Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 23STCV24748, Date: 2024-01-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV24748    Hearing Date: January 3, 2024    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            On October 11, 2023, Plaintiff Ashley Ramirez filed this action against Defendant Golden Felicity, Inc. The complaint stems from failure to pay wages and discrimination.

            On November 9, 2023, Defendant filed the instant motion for change of venue. Plaintiff filed her opposition on December 19, 2023. Defendant filed its reply on December 26, 2023.

LEGAL STANDARD

“[T]he superior court in the county where the defendants or some of them reside at the commencement of the action is the proper court for the trial of the action. If the action is for injury to person or personal property or for death from wrongful act or negligence, the superior court in either the county where the injury occurs or the injury causing death occurs or the county where the defendants, or some of them reside at the commencement of the action, is a proper court for the trial of the action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 395(a).) Upon motion, “the court shall, if it appears that the action or proceeding was not commenced in the proper court, order the action or proceeding transferred to the proper court.” (Id., § 396b(a).)

DISCUSSION

I. Proper Venue

“The general rule is that venue is proper only in the county of the defendant's residence.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 101, 108.) “Thus, the right of a plaintiff to have an action tried in a county other than that of the defendant's residence is exceptional. If the plaintiff would claim such right he must bring himself within the exception.” (Id. at p. 109.) “[A]ny ambiguities in the complaint must be construed against the plaintiff towards the end that the defendant will not be deprived of the right to a trial in the county of his or her residence.” (Ibid.) Additionally, proper venue under FEHA is “any county in the state in which the unlawful practice is alleged to have been committed, in the county in which the records relevant to the practice are maintained and administered, or in the county in which the aggrieved person would have worked or would have had access to the public accommodation but for the alleged unlawful practice.” (Gov. Code, § 12965(c)(3).)

Here, Defendant’s principal place of business is in Riverside County. (Tong Decl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff worked for Defendant in Riverside County. (Id., ¶ 2.) Therefore, the alleged unlawful practices occurred in Riverside County. (Id., ¶ 4.) Defendant maintains and administers its records in Riverside County. (Id., ¶ 3.) Defendant has demonstrated that proper venue lies in Riverside County.

The burden is on Plaintiff to show otherwise. Plaintiff argues that she “had good faith belief that Defendant was doing substantial business in Los Angeles County” based on address listings in Google and LinkedIn web pages. (Martin Decl. ¶¶ 4-6, Ex. A, B.) The unauthenticated web pages are not evidence of Defendant’s residence or principal place of business. Additionally, neither Plaintiff’s good faith belief nor the place where Defendant does “substantial business” determines the proper venue.  

 Defendant has presented undisputed evidence that its principal place of business is in Riverside County, that Plaintiff worked in Riverside County, that the alleged conduct occurred in Riverside County, and that it keeps its records in Riverside County. (See Tong Decl.) Therefore, Riverside County is the proper venue under both FEHA and the general venue statute. (See Gov. Code, § 12965(c)(3); Code Civ. Proc., § 395.)  

The Court finds that proper venue lies in Riverside County.

II. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

“In its discretion, the court may order the payment to the prevailing party of reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees incurred in making or resisting the motion to transfer whether or not that party is otherwise entitled to recover his or her costs of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 396b(b).) If the transfer is granted solely because the action was commenced in the wrong court, the plaintiff must pay the costs of the transfer, including any costs awarded under Section 396b, before the transfer occurs. (Id., § 399(a).)

            Defendant claims 4 hours to prepare the motion at a rate of $325 per hour. (See He Decl. ¶ 3.) The Court finds this reasonable. Any additional hours are unnecessary given the simplicity of the motion. Therefore, the total amount is $1,360, representing 4 hours at $325 per hour, plus a $60 filing fee.

CONCLUSION

            Defendant’s motion to change venue to Riverside County is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall pay attorneys’ fees of $1,360, as well as the costs of the transfer.