Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 23STCV19861, Date: 2024-01-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV19861    Hearing Date: January 22, 2024    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            On August 18, 2023, Plaintiffs filed this complaint against Defendants Ford Apartments, LP and Single Room Occupancy Housing Corporation, asserting the following causes of action: (1) breach of contract/covenant of quiet enjoyment/warranty of habitability; (2) tortious breach of the implied warranty of habitability; (3) negligence; (4) private nuisance; (5) violation of Civil Code section 1942.4; (6) unfair business practices; and (7) constructive eviction.

            Plaintiffs are various tenants residing in the subject property, and Defendants are allegedly the owners or managers of the property. Plaintiffs allege that they have consistently complained to Defendants about numerous uninhabitable conditions and that Defendants have failed to adequately abate the defects in order to save money.

            On December 6, 2023, Defendants filed the instant demurrer and motion to strike. Plaintiffs filed their opposition on January 8, 2024. Defendants filed their reply on January 16, 2024.

LEGAL STANDARD

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Ibid.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part of that pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b).) The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike (1) any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading and (2) all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id., § 437.)

MEET AND CONFER

Before filing a demurrer or a motion to strike, the demurring or moving party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to or the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41, 435.5.) The Court notes that Defendants have complied with the meet and confer requirement. (See Cain Decl.)

DISCUSSION

I. Demurrer

            a. Breach of Contract/Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment/Warranty of Habitability

            To establish breach of contract, a plaintiff must show: (1) the contract existed, (2) the plaintiff’s performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damage to the plaintiff. (Richman v. Hartley (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186.) Certain contractual obligations are implied by law. Specifically, “there is a warranty of habitability implied in residential leases in California.” (Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1296.) Additionally, “every lease contains an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment.” (Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 291.) A breach of contract can be alleged by simply “plead[ing] the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise language.” (Miles v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 394, 402.)

            Here, the complaint alleges that “Defendant breached the Plaintiffs’ lease contracts through breaches of the implied warranty of habitability and covenant of quiet enjoyment.” (Compl. ¶ 81.) Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have conflated normally separate claims for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment and breach of the warranty of habitability into one cause of action, rendering the complaint uncertain. Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs should be barred from asserting breach of contract as an independent cause of action.           However, “[a] plaintiff may plead cumulative or inconsistent causes of action.” (Gherman v. Colburn (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 544, 565.) It is the substance of a claim, not its formatting, that matters. (See Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) Despite how the first “cause of action” is labeled, the complaint is sufficiently clear that the contracts were breached because Defendants breached the implied obligations of quiet enjoyment and habitability. Because the obligations are defined by law, it is sufficiently clear what “material terms” of the contract were breached.  

            Defendants also argue that the complaint fails to allege that the conduct or issues were so substantial as to interfere with Plaintiffs’ right to use and enjoy the premises. For pleading purposes, the complaint sufficiently identifies multiple defective conditions that could have substantially interfered with Plaintiffs’ tenancies. (See Compl. ¶ 57 [inadequate sanitation and plumbing, mold, vermin infestation, defective wiring, structural hazards, and broken mechanical equipment].) Defendants allegedly failed to repair the defects in order to save money. (Id., ¶ 58.) Whether these facts actually constitute substantial interference is a question for the trier of fact. Therefore, the first cause of action is adequately pled.

            b. Unfair Business Practices

            Business and Professions Code section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices. Each of the three prongs is an independent basis for relief. (Smith v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 700, 718.) Unlawful conduct is defined as any practice forbidden by law. (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 377, 383.) UCL actions alleging unlawful conduct “borrow” from other statutes or common law causes of action outside Section 17200. (Klein v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1383.)  

            Defendants argue that the UCL claim is defective because it fails to allege actual reliance or causation, and is duplicative of the claims for warranty of habitability and Civil Code section 1942.4. However, “[a] plaintiff may plead cumulative or inconsistent causes of action.” (Gherman, supra, 72 Cal.App.3d at p. 565.) The warranty of habitability claim is adequately pled, as discussed above, and Defendants do not challenge the Civil Code section 1942.4 claim. Therefore, these claims form the predicate “unlawful” acts for a UCL claim. The complaint alleges that Defendants caused harm by maintaining uninhabitable conditions that interfere with Plaintiffs’ tenancies and extracting full rental value despite the unfitness of the property. (Compl. ¶¶ 120-126.) Therefore, the UCL claim is adequately pled.  

            c. Constructive Eviction

            “An eviction is actual when a landlord takes direct action to physically expel the tenant from the premises. An eviction is constructive if the landlord engages in acts that render the premises unfit for occupancy for the purpose for which it was leased, or deprive the tenant of the beneficial enjoyment of the premises.” (Cunningham v. Universal Underwriters (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1152.) “In order that there be a constructive eviction it is essential that the tenant should vacate the property. There is no constructive eviction if the tenant continues in possession of the premises however much he may be disturbed in the beneficial enjoyment.” (Ibid.)

            Here, the seventh cause of action for constructive eviction is only asserted by Plaintiffs Velez and Washington. Defendants argue that the claim is defective because Plaintiffs do not allege that the premises was unfit for occupancy or that they were deprived of enjoyment. Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs do not allege they vacated the premises. However, the allegations discussed above sufficiently establish uninhabitable conditions for pleading purposes. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that they were constructively evicted on a specific date, meaning they vacated the premises. (Compl. ¶¶ 18, 49.) Whether Plaintiffs vacated within a reasonable time is a factual issue. Therefore, the constructive eviction claim is adequately pled.

II. Motion to Strike

“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Id., subd. (c)(1).) “‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Id., subd. (c)(2).) Fraud is “intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Id., subd. (c)(3).)

The allegations discussed above sufficiently support an inference of malice and oppression for pleading purposes. Specifically, the complaint identifies sufficiently egregious uninhabitable conditions and alleges that Defendants knowingly failed to address the defects in order to save money and extract more rent. These are facts that demonstrate a conscious disregard for Plaintiffs’ rights and safety and unjust hardship. It is for the trier of fact to determine whether Defendants’ actions were actually malicious or merely negligent. Therefore, the complaint adequately pleads punitive damages.

CONCLUSION

            Defendants’ demurrer is OVERRULED. Defendants’ motion to strike is DENIED.