Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 23STCV25846, Date: 2024-05-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV25846    Hearing Date: May 22, 2024    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            On October 23, 2023, Plaintiffs filed this action arising from alleged uninhabitable conditions. Plaintiffs are two adults and their four minor children. Defendants are the alleged owners or operators of the subject property.

            On April 24, 2024, Defendants filed the instant motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiffs filed their opposition on May 7, 2024. Defendants filed their reply on May 15, 2024.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made on the same grounds as those supporting a general demurrer, i.e., that the pleading fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a legally cognizable claim or defense. (Stoops v. Abbassi (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 644, 650.) A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1999) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.) Judgment on the pleadings must be denied where there are material factual issues that require evidentiary resolution. (Schabarum v. Calif. Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216.) 

DISCUSSION

I. Breach of the Warranty of Habitability

            “[T]here is a warranty of habitability implied in residential leases in California.” (Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1296.) “[A] tenant may bring suit against the landlord for damages resulting from such breach.” (Id. at p. 1297.) “The elements of such an affirmative claim are the existence of a material defective condition affecting the premises' habitability, notice to the landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant's discovery of the condition, the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency, and resulting damages.” (Ibid.) “[A] tenant may maintain a tort action against his landlord for damages suffered by way of annoyance or discomfort or for injury to his personal property caused by the landlord's failure to keep the premises in a habitable condition.” (Id. at p. 1298.)

            Here, Plaintiffs allege that the premises was subject to “a severe mold contamination, severe rodent and termite infestation; lack of ventilation maintained in good working order; roof, windows, foundation and/or structural damage to the walls and ceiling due to deterioration, water intrusion, damage, and/or improper repairs.” (Compl. ¶ 22.) Plaintiffs allege that they notified Defendants of the defective conditions and that Defendants have intentionally ignored the issues. (Id., ¶¶ 36-38.) Plaintiffs allege that they have incurred medical expenses, pain and suffering, and damage to property. (Id., ¶ 45.) Plaintiffs also allege that they have paid rent above the fair rental value of the property given the defective conditions. (Ibid.) These facts fulfill the elements of a claim for breach of the warranty of habitability.  

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot maintain claims for “tortious” breach of the warranty of habitability because Plaintiffs have remained on the premises. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs are limited to a contract claim arising from the implied covenant of habitability within the lease. However, the cited authority does not stand for this proposition. (See Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 578, 590.) The court in Andrews did not distinguish between tortious and contractual breach of the warranty of habitability, much less hold that tenants who maintain possession of the premises cannot assert a tort claim. As stated in Erlach, a tenant may maintain a tort claim for uninhabitable conditions that cause injury to himself or his property. (Erlach, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1298.) Therefore, the first cause of action is adequately pled.

II. Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment

            “[E]very lease contains an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment” which “insulates the tenant against any act or omission on the part of the landlord, or anyone claiming under him, which interferes with a tenant's right to use and enjoy the premises for the purposes contemplated by the tenancy.” (Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 291.) Though the Supreme Court once held that “the covenant of quiet possession in a lease is not breached until there has been an actual or constructive eviction” (Standard Livestock Co. v. Pentz (1928) 204 Cal. 618, 625), more recent authorities “recognize that a tenant may sue for breach of the covenant while remaining in possession” (Nativi, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 292 [citing Guntert v. City of Stockton (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 131, 141; Andrews, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at pp. 590–591; Marchese v. Standard Realty & Dev. Co. (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 142, 148]). “Breach can take many forms, including actual or constructive eviction.” (Nativi, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 293.)

            The same facts that support the habitability claim also satisfy the definition of interfering with a tenant’s quiet enjoyment of the premises. (See Compl. ¶¶ 22, 36-38, 45.) Based on the above authority, the fact that Plaintiffs have remained on the premises does not defeat the quiet enjoyment claim as a matter of law. Therefore, the third cause of action is adequately pled.

III. Statutory Habitability Claim

            Plaintiffs’ second cause of action is for violation of Civil Code sections 1941 et seq. Defendants acknowledge that a statutory habitability claim is actionable but argue that the complaint here fails the heightened pleading standard for statutory claims. (See Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 771, 790.) Defendants contend that Plaintiffs should have pled “which defective conditions started when, what health conditions they were diagnosed with, when they contacted Defendants for repairs, or what Defendants’ responses were.” (Mtn. 7:7-9.) Defendants cite no authority requiring this level of detail in pleading a statutory habitability claim.

The complaint specifies the alleged defective conditions. (Compl. ¶ 22.) These conditions satisfy the definition of “untenantable” under Civil Code section 1941.1(a). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants responded to complaints by intentionally ignoring the issues. (Id., ¶¶ 36-38.) For pleading purposes, these facts sufficiently establish a violation of statutory habitability.

IV. Nuisance

            “Anything which is injurious to health . . . or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property . . . is a nuisance.” (Civ. Code, § 3479.) “It is settled that where conduct which violates a duty owed to another also interferes with that party's free use and enjoyment of his property, nuisance liability arises.” (Cutujian v. Benedict Hills Estates Assn. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1390.)  “[C]ourts have allowed plaintiffs to litigate nuisance causes of action in cases involving housing conditions.” (El Escorial Owners' Assn. v. DLC Plastering, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1348.)

In Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, the court held that “[a] nuisance may be either a negligent or an intentional tort.” (Id. at p. 920.) “The fact that the defendants' alleged misconduct consists of omission rather than affirmative actions does not preclude nuisance liability.” (Ibid.) The plaintiff in Stoiber managed to demonstrate intentional conduct by alleging that the landlord had actual knowledge of uninhabitable conditions and “acted with full knowledge of the consequences thereof and the damage being caused to plaintiff, and their conduct was willful, oppressive and malicious.” (Ibid.)

The alleged defects in this case are sufficiently offensive to the senses or obstructive to use of the property so as to constitute a nuisance. (See Compl. ¶ 22.) As discussed above, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled the defective conditions and that Defendants intentionally ignored the issues, thus allowing them to continue. Defendants cite no authority for their position that they must have “created” the conditions in order to be liable for nuisance. The law holds otherwise. Omissions are actionable under nuisance as much as affirmative conduct (Stoiber, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at p. 920), and nuisance liability attaches to those who create or maintain a nuisance (City of Modesto Redevelopment Agency v. Superior Court (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 28, 38).  

Defendants cite no authority supporting their contention that Plaintiffs must allege a diagnosed medical condition in order to maintain a nuisance claim. The complaint adequately specifies the nature of Plaintiffs’ injuries. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 31.) Lastly, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have waived their right to bring a nuisance claim by remaining on the premises. None of the cited authority suggests that remaining on premises waives a nuisance claim, or even discusses nuisance at all. (See Gould v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1176; Salton Community Services Dist. v. Southard (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 526.) Therefore, the fourth and seventh causes of action are adequately pled.

V. Negligence

            The elements of negligence are: (1) a duty to exercise ordinary care; (2) breach of that duty; (3) causation; and (4) damages. (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917.)

            Defendants first argue that the negligence claim conflicts with Plaintiffs’ allegation that Defendants intentionally refused to repair the property. However, “[a] plaintiff may plead cumulative or inconsistent causes of action.” (Gherman v. Colburn (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 544, 565.) Plaintiff is entitled to plead multiple theories arising from the same facts. “A nuisance may be either a negligent or an intentional tort.” (Stoiber, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at p. 920.)

            Defendants then argue that the complaint fails to allege “Defendants’ actions or inactions, when Plaintiffs first discovered the deficiencies with the subject property, when they first notified Defendants of any issues, when Defendants responded, and what the response was.” (Mtn. 10:12-14.) These are evidentiary facts not required for pleading. As discussed above, the complaint adequately identifies the defective conditions and alleges that Defendants ignored Plaintiffs’ complaints and refused to repair the premises. These facts support a reasonable inference that Defendants negligently maintained the premises and harmed Plaintiffs as a result.

VI. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

            To state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must establish: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. (Vasquez v. Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 819, 832.) “For conduct to be outrageous, it must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated by a civilized community.” (Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 172.) “Severe emotional distress [is] emotional distress of such substantial quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to endure it.” (Fletcher v. Western Life Insurance Co. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 376, 397.) A landlord’s willful failure to correct defective conditions can constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Burnett v. Chimney Sweep (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1069.)

            Plaintiffs allege that as a result of Defendants’ conduct, they have suffered “illness, physical injury, severe mental stress, extreme emotional distress, anxiety, annoyance, discomfort, fear, humiliation, anger, loss of appetite.” (Compl. ¶ 106.) These allegations are too conclusory and vague to state a claim for severe emotional distress. (See Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1051 [“discomfort, worry, anxiety, upset stomach, concern, and agitation” do not satisfy the severity standard].) Therefore, the IIED claim fails as a matter of law.

VII. Unfair Business Practices

            Business and Professions Code section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices. Each of the three prongs is an independent basis for relief. (Smith v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 700, 718.) Unlawful conduct is defined as any practice forbidden by law. (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 377, 383.) UCL actions alleging unlawful conduct “borrow” from other statutes or common law causes of action outside Section 17200. (Klein v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1383.)

            The causes of action discussed above sufficiently constitute “unlawful” conduct for purposes of the UCL. Defendants argue that the UCL does not permit damages, only restitution or injunctive relief. (See Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1144.) Plaintiffs explicitly seek “restitution and disgorgement of all sums of money wrongfully

obtained by the Defendants during the entire term of leasehold.” (Compl. 19:17-20.) Therefore, the complaint properly seeks restitution, not damages. Whether Plaintiffs are ultimately entitled to restitution, and to what extent, are factual matters unsuited for demurrer.

Lastly, Defendants cite Code of Civil Procedure 425.10 to argue that the complaint fails to specify a precise amount. However, Section 425.10(b) states that “where an action is brought to recover actual or punitive damages for personal injury or wrongful death, the amount demanded shall not be stated.” The complaint here is for actual and punitive damages for personal injury. Therefore, Plaintiffs need not allege a precise amount. The UCL claim is adequately pled.  

VIII. Punitive Damages

“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Id., subd. (c)(1).) “‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Id., subd. (c)(2).) Fraud is “intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Id., subd. (c)(3).)

The conduct discussed above is sufficiently malicious or oppressive for pleading purposes. The allegations support a reasonable inference that Defendants were aware of the defective conditions and their potential for harm, yet ignored the issue in spite of Plaintiffs’ complaints. This sufficiently demonstrates willful disregard for Plaintiffs’ rights and safety, or imposing undue hardship on Plaintiffs. The complaint adequately pleads a basis for punitive damages. 

IX. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

            The motion is moot as to the fifth cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress because Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed that claim on May 8, 2024.

CONCLUSION

            Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED with leave to amend as to the eighth cause of action and DENIED in all other respects.