Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 24STCV11549, Date: 2024-09-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV11549    Hearing Date: September 25, 2024    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            On May 8, 2024, Plaintiff Pedro Huinac filed this action against Defendant Hyundai Motor America (HMA), alleging breach of express and implied warranties under the Song-Beverly Act.

            On August 20, 2024, Defendant filed the instant motion to disqualify Logan Hensley, an associate attorney with Plaintiff’s counsel, Drake Law Firm. Plaintiff filed his opposition on September 12, 2024. Defendant filed its reply on September 18, 2024.

LEGAL STANDARD

“A trial court's authority to disqualify an attorney derives from its inherent power to ‘control in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in every matter pertaining thereto.’” (Clark v. Superior Court (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 37, 47, quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 128(a)(5).) “An attorney is required to avoid the representation of adverse interests and cannot, without the informed written consent of the client or former client, accept employment adverse to the client or former client where, by reason of the representation of the client or former client, the member has obtained confidential information material to the employment. (Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 3-310(E).)” (Jessen v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 698, 705.)

“[W]hether an attorney should be disqualified in a successive representation case turns on two variables: (1) the relationship between the legal problem involved in the former representation and the legal problem involved in the current representation, and (2) the relationship between the attorney and the former client with respect to the legal problem involved in the former representation.” (Jessen, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 709.)

DISCUSSION

I. Substantial Relationship

            “The substantial relationship test requires comparison not only of the legal issues involved in successive representations, but also of evidence bearing on the materiality of the information the attorney received during the earlier representation.” (Khani v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 916, 921.) “The attorney's acquisition of general information about the former client's overall structure and practices would not of itself require disqualification unless it were found to be material—i.e., directly in issue or of critical importance—in the second representation. The same is true about information such as the first client's litigation philosophy or key decision makers.” (Ibid., citing Farris v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 671, 680.)

            Logan Hensley represented Defendant HMA in Song-Beverly cases while working for RoseWaldorf LLP from December 2022 to May 2024. (Yasuzawa Decl. ¶¶ 3-5.) According to RoseWaldorf, Mr. Hensley was exposed to “HMA’s defenses and strategies of various cases” and “received extensive and almost constant training regarding HMA’s litigation strategies and the manner in which those litigation strategies were developed and implemented.” (Id., ¶¶ 7-9.) “Mr. Hensley was also responsible for drafting responses to discovery and reviewing and determining which HMA documents were responsive and discoverable such that they should be produced at a particular Person Most Knowledgeable deposition or in response to discovery.” (Id., ¶ 10.)

            Khani is informative on whether this is sufficient to warrant disqualification. In Khani, Ford similarly moved to disqualify the plaintiff’s counsel, Payam Shahian, due to Shahian’s prior representation of Ford in lemon law cases. (Khani, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 919.) Ford similarly argued that Shahian “was ‘privy to confidential client communications and information relating to the defense of’ such cases, as well as to ‘pre-litigation strategies, tactics, and case handling procedures.’” (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal rejected Ford’s argument because “[w]hile Ford presented evidence that Shahian represented it in California lemon law cases, it did not establish that any confidential information about the defense in those cases would be at issue in this case.” (Id. at p. 922.) “The trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the prior cases were substantially related to the current case just because they involved claims under the same statute.” (Ibid.) “The court also incorrectly assumed that Shahian's exposure to playbook information in prior lemon law cases was sufficient to disqualify him in this case without any showing of its materiality.” (Ibid.)         

Here, HMA has similarly failed to show that Mr. Hensley gained confidential information from his prior participation in HMA cases that is material to the current representation of Plaintiff Huinac. RoseWaldorf’s vague reference to “litigation strategies” is insufficient to warrant disqualification under Khani. (See Khani, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 922 [“Ford's bare-bones evidence in this case is insufficient to establish that Shahian's previous representation of Ford in California lemon law cases exposed him to confidential information that would be material to his current representation of Khani”].) As in Khani, there is no indication that the subject vehicle in this case or its repair history were the subject of any prior action in which Mr. Hensley represented HMA. (Ibid.)

Because HMA has failed to demonstrate a substantial relationship between the prior and current representations under the standards set forth in Jessen and Khani, there is no basis for disqualification.

II. Screening

            In any event, proper screening of Mr. Hensley would allow Drake Law Firm to represent Plaintiff even if Mr. Hensley were found to have a conflict. (See Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Rule 1.10(a)(2).) Mr. Hensley has been blocked from accessing any casefiles involving HMA, cannot receive communications discussing HMA, and other employees have been instructed not to discuss cases involving HMA with Mr. Hensley. (Serrano Decl. ¶¶ 9-11.) HMA’s counsel has been notified of these screening procedures. (Id., Ex. A, B.)

The Court finds that Drake Law Firm has satisfied the requirements of Rule 1.10(a)(2). Because Mr. Hensley has been properly screened from cases involving HMA, the conflict (if it exists) is not imputed to Drake Law Firm. Accordingly, Drake Law Firm may continue to represent Plaintiff even if Mr. Hensley cannot.

CONCLUSION

            Defendant’s motion to disqualify counsel is DENIED.