Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 23STCV15075, Date: 2023-11-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV15075 Hearing Date: November 13, 2023 Dept: 32
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KENDALL BLEVENS, Plaintiff, v. GREAT MAPLE, LLC, et
al., Defendants.
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Case No.: 23STCV15075 Hearing Date: November 13, 2023 [TENTATIVE]
order RE: defendants’ motion to compel arbitration
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BACKGROUND
On June 28, 2023, Plaintiff Kendall
Blevens filed this action asserting (1) wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy, (2) Labor Code retaliation, and (3) battery. Plaintiff alleges
that he was retaliated against and ultimately terminated after reporting a manager’s
inappropriate touching.
On October 17, 2023, Defendants
filed the instant motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff filed his opposition
on October 30, 2023. Defendants filed their reply on November 3, 2023.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) states
that “[a] written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.” (9 U.S.C. § 2.) The term “involving commerce” is interpreted to mean
simply “affecting commerce” to give the FAA the broadest reach possible, and
does not require a transaction that is actually “within the flow of interstate
commerce.” (See
Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson (1995) 513 U.S. 265, 273-74; Citizens
Bank v. Alafabco, Inc. (2003) 539 U.S. 52, 56.) Moreover, parties may agree
to apply the FAA notwithstanding any effect on interstate commerce. (Victrola
89, LLC v. Jaman Properties 8 LLC (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 355.)
“On petition of a party to an arbitration
agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy
and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the
court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the
controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists….”
(Code Civ. Proc, § 1281.2.) “The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of
proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration
bears the burden of proving any defense, such as unconscionability.” (Pinnacle
Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55
Cal.4th 223, 236.)
DISCUSSION
I.
Existence of a Valid Agreement
“The moving party ‘can meet its initial
burden by attaching to the motion or petition a copy of the arbitration
agreement purporting to bear the opposing party's signature.’” (Gamboa v.
Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165, quoting Bannister
v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 543-44.)
Plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement
on December 19, 2022 upon the start of his employment. (Def.’s Ex. A.)
Plaintiff does not dispute the existence of the arbitration agreement, its
contents, or the fact that he signed it. Nor does Plaintiff dispute Defendants’
equitable estoppel argument with regards to the defendants that are not
signatories to the agreement. (See Mtn. 14:19-16:13.) Therefore, the Court finds
that Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate the claims at issue and that the agreement
is enforceable by all moving defendants.
II.
The FAA and Labor Code Section 432.6
Plaintiff’s opposition is limited to
arguing that Labor Code section 432.6 bars enforcement of the agreement. Section
432.6 prohibits an employer from requiring an employee to arbitrate FEHA or
Labor Code claims as a condition of employment. However, “[n]othing in this
section is intended to invalidate a written arbitration agreement that is
otherwise enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act.” (Id., subd.
(f).) Section 432.6 is preempted by the FAA. (Chamber of Commerce of the
United States v. Bonta (9th Cir. 2023) 62 F.4th 473.)
Plaintiff argues that the FAA does
not apply because Defendants have not proven that Plaintiff’s employment
implicated interstate commerce. “But the presence of interstate commerce is not
the only manner under which the FAA may apply. As discussed above, the parties
may also voluntarily elect to have the FAA govern enforcement of the Agreement,
as they did here.” (Victrola 89, LLC, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 355.)
The agreement here expressly provides for enforcement
under the FAA. (Def.’s Ex. A, § D(1).) Plaintiff acknowledges this provision but
argues that it is a legal conclusion that provides no evidence of interstate
commerce. (Opp. 2:19-3:4.) This argument is without merit. As explained in Victrola,
the FAA applies if the parties agree to apply it, even without proving
interstate commerce. Here, because the parties agreed to apply the FAA, Defendants
need not independently prove interstate commerce.
Because the FAA applies to the agreement,
it preempts Labor Code section 432.6. Plaintiff presents no other defense against
enforcement of the agreement.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration
is GRANTED. The case is stayed in its entirety pending the outcome of
arbitration.