Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 23STCV11618, Date: 2024-05-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV11618    Hearing Date: May 22, 2024    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            On May 23, 2023, Plaintiff Michael Boyd filed this action against Defendants Megan St. Clair, Peter Burra, HALO Behavioral Health, Inc., Brandon St. Clair, and Paul Meyers. Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint on November 15, 2023, asserting 14 causes of action arising from the following facts.

            Plaintiff alleges that he was engaged to Kathleen St. Clair (Kathleen) until her death in May 2022. Kathleen’s two children, Defendants Megan St. Clair (Megan) and Brandon St. Clair (Brandon), were allegedly hostile towards Kathleen and resentful of the relationship between Plaintiff and Kathleen. When Kathleen was hospitalized for a heart attack, Megan allegedly used a California Advanced Health Care Directive (CAHCD) to place Kathleen in hospice, exclude Plaintiff from visiting, and prohibit Kathleen’s healthcare providers from communicating with Plaintiff.

The complaint alleges that Megan and her husband, Defendant Bryan Burra (Burra), falsely accused Plaintiff of having a criminal record as a pretext to exclude him from Kathleen’s care. Megan and Burra allegedly embarked on a scheme to investigate Plaintiff and fabricate and disseminate false information on Plaintiff. This scheme allegedly involved resources and employees of their business, Defendant HALO Behavioral Health, Inc. (HALO). Megan allegedly filed for a temporary restraining order (TRO) against Plaintiff based on false information.

In November 2022, Plaintiff was hospitalized. Defendant Paul Meyers (Meyers), Kathleen’s brother, allegedly discovered this by calling the hospital and then informed Brandon. Brandon then allegedly took the opportunity to break into Plaintiff’s home, taking furniture and other property. Plaintiff alleges that Megan, Burra, and Meyers were either present at or assisted in the burglary and that Megan and Burra took possession of the stolen property. Plaintiff alleges that Megan and Burra burglarized his home again in January 2023.

On March 11, HALO filed a demurrer and motion to strike against the FAC. On April 9, 2024, Brandon, Burra, and Meyers filed separate demurrers and a joint motion to strike. Plaintiff has not filed an opposition.

LEGAL STANDARD

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Ibid.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part of that pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b).) The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike (1) any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading and (2) all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id., § 437.)

DISCUSSION

I. HALO’s Liability

            Plaintiff includes HALO as a defendant because Megan and Burra allegedly own or operate HALO. (FAC ¶ 5.) However, Plaintiff alleges no theory by which HALO could be liable for the other Defendants’ conduct. Therefore, the claims against HALO fail as a matter of law. The demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend as to the claims against HALO.   

II. Defamation and False Light

            The elements of a defamation claim are: (1) publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or cause special damage. (Wong v. Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1369.) False statements charging the commission of crime, or tending directly to injure a plaintiff in respect to his or her profession by imputing dishonesty or questionable professional conduct are defamatory per se. (Burrill v. Nair (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 357, 383.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants falsely accused him of making threats and committing crimes, and spread false rumors about him having a criminal record (See, e.g., FAC ¶¶ 35-37, 46, 104.) These alleged statements are sufficiently defamatory for pleading purposes.  

Defendants argue that the claim “may” be time-barred because most of the alleged statements occurred in May 2022, and Plaintiff filed this action on May 23, 2023. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 340(c) [one-year limitations period for defamation].) However, a statute of limitations defense must appear clearly on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the claim might be time-barred. (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1316.) Plaintiff alleges that the statements occurred in May 2022, and he filed the complaint in May 2023, which is potentially within one year. All reasonable inferences must be drawn in Plaintiff’s favor. Therefore, without specific dates, it must be assumed that the claim is timely.

            Defendants also argue that the statements made by Megan during the TRO proceeding are nonactionable under the litigation privilege. (See Civ. Code, § 47.) However, that does not address the remaining defamatory statements that were made outside of litigation, such as Burra’s proclamations in the hospital lobby, or spreading false rumors to Plaintiff’s neighbors and Burra’s associates. (See FAC ¶¶ 35-37, 46, 104.) The defamation claim survives because Plaintiff has alleged at least one actionable statement. Defendants cannot partially demur to a cause of action. 

            “When a false light claim is coupled with a defamation claim, the false light claim is essentially superfluous, and stands or falls on whether it meets the same requirements as the defamation cause of action.” (Jackson v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1264.) Because the defamation claim survives, so does the derivative false light claim. The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the first and ninth causes of action.

III. Trespass and Theft

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged ownership of the personal property that was taken or the property that was burglarized because he admits that most of the stolen property belonged to Kathleen and that he lived with Kathleen at a home owned by Kathleen. (FAC ¶¶ 20, 77.)

However, trespass to land requires “the plaintiff’s ownership or control of the property.” (Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Victory Consultants, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 245, 262.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants entered his “residence,” without specifying whether that residence is the home he shared with Kathleen or a separate residence. (FAC ¶ 77.) Even if it was the house that Kathleen owned, there is no indication from the face of the complaint that Plaintiff lacked control over the residence. For pleading purposes, it may be reasonably inferred that Plaintiff either owned or controlled the property that was broken into.

Furthermore, Plaintiff does allege that his personal property was taken, specifically several computer drives. (FAC ¶ 77.) This constitutes Plaintiff’s own property that is subject to conversion and trespass to chattel. Plaintiff alleges that Megan and Burra received the stolen property. (FAC ¶ 78.) Therefore, the FAC adequately pleads trespass, conversion, and theft. The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the third through sixth causes of action. 

IV. Invasion of Privacy

            The essential elements of an invasion of privacy cause of action are (1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by defendant constituting a serious invasion of privacy. (Folgelstrom v. Lamps Plus, Inc. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 986, 990.)

            Plaintiff alleges that Defendants broke into his residence, stole his computer drives containing personal data, exposed his hospitalization status, and surveilled him using electronic communication devices. (FAC ¶¶ 77, 230.) For pleading purposes, Plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his home, personal data, and medical information. Defendants’ alleged actions constitute an invasion of that privacy interest.

            Defendants argue that the reference to “electronic communication devices” is vague. However, that is not the only basis for the invasion of privacy claim, and the ambiguities may be clarified through discovery. Therefore, the invasion of privacy claim is adequately pled. The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the eighth cause of action.  

V. Vandalism

            A duplicative pleading may be properly stricken if it “adds nothing to the complaint by way of fact or theory.” (Award Metals, Inc. v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1128, 1135.) Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action for “vandalism” reiterates the allegations that Defendants entered his residence and stole his property. (FAC ¶¶ 219-220.) Plaintiff alleges that the vandalism “interfered with plaintiff's right to use and enjoy the property” and “involved the damaging and destroying of the property.” (FAC ¶¶ 224-225.) However, Plaintiff already asserts causes of action for trespass and conversion, all of which cover unlawful entry, destruction, or interference with property. Therefore, the vandalism claim adds nothing to the complaint by way of fact or theory. The demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend as to the seventh cause of action.

VI. Harassment

            Plaintiff’s tenth cause of action for “harassment” merely incorporates all prior allegations. Defendants’ alleged misconduct is already covered by the other causes of action in the complaint. Therefore, the harassment claim adds nothing by way of fact or theory and is stricken as duplicative. The demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend as to the tenth cause of action.   

VII. Stalking

            Civil Code section 1708.7(a) defines the tort of stalking. Defendants argue that constitutionally protected conduct cannot be considered stalking. However, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants broke into his residence, stole his personal data, surveilled him using electronic communication devices, and watched his vehicle and home. (FAC ¶¶ 68, 77, 230.) For pleading purposes, it may be reasonably inferred that this conduct was not constitutionally protected. The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the eleventh cause of action.

VIII. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

To state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must establish: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. (Vasquez v. Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 819, 832.) “For conduct to be outrageous, it must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated by a civilized community.” (Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 172.) “Severe emotional distress [is] emotional distress of such substantial quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to endure it.” (Fletcher v. Western Life Insurance Co. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 376, 397.)

While Defendants’ alleged conduct may be considered outrageous, Plaintiff fails to allege severe emotional distress. “[D]iscomfort, worry, anxiety, upset stomach, concern, and agitation” do not satisfy the severity standard. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1051.) Plaintiff makes generic allegations such as “humiliation, embarrassment, mental anguish, emotional distress and physical injury.” (See, e.g., FAC ¶ 138.) This does not sufficiently demonstrate severe emotional distress. Therefore, the demurrer is SUSTAINED with leave to amend as to the twelfth cause of action.

IX. Civil Conspiracy

            “The elements of an action for civil conspiracy are (1) formation and operation of the conspiracy and (2) damage resulting to plaintiff (3) from a wrongful act done in furtherance of the common design.” (Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1136.) When the complaint is read as a whole and interpreted liberally, it may be reasonably inferred that Defendants participated in a common plan with knowledge of the wrongful acts. Therefore, the FAC adequately pleads civil conspiracy.

For this reason, Defendants’ arguments that they did not directly engage in certain wrongful acts does not absolve them of liability at this stage. “The significance of a conspiracy theory of liability is that each member may be held jointly liable as a tortfeasor, even though he or she may not have participated directly in the underlying tort.” (Ibid.) The demurrer is OVERRULED as to civil conspiracy.

X. Punitive Damages

“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Id., subd. (c)(1).) “‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Id., subd. (c)(2).) Fraud is “intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Id., subd. (c)(3).)

The conduct discussed above is sufficiently despicable, cruel, or unjust for pleading purposes. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants acted out of personal resentment against Plaintiff due to his relationship with Kathleen. (FAC ¶ 21.) Therefore, it may be reasonably inferred that Defendants acted out of malice. The motion to strike is DENIED as to punitive damages. 

XI. Attorney’s Fees

“Except as attorney’s fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.) Therefore, a plaintiff must allege either a statutory or contractual basis for attorneys’ fees.

            “[A] pro se attorney litigant does not incur attorney's fees, because the attorney litigant is not liable to pay consideration for the legal representation.” (Argaman v. Ratan (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1173, 1179.) Plaintiff is a pro se litigant and therefore incurs no attorney’s fees. Therefore, the motion to strike is GRANTED as to attorney’s fees.

CONCLUSION

            HALO’s demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend. HALO’s motion to strike is moot.

            The demurrers filed by Brandon St. Clair, Peter Burra, and Paul Meyers are SUSTAINED in part as set forth above without leave to amend. The joint motion to strike is GRANTED in part as set forth above.  

            Brandon St. Clair, Peter Burra, and Paul Meyers shall file their answer to the first amended complaint within 20 days.