Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 24STCV10117, Date: 2025-06-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV10117    Hearing Date: June 2, 2025    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            On April 22, 2024, Plaintiff Joytech Healthcare Co., Ltd. filed this action against Defendant MediUSA, Inc.

            On June 12, 2024, Defendant filed its answer.

            On January 6, 2025, the Court granted defense counsel’s motion to be relieved as counsel. In that order, the Court set a January 29, 2025 Order to Show Cause (OSC) re: Striking Defendant’s answer if not represented by counsel. 

            On January 29, 2025, the Court held the OSC, and Defendant did not appear. The Court struck Defendant’s answer and entered default.

            On March 26, 2025, default judgment was entered accordingly.

            On May 1, 2025, Defendant filed the instant motion to set aside the default. Plaintiff filed its opposition on May 19, 2025. Defendant filed its reply on May 27, 2025.

LEGAL STANDARD

            “The court may . . . on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473(d).) A void judgment may be set aside “at any time.” (Heidary v. Yadollahi (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 857, 862.)

DISCUSSION

            “The relief granted to the plaintiff, if there is no answer, cannot exceed that demanded in the complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 580(a).) “[S]ection 580 is an unqualified limit on the jurisdiction of courts entering default judgments.” (Finney v. Gomez (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 527, 534.) Thus, “a default judgment greater than the amount specifically demanded is void as beyond the court's jurisdiction.” (Greenup v. Rodman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 822, 826.)

            Here, Plaintiff’s complaint demanded attorney’s fees “pursuant to Civil Code section 1717.5.” (Compl. ¶ 29.) That statute limits attorney’s fees to “the lesser of: (1) nine hundred sixty dollars ($960) for book accounts based upon an obligation owing by a natural person for goods, moneys, or services which were primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; and one thousand two hundred dollars ($1,200) for all other book accounts to which this section applies; or (2) 25 percent of the principal obligation owing under the contract.” (Civ. Code, § 1717.5(a).)

            The principal obligation owed in this case was alleged to be $135,420. (Compl. ¶ 7.) Under Civil Code section 1717.5, Plaintiff would be entitled to the lesser of (i) $960 or $1,200 and (ii) 25% of $135,420, which is $33,855. The lesser amount is clearly $960 or $1,200. Thus, under section 1717.5, Plaintiff would be entitled to a maximum of $1,200 in attorney’s fees. However, the default judgment awarded $5,978.40 in attorney’s fees, beyond the amounts permitted in Civil Code section 1717.5. This means that the judgment awarded an amount beyond that demanded in the complaint, rendering the judgment void.

            Plaintiff does not dispute this, but argues that Defendant’s motion fails to expressly request relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(d). However, the notice of motion states that “DEFENDANT further brings this motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 580(a) on the basis that the $205,629.15, judgment obtained by Plaintiff is void as a matter of law as it includes an award of attorney fees which exceeds the amount allowed under the statute Plaintiff used as its sole basis for attorney fees in the Complaint.” (Not. of Mtn. 2:16-19.) This clearly requests relief from a void judgment and sets forth the precise basis for doing so. Plaintiff was sufficiently put on notice and clearly acknowledged section 473(d) as the statutory basis for setting aside a void judgment. (See Opp. 13:20-22.) Thus, relief under section 473(d) is warranted.

CONCLUSION

            Defendant’s motion to set aside default is GRANTED.