Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 23STCV06861, Date: 2023-09-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV06861    Hearing Date: September 18, 2023    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            On March 29, 2023, Plaintiff Margarita Isais de Rodriguez initiated this action against Defendants Utopia Management, Inc. and Rochelle Kiner. The operative First Amended Complaint was filed on July 17, 2023. The FAC asserts causes of action for: (1) negligence; (2) breach of the warranty of habitability; (3) breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment; (4) private nuisance; (5) unfair business practices; (6) conversion; and (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

            Beginning in March 2019, Plaintiff was a tenant in the Subject Property owned and managed by Defendants. (FAC ¶¶ 10-11.) Plaintiff alleges that during her tenancy, she was subject to multiple substandard and dangerous conditions, including faulty carbon monoxide detectors, faulty water heater, defective windows, broken garbage disposal, defective ceiling fans, peeling walls, leaky faucets, loose tiles, malfunctioning cabinets, rusty dish washer, and faulty electrical outlets. (Id., ¶ 12.) Plaintiff allegedly provided notice of these conditions through a move-in inspection report, formal written complaints, and repair requests. (Id., ¶¶ 13-16.) Defendants allegedly ignored Plaintiff’s complaints or promised to repair the defects but failed to follow through. (Id., ¶¶ 14, 19.)

            Around September 2020, Plaintiff requested that Defendants hire an electrician after multiple power outages. (FAC ¶ 20.) Defendants initially refused and then hired an unqualified electrician to install new electrical equipment. (Ibid.) This resulted in an electrical fire in November 2020 that destroyed the premises and Plaintiff’s personal belongings. (Id., ¶ 21.) Plaintiff attributes the fire to Defendants’ failure to timely respond to Plaintiff’s repair requests and Defendants’ hiring of an unqualified electrician. (Id., ¶ 22.)

            On August 16, 2023, Defendants filed separate but identical demurrers and motions to strike. Plaintiff filed her opposition on August 5, 2023. Defendants filed their reply on September 11, 2023.  

LEGAL STANDARD

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Ibid.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part of that pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b).) The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike (1) any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading and (2) all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id., § 437.)

MEET AND CONFER

Before filing a demurrer or a motion to strike, the demurring or moving party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to or the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41, 435.5.) The Court notes that Defendants have complied with the meet and confer requirement. (See Vasandani Decl.)

DISCUSSION

I. Demurrer

            a. Negligence

            Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim for lost wages and earning capacity, as pled in the first cause of action, is time-barred. An action for personal injury is subject to a two-year limitations period. (Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1.) However, “[a]n action for trespass upon or injury to real property” and “[a]n action for taking, detaining, or injuring goods or chattels” is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. (Id., § 338(b), (c)(1).) Plaintiff does not allege that she lost income because she was physically injured in the fire, but because the premises burned down and her personal belongings were destroyed. (See FAC ¶¶ 21, 22, 29.) In other words, the claim for lost wages is premised on “injury to real property” and “injuring goods or chattels,” which is timely under the three-year statute of limitations. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 338(b), (c)(1).)  

            Defendants themselves acknowledge that the statute of limitations issue only applies “to the extent that the loss of earning capacity/loss of wages is rooted in plaintiff’s personal injury claims arising from the fire incident.” (Reply 3:12-15.) This impliedly concedes that there is no statute of limitations issue with Plaintiff’s lost wages claim to the extent it is based on property damage. (See also Dem. 11:1-2 [“To the extent that plaintiff is claiming property damage as a result of the incident Defendant does not object to the same”].)

To the extent Defendants are suggesting that any lost wages constitute personal injury as a matter of law, this contention is not well-taken. Defendants cite no authority for such a proposition. In fact, Defendants acknowledge in their own motion to strike that “the nature of the right sued upon and not the form of action nor the relief demanded determines the applicability of the statute of limitations.” (Mtn. 6:11-13.) Therefore, if the gravamen of the claim is damage to property, the three-year statute of limitations applies even if the relief demanded is compensation for lost wages. Such is the case here.

“An injury is personal when it impairs the well-being or the mental or physical health of the victim.” (McKinney v. California Portland Cement Co. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1231.) Defendants cite to distinguishable cases where lost income stemmed from personal injury. (See McKinney, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1218 [wrongful death from asbestos]; Bonneau v. North S. R. Co. (1907) 152 Cal. 406, 408 [disabled as a result of train derailment]; Connolly v. Pre-Mixed Concrete Co. (1957) 49 Cal.2d 483 [leg injury leaves plaintiff unable to earn winnings in tennis tournament].) By contrast, Plaintiff here claims lost wages from the destruction of the premises and her personal belongings, which are property claims.

 Defendants argue that “[d]amages incurred by plaintiff due to hardships arising from the fire incident, are an element of general damages and are not property damage.” (Reply 3:1-2.) First, loss of income is considered special damages, not general damages. (See Beeman v. Burling (1990) 216 Cal.App.3d 1586, 1599.) Furthermore, the cited case law does not suggest that general damages and property damage are mutually exclusive. Defendants insist that Plaintiff is alleging lost wages from personal injury, but Defendants cannot define Plaintiff’s claim for her. Plaintiff alleges that she lost income because the premises and her personal belongings were destroyed. (FAC ¶¶ 21, 22, 29.) These are property claims. Plaintiff does not allege, for example, that she was unable to work due to smoke inhalation or burns. Defendants’ authority does not change the conclusion that if Plaintiff’s lost wages stem from the destruction of property, the claim would fall under the three-year statute of limitations for property claims. Interpreting the complaint in Plaintiff’s favor, it may be reasonably inferred that Plaintiff’s lost wages claim stems from destruction of property rather than personal injury and is therefore not time-barred.    

In conclusion, Defendants have no authority suggesting that lost wages constitute personal injury in all cases. The FAC also does not reveal on its face that Plaintiff’s lost wages in this particular case necessarily stem from personal injury. Because the allegations in the FAC support a reasonable inference that the claim stems from property damage, the claim is not time-barred. The demurrer is OVERRULED as to Plaintiff’s claim for lost wages.  

b. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

On the other hand, emotional distress is a personal injury subject to the two-year statute of limitations. As discussed above, “[a]n injury is personal when it impairs the well-being or the mental or physical health of the victim.” (McKinney, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1231.) Plaintiff’s IIED claim seeks compensation for impairment to her mental health and is therefore a personal injury claim. “Causes of action for assault, battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress are governed by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1.” (Pugliese v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1450.)

Therefore, the demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend as to the seventh cause of action.

II. Motion to Strike

            a. Loss of Income

            As discussed above, Plaintiff has properly pled loss of income to the extent that it is based on property damage. Therefore, the motion to strike is DENIED as to loss of income.

            b. Emotional and Physical Distress

            As discussed above, Plaintiff cannot recover for personal injuries due to the statute of limitations. Therefore, the motion to strike is GRANTED as to allegations of emotional and physical distress.

c. Punitive Damages

            “In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Id., subd. (c)(1).) “‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Id., subd. (c)(2).) Fraud is “intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Id., subd. (c)(3).)

            Here, Plaintiff has adequately pled malicious conduct by alleging that Defendants knew about the dangerous conditions but refused to address them. Defendants’ alleged failures ultimately led to a fire that destroyed Plaintiff’s home and personal possessions. For pleading purposes, this supports a reasonable inference that Defendants acted in conscious disregard for Plaintiff’s rights and safety. Therefore, the motion to strike is DENIED as to punitive damages.

CONCLUSION

            Defendants’ demurrers are SUSTAINED in part as set forth above without leave to amend. The motions to strike are GRANTED in part as set forth above without leave to amend.