun-Diamond Growers (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 327,
341.) A plaintiff seeking redress for one injury has one cause of action “no
matter how many forms or kinds of relief he may claim that he is entitled to.” (Ibid.)
“Multiple remedies may be available to vindicate a single primary right.” (Anderson
v. Ford Motor Co. (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 946, 969.)
In denying Plaintiff’s motion to amend the
federal complaint to add the Penal Code section 496 claim, the district court
acknowledged that the new claim was merely “a new legal theory based on the
existing allegations.” (Def.’s RJN, Ex. 3 at 4:6-10.) Asserting the claim in a
different forum, as Plaintiff does now, does not change this. The Penal Code
and conversion claims in this complaint are merely different legal theories
based on the same harm asserted in the federal complaint. Plaintiff does not
dispute Defendants’ analysis of the identical operative facts alleged in the
two complaints. (See Dem. 3:15-5:12.) Therefore, “[t]here is another action
pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 430.10(c).)
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s demurrer is SUSTAINED
without leave to amend.