Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 23STCV22852, Date: 2024-03-29 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV22852    Hearing Date: March 29, 2024    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            This is a habitability complaint filed by various current and former tenants against the alleged owners or operators of the subject premises. The complaint asserts causes of action based on the warranty of habitability, covenant of quiet enjoyment, nuisance, negligence, Civil Code section 1942.4, and Unfair Competition Law.

            On February 21, 2024, Defendants filed the instant demurrer and motion to strike against the complaint. Plaintiffs filed their opposition on March 18, 2024. Defendants filed their reply on March 22, 2024.

LEGAL STANDARD

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Ibid.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part of that pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b).) The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike (1) any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading and (2) all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id., § 437.)

MEET AND CONFER

Before filing a demurrer or a motion to strike, the demurring or moving party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to or the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41, 435.5.) The Court notes that Defendants have complied with the meet and confer requirement. (See Torres-Brito Decl.)

DISCUSSION

I. Demurrer

            a. Quiet Enjoyment

            Plaintiffs conceded during meet and confer that this claim is subject to demurrer. (Torres-Brito Decl. ¶ 9.) Plaintiffs’ opposition does not address this cause of action. Therefore, the demurrer is sustained without leave to amend as to the third cause of action.

            b. Nuisance

            “Anything which is injurious to health . . . or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property . . . is a nuisance.” (Civ. Code, § 3479.) “It is settled that where conduct which violates a duty owed to another also interferes with that party's free use and enjoyment of his property, nuisance liability arises.” (Cutujian v. Benedict Hills Estates Assn. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1390.)

Defendants do not contend that the facts alleged in the complaint do not fit this definition of nuisance. However, relying on El Escorial Owners' Assn. v. DLC Plastering, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1337, Defendants argue that the nuisance claim is duplicative of the negligence claim and should therefore be stricken. “Where negligence and nuisance causes of action rely on the same facts about lack of due care, the nuisance claim is a negligence claim.” (Id. at p. 1349.) The court in El Escorial based its holding on a concern that the definition of nuisance “is so broad that it could be applied indiscriminately to everything.” (Id. at p. 1348.) The court therefore held that the toxic mold contamination claim in that case “involves a traditional tort that should not be litigated under the guise of a nuisance action.” (Ibid.) At the same time, the court acknowledged that “courts have allowed plaintiffs to litigate nuisance causes of action in cases involving housing conditions.” (Ibid.) 

            In Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, the court held that “[a] nuisance may be either a negligent or an intentional tort.” (Id. at p. 920.) “The fact that the defendants' alleged misconduct consists of omission rather than affirmative actions does not preclude nuisance liability.” (Ibid.) The plaintiff in Stoiber managed to demonstrate intentional conduct by alleging that the landlord had actual knowledge of uninhabitable conditions and “acted with full knowledge of the consequences thereof and the damage being caused to plaintiff, and their conduct was willful, oppressive and malicious.” (Ibid.)

            The complaint here similarly alleges that Defendants knowingly ignored Plaintiffs’ complaints regarding the uninhabitable conditions and thereby consciously disregarded Plaintiffs’ rights and safety. (Compl. ¶ 96.) Defendants allegedly exploited Plaintiffs’ status as low-income tenants who likely had no ability to defend themselves. (Id., ¶ 66.) The complaint also alleges that Defendants’ conduct was “intentional, malicious, and oppressive.” (Ibid.) This sufficiently demonstrates intentional conduct that goes beyond mere lack of due care. Therefore, Plaintiffs have adequately pled a nuisance claim apart from negligence. Although Plaintiffs cannot recover twice for the same injury, at the pleading stage, “[a] plaintiff may plead cumulative or inconsistent causes of action.” (Gherman v. Colburn (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 544, 565.) Plaintiffs are entitled to plead multiple theories arising from the same facts. Therefore, the demurrer is overruled as to the fourth cause of action.

            c. UCL

            Business and Professions Code section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices. Each of the three prongs is an independent basis for relief. (Smith v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 700, 718.) “Under the UCL, damages cannot be recovered, and plaintiffs are generally limited to restitution and injunctive relief.” (Safeway, Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1147.)

            The allegations discussed above sufficiently constitute unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent conduct, and Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiffs seek restitution. However, Defendants argue that the UCL claim is duplicative of the habitability claims. As stated above, Plaintiffs may plead cumulative causes of action even if they do not end up recovering separately for every cause of action. The UCL also explicitly provides that “the remedies or penalties provided by this chapter are cumulative to each other and to the remedies or penalties available under all other laws of this state.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17205.) Therefore, the demurrer is overruled as to the seventh cause of action.

            d. Uncertainty

            A demurrer for uncertainty is disfavored and is only granted “if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (A.J. Fistes Corp. v. GDL Best Contractors, Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 677, 695.) A complaint does not need to be a “model of clarity” to survive a demurrer because most ambiguities can be clarified through discovery. (Ibid.)

            Defendants argue that Plaintiffs attribute the alleged conduct to all defendants without regard to when each Defendant owned the property and without specifying which Defendants committed which actions. Such detail is not required in the complaint because those questions can be answered by discovery. Plaintiffs are entitled to plead that all of the Defendants are responsible for all of the alleged wrongdoing, no matter how improbable that may be. The complaint sufficiently acquaints Defendants with the nature of the claims.   

II. Motion to Strike

“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Id., subd. (c)(1).) “‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Id., subd. (c)(2).) Fraud is “intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Id., subd. (c)(3).)

            As discussed above, the complaint alleges that Defendants knowingly ignored the uninhabitable conditions while being aware that Plaintiffs were being harmed. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 64-66.) Defendants allegedly sought to exploit Plaintiffs’ status as low-income tenants without access to alternate housing or legal support. (Ibid.) This sufficiently demonstrates malice and oppression for pleading purposes. “A nuisance may be either a negligent or an intentional tort. If the latter, then exemplary damages are recoverable.” (Stoiber, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at p. 920.) As established above, Plaintiffs have alleged intentional nuisance. Therefore, the complaint adequately pleads a basis for punitive damages.

CONCLUSION

            Defendants’ demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend as to the third cause of action and OVERRULED in all other respects. The motion to strike is DENIED.