Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 24STCV03649, Date: 2025-04-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV03649    Hearing Date: April 30, 2025    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            On February 13, 2024, Plaintiff Myles Hamilton filed this action against Defendants Unruly Agency Limited Liability Company (Unruly); Plutus LLC; Tara Niknejad; and Nicky Gathrite. This case was consolidated with two other cases—Sophia Patterson v. Unruly Agency Limited Liability Company, et al. (24STCV03683) and Andria Carpenter v. Unruly Agency Limited Liability Company, et al. (24STCV06124)—with this case as the lead case.

            Plaintiffs Hamilton and Patterson worked for Unruly, an agency that represents content creators (models) on the pornography website OnlyFans. Unruly helps the models market and sell their content. Plaintiffs were “Account Managers” tasked with impersonating models to sell their content. Plaintiffs were paid on commission based on how much content they sold. Plaintiffs allege they were misclassified as independent contractors and not paid minimum wage or overtime. Plaintiffs also allege they were not properly paid according to the commission structure established under an implied-in-fact contract.

            In May 2023, Plaintiffs were terminated based on the allegedly false accusation that they were working for a competing agency and stealing talent from Unruly. Defendants allegedly threatened Plaintiffs and trapped Plaintiffs in a conference room until Plaintiffs signed a Severance Agreement and General Release.

            Unruly has cross-complained against each plaintiff, with the operative First Amended Cross-Complaint (FACC) filed on January 30, 2025. As to Plaintiffs Hamilton and Patterson, Unruly asserts two causes of action: (1) breach of settlement agreement; and (2) breach of severance agreement. According to the FACC, the parties settled the misclassification dispute in November 2021 for $100, and the Settlement Agreement includes a full release of Unruly and its agents. The FACC further alleges that when Plaintiffs sought to terminate their employment in 2023, they signed a Severance Agreement for $5,000 which also contained a full release. The FACC alleges that Plaintiffs breached the contracts by filing this action.

            On April 2, 2025, Plaintiffs Hamilton and Patterson filed separate but identical demurrers to the second cause of action in the FACC. Unruly filed its opposition on April 17, 2025. Plaintiffs filed their replies on April 23, 2025.

LEGAL STANDARD

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Ibid.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

MEET AND CONFER

Before filing a demurrer or a motion to strike, the demurring or moving party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to or the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41, 435.5.) The Court notes that Plaintiffs have complied with the meet and confer requirement. (See Richter Decl.)

DISCUSSION

            An unlawful contract is unenforceable. (Kashani v. Tsann Kuen China Enterprise Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 531, 541.) A contract is unlawful if it is “[c]ontrary to an express provision of law.” (Civ. Code, § 1667(1).)

            Plaintiffs argue that the Severance Agreement is unenforceable as a matter of law because it violates the requirement in Government Code section 12964.5(b)(4) that “[a]n employer offering an employee or former employee an agreement related to that employee’s separation from employment as provided in this subdivision shall notify the employee that the employee has a right to consult an attorney regarding the agreement and shall provide the employee with a reasonable time period of not less than five business days in which to do so.” Plaintiffs argue that the FACC admits the Severance Agreement was presented to Plaintiffs on May 15, 2023 and signed the same day, thus failing to provide the required five-day notice. (See FACC re Hamilton ¶¶ 18, 22; FACC re Patterson ¶¶ 17, 21.)

However, the requirement is for the employer to provide five days, not for the employee to actually take five days. Nothing precludes the employee from signing a severance agreement in less than five days, including immediately. In fact, the statute expressly states: “An employee may sign such an agreement prior to the end of the reasonable time period as long as the employee’s decision to accept such shortening of time is knowing and voluntary and is not induced by the employer through fraud, misrepresentation or a threat to withdraw or alter the offer prior to the expiration of the reasonable time period, or by providing different terms to employees who sign such an agreement prior to the expiration of such time period.” (Gov. Code, § 12964.5(b)(4).) This is a factual issue not resolvable on a demurrer. Plaintiffs’ allegation that they were coerced into signing the Severance Agreement only raises a factual dispute; it does not defeat Unruly’s claims.    

Plaintiffs also argue that the Severance Agreement itself provides for less than five days because it states that the offer will expire if not signed by May 15, 2023. However, the Severance Agreement is not attached to either the complaint or the FACC, nor can Plaintiffs present extrinsic evidence of the agreement. On a demurrer, the Court cannot consider the agreement’s terms, outside of the portions quoted in the allegations. Plaintiffs’ contention that the agreement contains a due date of May 15, 2023 is a factual matter beyond the four corners of the complaint.

In sum, the Severance Agreement’s illegality under Government Code section 12964.5(b)(4) is not a defect that appears on the face of the FACC. Therefore, a demurrer cannot be sustained on this ground.

CONCLUSION

            Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants Myles Hamilton’s and Sophia Patterson’s demurrers to the FACC are OVERRULED.