Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 24STCV06098, Date: 2025-04-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV06098    Hearing Date: April 18, 2025    Dept: 32

 

ZULY MEJIA DE MARTIR,

                        Plaintiff,

            v.

 

ANA HELENA RANKOVIC, D.D.S., et al.,

                        Defendants.

 

  Case No.:  24STCV06098

  Hearing Date:  April 18, 2025

 

     [TENTATIVE] order RE:

defendants’ motion for summary judgment

 

 

BACKGROUND

            On March 12, 2024, Plaintiff Zuly Mejia de Martir filed this action against Defendants Ana Helena Rankovic, D.D.S (Dr. Rankovic) and Ana Helena Rankovic, D.D.S., Inc. The complaint asserts causes of action for (1) dental malpractice, (2) intentional misconduct, (3) lack of informed consent, (4) pain and suffering, and (5) emotional distress.

            The complaint alleges that Dr. Rankovic performed multiple dental procedures upon Plaintiff throughout the period from February 2023 to August 2023, and eventually broke Plaintiff’s tooth during one of the procedures. Plaintiff alleges that she returned to Dr. Rankovic and expressed that she only wished to have the tooth fixed. Instead, Dr. Rankovic allegedly removed crowns and then broke two other teeth. As a result, Plaintiff alleges that she suffers from depression and anxiety, and has lost weight due to difficulty eating. Plaintiff alleges that other dentists have informed her she will lose five teeth, one of which will involve a bone implant.

            On May 24, 2024, the Court sustained Defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend as to the claims for intentional misconduct, pain and suffering, and emotional distress. The remaining claims are dental malpractice and lack of informed consent.

            On January 23, 2025, Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff has not filed an opposition.

LEGAL STANDARD

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

DISCUSSION

I. Medical Malpractice

“The elements of a cause of action for medical malpractice are: (1) a duty to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of the profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of the duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the injury; and (4) resulting loss or damage.” (Lattimore v. Dickey (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 959, 968.) “The first element, standard of care, is the key issue in a malpractice action and can only be proved by expert testimony, unless the circumstances are such that the required conduct is within the layperson's common knowledge.” (Ibid.)

Here, Defendants’ medical expert avers that the treatment provided by Dr. Rankovic complied with the standard of care and did not cause Plaintiff’s injuries. (Shelhamer Decl. ¶¶ 15-27.) “Expert evidence in a malpractice suit is conclusive as to the proof of the prevailing standard of skill and learning in the locality and of the propriety of particular conduct by the practitioner in particular instances because such standard and skill is not a matter of general knowledge and can only be supplied by expert testimony.” (Willard v. Hagemeister (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 406, 412.)

Plaintiff has not filed an opposition and presents no conflicting expert testimony. Therefore, Defendants’ expert testimony is conclusive. Defendants have established as a matter of law that Dr. Rankovic’s actions followed the standard of care. As a result, Defendants are not liable for malpractice as a matter of law.

 

II. Informed Consent

“Because a patient relies upon her physician's greater medical knowledge when seeking medical treatment, the physician has a fiduciary-like duty to obtain his patient's informed consent regarding which course of treatment to pursue.” (Flores v. Liu (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 278, 292.) “To comply with the duty to obtain a patient’s informed consent, a physician must ‘disclose to the patient all material information—that is, information which the physician knows or should know would be regarded as significant by a reasonable person in the patient’s position when deciding to accept or reject a recommended medical procedure.’” (Id. at pp. 292-93, quoting Arato v. Avedon (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1172, 1186.)

            It is undisputed that Plaintiff signed consent forms for the treatments at issue. (UF 10-11, 18, 21, 107, 114-115.) This establishes an inference that Plaintiff provided informed consent to the treatments. Without rebuttal evidence, Plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue. Therefore, Defendants are not liable for lack of informed consent as a matter of law.

CONCLUSION

            Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

 

 





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