Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 23STCV08389, Date: 2024-02-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV08389    Hearing Date: April 3, 2024    Dept: 32

 

ADOLFO JAIR SANTANA, et al.,

                        Plaintiffs,

            v.

 

VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC.,

                        Defendant.

 

  Case No.:  23STCV08389

  Hearing Date:  April 3, 2024

 

     [TENTATIVE] order RE:

plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file first amended complaint

 

 

BACKGROUND

            On April 17, 2023, Plaintiffs Adolfo Jair Santana and Lenin Toscano Santana filed this action against Defendant Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., asserting three causes of action for violation of the Song-Beverly Act.

            On March 6, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for leave to file a first amended complaint. Defendant filed its opposition on March 20, 2024. Plaintiffs filed their reply on March 26, 2024.

LEGAL STANDARD

The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on such terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc, §§ 473, subd. (a), 576.) Courts must apply a policy of liberality in permitting amendments at any stage of the proceeding, including during trial, when no prejudice to the opposing party is shown. (Duchrow v. Forrest (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1377.) In determining the extent of prejudice to the opposing party, the court must consider various factors, such as whether the amendment would delay trial or increase the discovery burden. (Demetriades v. Yelp, Inc. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 294, 306.)

A motion for leave to amend a complaint must be accompanied by a declaration that explains: (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) the reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier. (Cal. Rules of Ct., Rule 3.1324(b).)

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs seek to add causes of action for violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and California Commercial Code. The new causes of action arise from the same nucleus of facts. Plaintiffs set forth the effect of the amendment (Brim Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. B), and explain that the amendment was not proposed earlier because Plaintiffs only realized the viability of the new claims after reviewing Defendant’s defenses and information produced in discovery (id., ¶ 9). Plaintiffs aver that the amendment is necessary and proper to allow recovery of all damages within a single lawsuit and to avoid forfeiture. (Id., ¶ 10.)

            Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ motion fails to comply with Rule 3.1324(b) because Plaintiffs offer no reason for the delay in filing the amendment. Specifically, Defendant points out that it last updated its document production on December 5, 2023, and Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary adjudication against Defendant’s affirmative defenses on January 30, 2024. According to Defendant, this means that Plaintiffs were aware of the pertinent facts long before they filed this motion. The Court does not find the period between December 5, 2023 and March 6, 2024 to be a significant delay causing prejudice. Plaintiff’s counsel clarifies in reply that he substituted in recently during the latter half of February 2024 and realized that the new claims were necessary upon reviewing the casefile. (Brim Reply Decl. ¶¶ 5, 8.) Plaintiff’s counsel avers that the failure to amend the complaint earlier was due to mistake or inadvertence. (Id., ¶ 8.) The Court finds that Plaintiff has substantially complied with Rule 3.1324(b).

            Defendant next argues that the proposed Magnuson-Moss claim necessarily fails because the Song-Beverly claims fail. (See Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 833 [“failure to state a warranty claim under state law necessarily constituted a failure to state a claim under Magnuson-Moss”].) However, the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims are not at issue in this motion. The validity of the Song-Beverly claims has not been adjudicated. In fact, Defendant has a pending summary judgment motion related to those claims that has yet to be heard. This motion is not the place to address those arguments.  

            Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs failed to participate in Defendant’s informal resolution process prior to filing their Magnuson-Moss claim. (See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a) [“one or more warrantors may establish an informal dispute settlement procedure which meets the requirements of the Commission’s rules,” and “the consumer may not commence a civil action . . . unless he initially resorts to such procedure”].) This again goes to the merits of the claim. It has not been determined, and cannot be determined on this motion, that Defendant’s dispute process satisfies the Commission’s rules or that Plaintiffs failed to participate in the process.

            Lastly, Defendant argues that the Commercial Code claim fails because Defendant is not a seller and did not issue any covered warranties. Again, this is an issue on the merits that cannot be adjudicated in this motion.

            Defendant’s opposition makes no mention of prejudice, which is the primary factor in denying leave to amend. (See Duchrow, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1377 [amendments are liberally granted absent prejudice to the opposing party].) It remains undisputed that the proposed claims arise from the same facts, are made sufficiently ahead of trial, and will not significantly increase the discovery burden. Therefore, leave to amend is warranted.

CONCLUSION

            Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file first amended complaint is GRANTED.