Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 24STCV07071, Date: 2025-01-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV07071    Hearing Date: January 22, 2025    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            On March 21, 2024, various tenants of five units in a residential building filed this habitability action against Defendants View Pointe Leeward, LLC and JK Properties, Inc. Plaintiffs filed the operative First Amended Complaint on November 5, 2024.

            On December 6, 2024, Defendants filed the instant demurrer and motion to strike against the FAC. Plaintiffs filed their opposition on January 8, 2025. Defendants filed their reply on January 13, 2025.

LEGAL STANDARD

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Ibid.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part of that pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b).) The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike (1) any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading and (2) all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id., § 437.)

MEET AND CONFER

Before filing a demurrer or a motion to strike, the demurring or moving party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to or the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41, 435.5.) The Court finds that Defendants have satisfied the meet and confer requirement. (See Raichelson Decl.)

DISCUSSION

I. Demurrer

            a. Misjoinder of Parties

            A demurrer lies if “[t]here is a defect or misjoinder of parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(d).) “All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if . . . [t]hey assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative, in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action.” (Id., § 378(a)(1).) “It is not necessary that each plaintiff be interested as to every cause of action or as to all relief prayed for. Judgment may be given for one or more of the plaintiffs according to their respective right to relief.” (Id., § 378(b).) “The statute should be liberally construed so as to permit joinder whenever possible in furtherance of this purpose.” (Moe v. Anderson (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 826, 833.)

            Defendants argue that there is a misjoinder of plaintiffs here because Plaintiffs are former and current tenants of different units, each with unique alleged problems and different damages. However, this is not sufficient to find misjoinder. As the Code states, each plaintiff need not be interested as to every cause of action or as to each prayer for relief. (Code Civ. Proc., § 378(b).) The claims arise “out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” because Plaintiffs leased units from the same owners/operators, resided in the same building, and suffered uninhabitable conditions due to the same misconduct. (See id., § 378(a)(1).) Thus, the action involves “question[s] of law or fact common to all these persons.” (Ibid.)

            b. Nuisance (Fifth COA)

            “Anything which is injurious to health . . . or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property . . . is a nuisance.” (Civ. Code, § 3479.) “It is settled that where conduct which violates a duty owed to another also interferes with that party's free use and enjoyment of his property, nuisance liability arises.” (Cutujian v. Benedict Hills Estates Assn. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1390.)

            Defendants argue that passive neglect, such as failure to remediate defective conditions, cannot support a nuisance claim. However, “[a] nuisance may be either a negligent or an intentional tort.” (Stoiber, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at p. 920.) “The fact that the defendants' alleged misconduct consists of omission rather than affirmative actions does not preclude nuisance liability.” (Ibid.) The allegations demonstrate that Defendants knew of the defects and their injurious effects and intentionally failed to remediate. For pleading purposes, this sufficiently constitutes an interference with Plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of the property so as to constitute a nuisance. (See Civ. Code, § 3479; Cutujian, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 1390.)

Relying on El Escorial Owners' Assn. v. DLC Plastering, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1337, Defendants also argue that the nuisance claim is duplicative of the negligence claim and should therefore be stricken. “Where negligence and nuisance causes of action rely on the same facts about lack of due care, the nuisance claim is a negligence claim.” (Id. at p. 1349.) The court in El Escorial based its holding on a concern that the definition of nuisance “is so broad that it could be applied indiscriminately to everything.” (Id. at p. 1348.) The court therefore held that the toxic mold contamination claim in that case “involves a traditional tort that should not be litigated under the guise of a nuisance action.” (Ibid.) At the same time, the court acknowledged that “courts have allowed plaintiffs to litigate nuisance causes of action in cases involving housing conditions.” (Ibid.)

As discussed above, nuisance may be negligent or intentional. (Stoiber, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at p. 920.) The plaintiff in Stoiber sufficiently established intentional conduct by alleging that the landlord had actual knowledge of uninhabitable conditions and “acted with full knowledge of the consequences thereof and the damage being caused to plaintiff, and their conduct was willful, oppressive and malicious.” (Ibid.) Plaintiffs make similar allegations here and therefore have sufficiently pled intentional nuisance apart from negligence.

The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the fifth cause of action.

c. Unfair Business Practices (Sixth COA)

Business and Professions Code section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices. Each of the three prongs is an independent basis for relief. (Smith v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 700, 718.) Unlawful conduct is defined as any practice forbidden by law. (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 377, 383.) UCL actions alleging unlawful conduct “borrow” from other statutes or common law causes of action outside Section 17200. (Klein v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1383.)

As discussed above, the nuisance claim has been adequately pled. Additionally, Defendants do not demur to the other causes of action, which include breach of the warranty of habitability, breach of quiet enjoyment, and violations of the Civil Code. These all represent “unlawful” conduct which may serve as the predicate for a UCL claim.

The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the sixth cause of action. 

d. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Seventh COA)

            To state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must establish: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. (Vasquez v. Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 819, 832.) “For conduct to be outrageous, it must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated by a civilized community.” (Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 172.) “Severe emotional distress [is] emotional distress of such substantial quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to endure it.” (Fletcher v. Western Life Insurance Co. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 376, 397.)

            Plaintiffs allegedly suffered “severe emotional distress, including extreme suffering, anguish, depression, fearfulness, anxiety, nightmares, difficulty sleeping, embarrassment, and shame.” (FAC ¶ 101.) This is generic and insufficient to state severe emotional distress. (See Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1051 [“discomfort, worry, anxiety, upset stomach, concern, and agitation” do not satisfy the severity standard].)

            The demurrer is SUSTAINED as to the seventh cause of action.

II. Motion to Strike

“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Id., subd. (c)(1).) “‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Id., subd. (c)(2).) Fraud is “intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Id., subd. (c)(3).)

The FAC alleges the particular defects with each unit, including cockroach infestations, pest infestations, widespread dampness, sewage water backup, water damage and mold contamination, as well as other plumbing issues, and structural defects. (FAC ¶¶ 20, 38-46.) These conditions allegedly exposed Plaintiffs, including minors, to health and safety hazards. (Id., ¶ 23.) The FAC alleges that Plaintiffs notified Defendants of the defective conditions and their effects, and Defendants received government notices of violations, but Defendants failed to remediate the conditions. (Id., ¶¶ 27-32.) Defendants allegedly sought to maximize profits by minimizing services and exploited Plaintiffs’ status as low-income tenants with limited resources and access to alternative housing. (Id., ¶¶ 94, 99.) For pleading purposes, this demonstrates a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of Plaintiffs and subjecting Plaintiffs to unjust hardship.

The motion to strike is DENIED as to punitive damages.

CONCLUSION

            Defendants’ demurrer is SUSTAINED as to the seventh cause of action without leave to amend and OVERRULED in all other respects. The motion to strike is DENIED.  Answer to be filed within 10 days of this order.