Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 23STCV16188, Date: 2024-04-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV16188    Hearing Date: April 19, 2024    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            On July 11, 2023, Plaintiff Nydia McFadden filed this action against Defendant William Rogers, asserting sixteen causes of action arising from alleged habitability issues, harassment, discrimination, and illegal rent increases.

            On February 26, 2024, Defendant filed the instant motion to quash service of summons. Plaintiff filed her opposition on April 8, 2024.  

LEGAL STANDARD

“[T]he court in which an action is pending has jurisdiction over a party from the time summons is served on him as provided by Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 413.10).” (Code Civ. Proc, § 410.50(a).) “[A] court acquires jurisdiction over a party by proper service of process or by that party's general appearance.” (In re Jennifer O. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 539, 547.) Actual notice of a lawsuit is not a substitute for proper service of process. (Abers v. Rohrs (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1199, 1206.) A defendant may serve and file a notice of motion to quash service of summons on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction. (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10(a).)

DISCUSSION

            “A summons may be served by personal delivery of a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the person to be served.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.10.) Here, according to a proof of service filed on August 25, 2023, a registered process server personally served Defendant at the address 2252 Laurel Canyon Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90046. In his motion, Defendant denies being served with the summons and complaint and argues that he resides at a different address. However, the motion is unaccompanied by Defendant’s declaration or any other evidence. Therefore, Defendant has failed to rebut the presumption of valid service. (See Evid. Code, § 647.)

            Additionally, Plaintiff has evidence demonstrating that personal service was properly effectuated. According to a declaration of diligence, the process server spoke with Defendant while Defendant stepped out onto the balcony, and Defendant responded to the name William Rogers. (Wobbe Decl., Ex. C.) The server identified himself as a process server and informed Defendant that he was being served. (Ibid.) Because Defendant refused to come down, the server dropped the papers in Defendant’s vicinity and left them visible. (Ibid.)

            “[A] ‘defendant will not be permitted to defeat service by rendering physical service impossible.’” (Bein v. Brechtel-Jochim Group, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1393.) The service statutes are “more liberally construed to effectuate service if actual notice has been received by the defendant.” (Stafford v. Mach (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1183.) Here, Defendant is clearly aware of the lawsuit, and there is no evidence to contradict the process server’s account. Service is not rendered improper simply because Defendant avoided physical contact with the documents. Although Defendant denies residing at the Laurel Canyon address, he does not deny being there at the time of service. Personal service is not limited to a defendant’s residence.

Ultimately, the Court finds that the manner of service in this case was “reasonably calculated to give an interested party actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard.” (See Stafford, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 1182.) Therefore, “the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice implicit in due process are satisfied.” (Ibid.)

CONCLUSION

            Defendant’s motion to quash is DENIED.