Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 23STCV08389, Date: 2024-02-26 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV08389 Hearing Date: April 3, 2024 Dept: 32
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ADOLFO JAIR SANTANA, et
al., Plaintiffs, v. VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC., Defendant.
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Case No.: 23STCV08389 Hearing Date: April 3, 2024 [TENTATIVE]
order RE: plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file
first amended complaint |
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BACKGROUND
On April 17, 2023, Plaintiffs Adolfo
Jair Santana and Lenin Toscano Santana filed this action against Defendant
Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., asserting three causes of action for
violation of the Song-Beverly Act.
On March 6, 2024, Plaintiffs filed
the instant motion for leave to file a first amended complaint. Defendant filed
its opposition on March 20, 2024. Plaintiffs filed their reply on March 26,
2024.
LEGAL STANDARD
The court may, in furtherance of justice,
and on such terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading. (Code
Civ. Proc, §§ 473, subd. (a), 576.) Courts must apply a policy of liberality in
permitting amendments at any stage of the proceeding, including during trial,
when no prejudice to the opposing party is shown. (Duchrow v. Forrest
(2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1377.) In determining the extent of prejudice to
the opposing party, the court must consider various factors, such as whether
the amendment would delay trial or increase the discovery burden. (Demetriades
v. Yelp, Inc. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 294, 306.)
A motion for leave to amend a complaint
must be accompanied by a declaration that explains: (1) the effect of the
amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts
giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) the reasons why
the request for amendment was not made earlier. (Cal. Rules of Ct., Rule
3.1324(b).)
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs seek to add causes of action
for violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and California Commercial Code.
The new causes of action arise from the same nucleus of facts. Plaintiffs set
forth the effect of the amendment (Brim Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. B), and explain that the
amendment was not proposed earlier because Plaintiffs only realized the
viability of the new claims after reviewing Defendant’s defenses and
information produced in discovery (id., ¶ 9). Plaintiffs aver that the
amendment is necessary and proper to allow recovery of all damages within a
single lawsuit and to avoid forfeiture. (Id., ¶ 10.)
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’
motion fails to comply with Rule 3.1324(b) because Plaintiffs offer no reason
for the delay in filing the amendment. Specifically, Defendant points out that
it last updated its document production on December 5, 2023, and Plaintiffs
filed a motion for summary adjudication against Defendant’s affirmative
defenses on January 30, 2024. According to Defendant, this means that
Plaintiffs were aware of the pertinent facts long before they filed this
motion. The Court does not find the period between December 5, 2023 and March
6, 2024 to be a significant delay causing prejudice. Plaintiff’s counsel
clarifies in reply that he substituted in recently during the latter half of
February 2024 and realized that the new claims were necessary upon reviewing
the casefile. (Brim Reply Decl. ¶¶ 5, 8.) Plaintiff’s counsel avers that the
failure to amend the complaint earlier was due to mistake or inadvertence. (Id.,
¶ 8.) The Court finds that Plaintiff has substantially complied with Rule 3.1324(b).
Defendant next argues that the
proposed Magnuson-Moss claim necessarily fails because the Song-Beverly claims
fail. (See Daugherty
v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 833 [“failure
to state a warranty claim under state law necessarily constituted a failure to
state a claim under Magnuson-Moss”].) However, the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims
are not at issue in this motion. The validity of the Song-Beverly claims has
not been adjudicated. In fact, Defendant has a pending summary judgment motion
related to those claims that has yet to be heard. This motion is not the place
to address those arguments.
Defendants also argue that
Plaintiffs failed to participate in Defendant’s informal resolution process
prior to filing their Magnuson-Moss claim. (See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a) [“one or
more warrantors may establish an informal dispute settlement procedure which
meets the requirements of the Commission’s rules,” and “the consumer may not
commence a civil action . . . unless he initially resorts to such procedure”].)
This again goes to the merits of the claim. It has not been determined, and
cannot be determined on this motion, that Defendant’s dispute process satisfies
the Commission’s rules or that Plaintiffs failed to participate in the process.
Lastly, Defendant argues that the
Commercial Code claim fails because Defendant is not a seller and did not issue
any covered warranties. Again, this is an issue on the merits that cannot be
adjudicated in this motion.
Defendant’s opposition makes no
mention of prejudice, which is the primary factor in denying leave to amend.
(See Duchrow, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1377 [amendments are
liberally granted absent prejudice to the opposing party].) It remains
undisputed that the proposed claims arise from the same facts, are made
sufficiently ahead of trial, and will not significantly increase the discovery
burden. Therefore, leave to amend is warranted.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file
first amended complaint is GRANTED.