Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 23STCV18929, Date: 2023-10-27 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV18929    Hearing Date: November 17, 2023    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            On August 9, 2023, Plaintiff Trizah Morris filed this action against Defendants Tiffany Haddish and Aries Spears, asserting causes of action for (1) defamation, (2) injunctive relief, (3) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, and (4) unjust enrichment.

            The dispute between the parties stems from an earlier lawsuit, Doe, et al. v. Haddish, et al. (22STCV28473), in which Plaintiff’s two children alleged that Defendants sexually abused them during filming of purported skits. Defendants allegedly responded to the lawsuit by publishing false and defamatory statements accusing Plaintiff of extortion. These alleged defamatory statements led to the instant action.

            The earlier lawsuit resolved via a settlement agreement, which contains an arbitration clause. Accordingly, on September 27, 2023, Defendant Haddish filed a motion to compel arbitration. However, the motion was improperly redacted. Defendant Haddish filed an amended motion on October 26, 2023. Plaintiff filed her opposition on November 6, 2023. Defendant filed her reply on November 13, 2023.

LEGAL STANDARD

 “On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists….” (Code Civ. Proc, § 1281.2.) “The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as unconscionability.” (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236.)

DISCUSSION

I. Prima Facie Proof of an Agreement to Arbitrate

“The moving party ‘can meet its initial burden by attaching to the motion or petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the opposing party's signature.’” (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165, quoting Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 543-44.) Plaintiff does not dispute signing an agreement containing an arbitration clause. (See Haddish Decl., Ex. C.) Instead, Plaintiff’s opposition is limited to unconscionability.

The Court finds that Defendant Haddish has satisfied her initial burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, thus shifting the burden to Plaintiff to articulate a defense against enforcement.

II. Delegation Clause

            “[T]he issue of arbitrability presumptively remains with the court except where the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.” (Nelson v. Dual Diagnosis Treatment Center, Inc. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 643, 655.) “[W]here the Contract provides for arbitration in conformance with rules that specify the arbitrator will decide the scope of his or her own jurisdiction, the parties’ intent is clear and unmistakable, even without a recital in the contract that the arbitrator will decide any dispute over arbitrability.” (Dream Theater, Inc. v. Dream Theater (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 547, 557.)

            Here, the arbitration agreement incorporates AAA rules, which gives the arbitrator authority over “any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement or to the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim, without any need to refer such matters to the court.” (Rule R-7 of AAA Commercial Rules.) This is a “clear and unmistakable” delegation to the arbitrator.

            “Since the parties clearly and unmistakably intended that the issue of arbitrability be determined by the arbitrator, we turn to the issue of whether the delegation clause is unconscionable.” (Aanderud v. Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 880, 894.) “When determining whether a delegation clause is unconscionable, any claim of unconscionability must be specific to the delegation clause.” (Id. at p. 895.) Plaintiff’s arguments on unconscionability appear to focus on the settlement agreement as a whole rather than the delegation clause specifically. Nonetheless, the Court does not find the delegation clause to be unconscionable for the reasons articulated below.  

III. Unconscionability

Unconscionability has both a procedural and a substantive element. (Aron v. U-Haul Co. of California (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 796, 808.) Both elements must be present for a court to invalidate a contract or clause. (Ibid.) However, the two elements need not be present in the same degree; courts use a sliding scale approach in assessing the two elements. (Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227, 242.)

a. Procedural Unconscionability

Procedural unconscionability “focuses on two factors: ‘oppression’ and ‘surprise.’ ‘Oppression’ arises from an inequality of bargaining power which results in no real negotiation and ‘an absence of meaningful choice.’ ‘Surprise’ involves the extent to which the supposedly agreed-upon terms of the bargain are hidden in the prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce the disputed terms.” (Zullo v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 477, 484, internal citations and quotations omitted.)

            Plaintiff argues that she was coerced into signing the agreement under the threat that her children’s names would be publicly exposed. Plaintiff avers in her declaration:

“From September 3, 2020 to September 28, 2022, Aries Spears, Tiffany Haddish attorney, Tiffany Haddish, many of her 7.5 million followers, ans her celebrity blogger friends menaced, harassed, bullied, intimidated, and pressured Trizah Morris with threats to reveal the identities of Jane and John Doe to the world which would cause more mental and emotional trauma on the sexual assault victims of Haddish and Spears. As a result, Jane Doe feared that her and her brother's identities would be revealed and Trizah Morris feared for the mental and emotional health of her children resulting in the unconscionable settlement agreement being signed under duress from the continuous coercion and threats Jane Doe and Trizah Morris received by and on behalf of Haddish and Spears.”

(Morris Decl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff also attaches internet articles discussing one individual, not the Defendants, supposedly making threats to expose the names of the Does involved in the prior lawsuit. (Opp., Ex. A.)  

The Court does not find this to be convincing evidence of duress which left Plaintiff with a lack of meaningful choice. Plaintiff has no evidence of any particular acts or statements which could be interpreted as threats to expose the names of Plaintiff’s children if Plaintiff did not sign the agreement. The unauthenticated internet articles are not evidence, and in any case, those articles contain no discussion of Plaintiff being forced into any contract. Therefore, the Court finds no procedural unconscionability.  

b. Substantive Unconscionability

Substantive unconscionability focuses on the actual terms of the agreement and evaluates whether they create overly harsh or one-sided results as to shock the conscience. (Suh v. Superior Court (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1504, 1515.)

Plaintiff argues that the agreement is substantively unconscionable for the following reasons: (i) the agreement “ensures that Defendant will have the ultimate choice in where, when, and how to select the arbitrator. The agreement provides for a selection process that is designed ensure that Defendant ultimately gets to select the time and place of their choosing” (Opp. 7:6-8); (ii) the agreement “reinforces Defendant’s position of power by substantively disadvantaging Plaintiff and frustrating Plaintiff's substantive rights” (Opp. 7:9-10); and (iii) “the agreement does not ‘virtually guarantee’ to make Plaintiff and the class whole” (Opp. 7:10-11).     

These arguments are without merit. There is no indication that the agreement fails to provide for a neutral arbitrator as required. (See Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 102.) “A contract term is not substantively unconscionable when it merely gives one side a greater benefit; rather, the term must be ‘so one-sided as to shock the conscience.’” (Pinnacle, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 246.) Next, Plaintiff does not explain how the agreement substantively disadvantages Plaintiff or frustrates Plaintiff’s substantive rights. Plaintiff cites no authority for the proposition that the arbitration agreement must “virtually guarantee” to make Plaintiff whole. The arbitration provision only concerns the forum in which the parties have agreed to resolve their dispute. It does not affect any substantive right held by Plaintiff. Arbitration is never guaranteed to make a plaintiff whole, nor is it required to. Plaintiff is not guaranteed to be made whole even if she proceeds in court. Therefore, the Court finds no substantive unconscionability.

Without either procedural or substantive unconscionability, the delegation clause remains enforceable. Because the delegation clause is enforceable, the arbitrator has the authority to determine which claims are arbitrable, as well as the validity of the settlement agreement. (See Malone v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1571 [“The delegation clause is not unconscionable, and the trial court therefore did not err in granting the motion to compel arbitration to permit the arbitrator to resolve Malone's challenges to the validity and enforceability of the arbitration agreement as a whole”].)

CONCLUSION

            Defendant Tiffany Haddish’s motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED. The case is stayed in its entirety pending the outcome of arbitration.