Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 23STCV11529, Date: 2025-04-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV11529    Hearing Date: April 14, 2025    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            On May 22, 2023, Plaintiff Maria del Socorro Ramirez filed this action against Defendants Elizabeth Cristina Ramirez Camacho (Christie) and Davian Camacho (Davian). Plaintiff is the mother of Christie and mother-in-law of Davian. The action concerns real property located in Los Angeles.

            Plaintiff alleges that she is the owner of the home. Plaintiff is an 84-year-old widower with multiple health issues and only speaks Spanish. In early 2022, Defendants allegedly proposed that in exchange for Plaintiff selling the property to Defendants, Defendants would assist in renovating the property and care for Plaintiff for the remainder of her life. Defendants’ alleged true motive was to flip the house for profit and place Plaintiff in an elderly home. Defendants allegedly induced Plaintiff into an agreement to sell the property but did not pay Plaintiff the amounts owed to her. After Defendants acquired title and renovated the property, they worked to remove Plaintiff from the property and then put it up for sale. Plaintiff does not currently live at the property. Plaintiff filed this action to quiet title to the property and recover damages from Defendants’ alleged wrongdoing.

            On January 2, 2025, Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment or adjudication in the alternative. Plaintiff filed her opposition on March 25, 2025. Defendants filed their reply on April 3, 2025.

LEGAL STANDARD

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

Plaintiff’s Objections

• Plaintiff’s objections are overruled.

Defendants’ Objections

• Objection Nos. 1-10, 13-14, 19-23, 32 are overruled. The remaining objections are not pertinent to the Court’s ruling. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(q).)
• Objection Nos. 67-136 are improperly stated because they object to Plaintiff’s separate statement rather than actual items of evidence. The objections fail to quote or set forth the objectionable material. (See Cal. Rules of Ct., Rule 3.1354(b)(3).) The Court does not consider these objections.

DISCUSSION

I. Elder Abuse

            a. Statutory Framework

Elder abuse is defined as any of the following: (1) physical abuse, neglect, abandonment, isolation, abduction, or other treatment with resulting physical harm or pain or mental suffering; (2) the deprivation by a care custodian of goods or services that are necessary to avoid physical harm or mental suffering; or (3) financial abuse. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.07(a).)

            “‘Abandonment’ means the desertion or willful forsaking of an elder or a dependent adult by anyone having care or custody of that person under circumstances in which a reasonable person would continue to provide care and custody.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.05.) Financial abuse occurs if any person “[t]akes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains real or personal property of an elder or dependent adult for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud,” or does so through “undue influence.” (Id., § 15610.30(a).) “‘Undue influence’ means excessive persuasion that causes another person to act or refrain from acting by overcoming that person’s free will and results in inequity.” (Id., § 15610.70(a).)

            b. Undue Influence

            Defendants argue that the elder abuse claims fail because Plaintiff’s written discovery responses revealed no facts showing Defendants promised to care for her in exchange for selling the subject property to them. (Def.’s Stmt. of Undisputed Facts (UF) 12-14.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff acknowledged signing the sale agreement and understood what it was. (UF 3-7.) The agreement contained no terms regarding the caretaking of Plaintiff. (UF 11.) Plaintiff received $356,761.88 from the sale. (UF 86.)

            However, these facts do not foreclose a triable issue that Plaintiff was induced into the sale agreement through undue influence. Whether undue influence exists depends on various factors: (1) the vulnerability of the victim; (2) the influencer’s apparent authority; (3) the actions or tactics used by the influencer; and (4) the equity of the result. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.70(a).) This is an inherently factual inquiry.

            Here, Plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient to raise a triable issue. Plaintiff is 84-years-old with various medical issues, including vision and hearing problems. (Plntf.’s Stmt. of Add’l Facts (AF) 386-387.) Plaintiff also does not understand English. (AF 378.) Plaintiff only signed an English version of the sale agreement and does not recall ever receiving a Spanish translation. (AF 379-380.) Plaintiff relied on her daughter, Christie, without whom she “couldn’t do anything.” (AF 388.) Christie described the proposed sale as follows: “It’s like us moving back into the house;” “You won’t be alone anymore;” and “Your grandchildren will come and visit you.” (AF 389.) Plaintiff believed this was a good idea because she did not want to be alone. (AF 390.)

            The transaction also included a purported gift of equity from Plaintiff in the amount of $155,000. (UF 10.) However, Plaintiff did not know how much the property was appraised for, and Plaintiff’s fraud expert avers that the inflation in equity is indicative of mortgage fraud. (Buttar Decl., Ex. 12 at 73:15-18; Novy Decl. ¶¶ 21-22.) The gift letters were in English, and Plaintiff did not receive any Spanish translation. (Buttar Decl. Ex. 11 at 77:1-25.) Moreover, the closing costs were significantly higher than expected for an ordinary transaction. (Novy Decl. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff was not aware that she would be responsible for paying closing costs. (Buttar Decl., Ex. 13 at 48:6-20.)

            Defendants argue that Plaintiff is precluded from relying on a theory of undue influence because Plaintiff made “fatal admissions” in discovery that she had no evidence to support her elder abuse claims. However, Plaintiff’s discovery responses did not admit that she had no evidence of elder abuse. (See UF 12-14.) Nor did the responses make admissions negating the facts discussed above. Even if Plaintiff’s written discovery responses lacked factual detail, that does not preclude Plaintiff from relying on other evidence obtained in discovery to support her position. 

            Taken together and interpreted in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the evidence raises a triable issue that Defendants exploited Plaintiff’s age, disability, lack of English proficiency, and trust in order to induce Plaintiff into selling the subject property. The evidence further supports a reasonable inference that Defendants wrongfully took Plaintiff’s money through the imposition of excessive costs and “gifts” of which Plaintiff was unaware. A reasonable trier of fact may find that this constitutes financial elder abuse through undue influence. Therefore, summary adjudication is unwarranted on the financial elder abuse claims. 

            c. Abandonment

            Defendants deny ever making a promise to care for Plaintiff for the remainder of her life. (E. Camacho Decl. ¶ 37-38; D. Camacho Decl. ¶ 54.) The sale agreement contained no terms about caretaking. (UF 11.) However, as discussed herein, there is a triable issue over whether Defendants made a promise to care for Plaintiff. Furthermore, abandonment does not depend on an agreement or promise. Rather, it depends on the “circumstances in which a reasonable person would continue to provide care and custody.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.05.) Thus, Defendants’ argument that there was no specific promise to care for Plaintiff, even if true, would not negate a triable issue over the abandonment claim.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff is limited to relying on the purported agreement because the complaint alleges abandonment based solely on an agreement to caretake. The Court disagrees. The complaint alleges an independent cause of action for abandonment specifically under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.05. (Compl. at 7:20-22.) Under that statute, abandonment has a distinct definition which does not require an agreement. Defendants were properly put on notice of the claim, and Plaintiff’s theory is in line with the pleadings.   

The complaint alleges not only that Defendants made an agreement, but that “Defendants knew that Plaintiff was unable to provide for her basic needs.” (Compl. ¶ 52.) The complaint further alleges that “Defendants ceased in providing necessary and promised care for Plaintiff knowing that without said necessary and promised care, and as a proximate cause, Plaintiff would be injured.” (Id., ¶ 53.) Defendants have not negated a triable issue over their responsibility for Plaintiff’s care under the statutory standard. Therefore, summary adjudication is unwarranted on the abandonment claim.

II. Fraud

a. Misrepresentation and Promissory Fraud

“The elements of fraud that will give rise to a tort action for deceit are: ‘(a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.’” (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 974, quoting Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.)

Here, the fraud claims are premised on the allegation that Defendants promised to care for Plaintiff for the remainder of her life in exchange for Plaintiff selling the property. (Compl. ¶¶ 67-68, 90-91.) Defendants deny ever making such a promise. (E. Camacho Decl. ¶ 37-38; D. Camacho Decl. ¶ 56.) Defendants argue that because there is no evidence of a misrepresentation or promise, the fraud claims fail.  

However, Plaintiff’s other daughter, Martha Ramirez, testified that she personally witnessed Christie representing to Plaintiff in person that “If you sell me the house, you can live here till the end,” and “We move in, you’re here, Celia will take care of you from the morning whenever she leaves. When I come home from work, I will be taking care of you.” (Buttar Decl., Ex. 14 at 23:22-24:3.) According to Martha, Christie said, “It’s like us moving back into the house.” (Id. at 24:4-5.) A reasonable trier of fact may interpret this as a promise to care for Plaintiff for the remainder of her life. Defendants have not precluded a triable issue over the meaning and veracity of these representations. Thus, summary adjudication is unwarranted on the fraud and promissory fraud claims.    

b. Fraudulent Concealment

The fraudulent concealment claim is based, in part, on Defendants’ alleged hidden intent to “flip” the property for profit. (Compl. ¶ 108.) Plaintiff alleges that if she had known of this intent, she would not have agreed to sell the property to Defendants. (Id., ¶ 110.)

Defendants argue that there is no evidence they intended to flip the property, because the home was appraised at $775,000 during escrow and appraised at $810,000 after Defendants spent $174,448 in renovations. (UF 123-129.) According to Defendants, the fact that the property’s value only increased by $35,000 after they spent $174,448 in renovations proves they did not intend to flip the property. However, Plaintiff’s evidence shows that in May 2023, Defendants listed the home for $1.5 million and $1.1 million. (AF 419-420.) This suggests that Defendants did in fact intend to flip the property, thus raising a triable issue. Therefore, summary adjudication is unwarranted on the fraudulent concealment claim.  

III. Breach of Contract

            To establish breach of contract, a plaintiff must show: (1) the contract existed, (2) the plaintiff’s performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damage to the plaintiff. (Richman v. Hartley (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186.)

            Here, the contract claim is based on the following allegation: “Defendants proposed that in exchange for Plaintiff selling the Property to Defendants, Defendants would assist in renovating the Property as well as caretake Plaintiff until the day of her passing.” (Compl. ¶ 114.)

Defendants argue that there is no evidence of an agreement to caretake Plaintiff. As discussed above, there is evidence of Defendants agreeing to caretake Plaintiff in exchange for Plaintiff selling them the property. This creates a triable issue on the breach of contract claim.

Defendants argue that the purported renovation agreement fails because the complaint itself admits that “[a]t all times after Defendants acquired title until around the time when Defendants moved out, Defendants began renovating the Property while Plaintiff was still living in the home.” (Compl. ¶ 119.) This is not a contradictory allegation and does not negate the possibility that Defendants breached an obligation to assist in renovating the home. Therefore, summary adjudication is unwarranted on the breach of contract claim.    

IV. Statute of Frauds

            Certain contracts, including “[a]n agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property, or of an interest therein,” are “invalid, unless they, or some note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party’s agent.” (Civ. Code, § 1624(a).)

            Defendants argue that the elder abuse, abandonment, and breach of contract claims are barred by the statute of frauds because the purported agreement to care for Plaintiff was not reduced to writing. However, an agreement to care for an elder is not an agreement concerning an interest in real property. Moreover, as discussed above, the elder abuse claims are based on Plaintiff being induced into the sale contract through undue influence and being abandoned by Defendants. These theories do not require a written contract to care for Plaintiff.

            Lastly, the statute of frauds does not apply where there is partial performance or reliance. (See Secrest v. Security National Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-2 (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 544, 555; Garcia v. World Savings, FSB (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1040, fn. 10.) There is a triable issue over whether Plaintiff sold the property to Defendants in reliance on Defendants’ representations of caretaking. Therefore, the claims are not barred by the statute of frauds.           

V. Conversion

            The elements of conversion are: (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of the personal property; (2) the defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (3) damages. (Welco Electronics, Inc. v. Mora (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 202, 208.)

It is undisputed that Plaintiff and her son were observed retrieving Plaintiff’s personal belongings from the property. (UF 215.) It is further undisputed that Defendants have not taken, sold, or otherwise disposed of any personal items left behind by Plaintiff when she moved out of the property. (UF 216-217.) This demonstrates as a matter of law that Defendants did not commit conversion.         

Plaintiff argues, “It is unclear whether valuable property, including two beds, two nightstands, freezer, washer and dryer, and a refrigerator, were sold or thrown out.” (Opp. 16:11-13.) Plaintiff argues, “If Plaintiff's property was sold, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff had seen the proceeds from the sale.” (Opp. 14-15.) This is speculation and not evidence that Defendants actually committed conversion of any personal property. (See Sangster, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 166 [plaintiff must produce “substantial responsive evidence” to survive summary judgment].)  

Again, Plaintiff’s response to UF 216 and 217 is “Undisputed.” If it is undisputed that Defendants did not take, sell, or otherwise dispose of any personal items left behind by Plaintiff, then Defendants did not commit conversion as a matter of law. Therefore, summary adjudication is warranted as to the conversion claim.   

VI. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress    

            To state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must establish: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. (Vasquez v. Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 819, 832.) “For conduct to be outrageous, it must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated by a civilized community.” (Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 172.) 

            Defendants argue that their conduct could not have been outrageous because they engaged in nothing more than a “garden variety” real estate transaction. However, the facts discussed above demonstrate that this was not a garden variety real estate transaction, and there is a triable issue that Defendants defrauded Plaintiff or unduly influenced her into selling the home. A reasonable trier of fact may find this to be outrageous conduct. Therefore, summary adjudication is unwarranted as to the IIED claim.  

VII. Quiet Title, Slander of Title, and Declaratory Relief

            Defendants incorporate their earlier arguments to argue that the quiet title, slander of title, and declaratory relief claims fail. (Mtn. 24:12-28.) Namely, Defendants argue that there was no promise to care for Plaintiff and that they only engaged in a garden variety real estate transaction. (Ibid.) Because the Court rejects these arguments, the quiet title, slander of title, and declaratory relief claims cannot be summarily adjudicated.   

VIII. Impossibility and Frustration

            Lastly, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s false police reports of physical and financial abuse forced Defendants to move out of the home for their own wellbeing. (Mtn. 25:2-6.) Defendants argue that this creates a “complete defense” to the entire complaint, since Plaintiff’s actions rendered Defendants’ caretaking obligations “impossible and frustrated.” (Mtn. 25:6-12.) Defendants cite no authority in support of this argument.

            “A thing is impossible in legal contemplation when it is not practicable; and a thing is impracticable when it can only be done at an excessive and unreasonable cost.” (SVAP III Poway Crossings, LLC v. Fitness Internat., LLC (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 882, 893.) “The doctrine of frustration excuses contractual obligations where ‘[p]erformance remains entirely possible, but the whole value of the performance to one of the parties at least, and the basic reason recognized as such by both parties, for entering into the contract has been destroyed by a supervening and unforeseen event.’” (Id. at p. 895.) “[T]he doctrine of frustration depends on the total or nearly total destruction of the purpose.” (Ibid.)

            This is an inherently factual analysis, and Defendants do not make the showings required to demonstrate impossibility or frustration as a matter of law. Furthermore, while impossibility and frustration may excuse nonperformance of an obligation, they are not defenses to affirmative misconduct. Defendants cite no authority suggesting that impossibility or frustration can excuse fraud and undue influence. Therefore, summary adjudication is unwarranted.

CONCLUSION

            Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Defendants’ alternative motion for summary adjudication is GRANTED as to conversion and DENIED in all other respects.