Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 23STCV19342, Date: 2025-03-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV19342    Hearing Date: March 28, 2025    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            On August 14, 2023, Plaintiff Ester Fishman filed this quiet title action against Defendant Marcus Fishman and all persons claiming any right in the subject property. Plaintiff and Defendant were married in 2013 and separated in 2016. Plaintiff alleges that during the parties’ relationship, Defendant was abusive and controlling. As a result, Plaintiff alleges that under Defendant’s undue influence and coercion, Plaintiff granted title of the two subject properties (Tracy and Glendale) to both herself and Defendant even though Plaintiff obtained the properties prior to marriage. Plaintiff filed this action to claim legal title to the Tracy and Glendale properties.

            On March 3, 2025, Defendant filed the instant motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff filed her opposition on March 17, 2025. Defendant filed his reply on March 21, 2025.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made on the same grounds as those supporting a general demurrer, i.e., that the pleading fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a legally cognizable claim or defense. (Stoops v. Abbassi (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 644, 650.) A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1999) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.) Judgment on the pleadings must be denied where there are material factual issues that require evidentiary resolution. (Schabarum v. Calif. Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216.) 

DISCUSSION

            “The Legislature has not established a specific statute of limitations for actions to quiet title.” (Salazar v. Thomas (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 467, 476.) “Therefore, courts refer to the underlying theory of relief to determine the applicable period of limitations.” (Ibid.) “Generally, the most likely time limits for a quiet title action are the five-year limitations period for adverse possession, the four-year limitations period for the cancellation of an instrument, or the three-year limitations period for claims based on fraud and mistake.” (Id. at pp. 476-77.)

            “[W]hether a statute of limitations bars an action to quiet title may turn on whether the plaintiff is in undisturbed possession of the land.” (Mayer v. L&B Real Estate (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1231, 1237.) “Alternatively, the question can be stated as (1) when were plaintiffs no longer owners ‘in exclusive and undisputed possession’ of the land; (2) when was defendants’ adverse ‘claim … pressed against’ plaintiffs; or (3) when was defendants’ hostile claim ‘asserted in some manner to jeopardize the superior title’ held by plaintiffs.” (Salazar, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 478, citations omitted.) “[M]ere notice of an adverse claim is not enough to commence the owner’s statute of limitations.” (Ibid.)  

            Defendant argues that he asserted a hostile and adverse claim on January 11, 2017 by filing a Request for Order (RFO) in the family law case BD645333. (See Def.’s RJN, Ex. A.) The RFO alleged that “[t]he parties own three parcels of real property,” including the Tracy and Glendale properties. (Id., Ex. A, Points & Authorities at p. 7.) The RFO requested a sale of one of the properties to pay for attorney’s fees, expert fees, and living expenses. (Id., Points & Authorities at p. 1.) Because this action was filed on August 14, 2023, more than six years after Defendant’s filing of the RFO, Defendant argues that the action is time-barred even under the most liberal limitations period of five years.

            However, the RFO’s allegation that the parties jointly owned the Tracy and Glendale properties arguably “did not call into question the validity of plaintiffs’ control of the property by claiming plaintiffs’ possession was improper or illegal.” (See Salazar, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 481.) Nor did it “indirectly question plaintiffs’ control of the property by asserting defendants were entitled to possess the . . . Property.” (Ibid.) At most, the request to sell put Plaintiff on notice of “an event that might provide the purchaser with a superior claim to the property,” which is not a sufficient disturbance to begin the running of the limitations period. (Id. at p. 482.) In fact, the RFO argued that it did not matter which of the three properties was sold, and actually advocated for the sale of the third property, not at issue in this action. (Def.’s RJN, Ex. A, Points & Authorities at p. 9.) This can hardly be considered pressing a claim against Plaintiff as to the Tracy and Glendale properties which jeopardized Plaintiff’s right to possession.

            Furthermore, as this Court previously acknowledged, “[t]he family court ‘deferred the issues of ownership, value and allocation of two parcels of property in dispute between the parties to the existing civil action between the parties.’” (Nov. 3, 2023 Order re Demurrer at 3:15-18.) “[T]he issue of ownership of the two properties was expressly removed from the divorce case.” (Id. at 4:11-12.) Defendant’s RFO, filed in a case where ownership of the properties will not be adjudicated, can hardly be considered an adverse claim which disturbed Plaintiff’s possession.  

            Ultimately, the tangential reference to joint ownership in the RFO is insufficient to establish as a matter of law that Plaintiff was disturbed in possession to a degree that started the running of the limitations period. At the very least, there is a triable issue. Therefore, it cannot be determined on the pleadings that the action is time-barred.

CONCLUSION

            Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED.