Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 24STCV12477, Date: 2024-09-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV12477    Hearing Date: September 6, 2024    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            On May 17, 2024, Plaintiff Michael Butler filed this action against Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Authority, asserting causes of action for (1) negligence, (2) dangerous condition of public property, (3) violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, (4) violation of the Disabled Persons Act, and (5) strict products liability.

            Plaintiff alleges that he is disabled and relies on a scooter or wheelchair for mobility and regularly rides the Los Angeles Metro for transportation. (Compl. ¶ 11.) On June 10, 2023, Plaintiff boarded a metro train in his wheelchair. (Id., ¶ 12.) The train allegedly braked aggressively multiple times during the ride, and on one such occasion, this caused Plaintiff to fall over in his wheelchair, leading to severe injuries. (Id., ¶ 13.) Several passengers allegedly attempted to contact the train operator, who did not respond. (Id., ¶ 14.) At a later stop, another operator appeared and quickly exited the train without acknowledging the passengers. (Ibid.) The train then continued as normal. (Ibid.)

            On August 9, 2024, Defendant filed the instant demurrer and motion to strike against the complaint. Plaintiff filed his opposition on August 23, 2024. Defendant filed its reply on August 29, 2024.   

LEGAL STANDARD

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Ibid.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part of that pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b).) The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike (1) any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading and (2) all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id., § 437.)

MEET AND CONFER

Before filing a demurrer or a motion to strike, the demurring or moving party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to or the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41, 435.5.) The Court notes that Defendant has complied with the meet and confer requirement. (See Liu Decl.)

DISCUSSION

I. Demurrer

a. Negligence (First COA)

“Except as otherwise provided by statute . . . [a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 815(a).) “[S]ection 815 abolishes common law tort liability for public entities.” (Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 899.) “In other words, direct tort liability of public entities must be based on a specific statute declaring them to be liable . . . .” (Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1183.)

1. Mandatory Duty

One such statute is Government Code section 815.6, which provides: “Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.” (Gov. Code, § 815.6.) “[A]pplication of section 815.6 requires that the enactment at issue be obligatory, rather than merely discretionary or permissive, in its directions to the public entity.” (Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 498.) “If a statute does not require that a ‘particular action’ be taken, Government Code section 815.6 does not create the right to sue a public entity.” (Shamsian v. Department of Conservation (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 621, 632.)

Plaintiff has not identified any statute imposing a mandatory duty in relation to the operation of the train. Plaintiff argues that “Defendant was the operator of the subject metro rail and had a duty of care to operate the train in a safe, lawful, and responsible manner so as to not cause injury to others.” (Opp. 5:14-15.) However, this is not sufficient under section 815.6; instead, the statute must “require that a ‘particular action’ be taken.” (See Shamsian, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 632.) Plaintiff has identified no statute mandating any “particular action” with regards to the operation of a metro train. Thus, liability for negligence cannot be based on section 815.6.   

2. Vicarious Liability

Another statute expressly imposing liability on public entities is Government Code section 815.2, which provides: “A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee.” (Gov. Code, § 815.2(a).) A government entity that is immune from direct tort liability may nonetheless be liable vicariously for the acts of its employees. (See Ross v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1514.) However, this also means that the entity is immune to the extent that its employees are immune. (Ibid.; Gov. Code, § 815.2(b).) 

An individual’s liability for negligence depends on the following elements: (1) a duty to exercise ordinary care; (2) breach of that duty; (3) causation; and (4) damages. (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917.) Here, Plaintiff has alleged that the individual train operators and servicers had a duty to operate and maintain the train with due care, that they breached that duty, and that the breach caused Plaintiff’s damages. (See Compl. ¶¶ 13-28.) Defendant claims that there are insufficient facts explaining how its employees’ actions caused Plaintiff’s injuries. This overlooks the allegations that the train operators braked excessively, ignored passengers’ alerts during the incident, and failed to properly maintain the rail’s safety systems, among other things. These allegations are sufficiently specific for pleading purposes.

Because the complaint adequately pleads negligence against the employees, it has established a basis for vicarious liability under section 815.2. Thus, Plaintiff has articulated a statutory basis for the negligence claim. The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the first cause of action.

b. Dangerous Condition of Public Property (Second COA)

            Government Code section 835 is yet another statute that expressly provides for liability against a public entity. It provides as follows:

“Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either:

(a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or

(b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.”

(Gov. Code, § 835.)

            Here, Plaintiff has alleged that the metro rail was in a dangerous condition due to defective design and maintenance of the train, tracks, tunnel, signals, electrical systems, brakes, etc. (Compl. ¶ 31.) Plaintiff alleges that such defects were the result of the negligent acts of Defendant’s employees. (Id., ¶ 32.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant had sufficient notice of the defects in time to take preventative measures before Plaintiff’s injury. (Id., ¶ 33.) Thus, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim under section 835.

            The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the second cause of action.   

c. Unruh Act (Third COA)

            The Unruh Civil Rights Act provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” (Civ. Code, § 51(b).)

            The term “business establishments of every kind whatsoever” should be interpreted “in the broadest sense reasonably possible.” (Burks v. Poppy Construction Co. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 463, 468.) Thus, “some entities that would not ordinarily ‘be thought of as … ‘traditional’ business establishment[s]’ should be considered business establishments for purposes of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.” (Brennon B. v. Superior Court (2022) 13 Cal.5th 662, 674.) “In parsing the boundaries of what constitutes a ‘business establishment,’ our cases have focused on attributes—performing business functions, protecting economic value, operating as the functional equivalent of a commercial enterprise, etc.” (Id. at p. 681.) “[A]n entity must effectively operate as a business or a commercial enterprise” (ibid.) or “engage[] in behavior involving sufficient ‘businesslike attributes’” (Carter v. City of Los Angeles (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 808, 825).

            In Brennon, the Supreme Court held that “public school districts engaged in the work of educating students” did not constitute a “business establishment” under the Unruh Act. (Brennon, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 681.) “When acting in their core educational capacity, public school districts do not perform ‘customary business functions,’ nor is their ‘overall function … to protect and enhance … economic value.” (Ibid.) Similarly, “[a] state prison is not a business establishment for purposes of the act unless it engages in behavior involving sufficient ‘businesslike attributes.’” (Carter, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 825.)

            Defendant relies on Brennon for the proposition that public entities cannot be “business establishments” under the Unruh Act. However, Brennon makes clear that the analysis focuses on “attributes” such as “performing business functions, protecting economic value, [or] operating as the functional equivalent of a commercial enterprise,” not on the public or private status of an entity. (See Brennan, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 681.) Brennan did not hold that all public entities fall outside the definition of “business establishment.” It merely held that school districts, “[w]hen acting in their core educational capacity,” could not be considered business establishments. (Ibid.) Carter recognized that a public entity, such as a state prison, may be considered a business enterprise if it “engages in behavior involving sufficient ‘businesslike attributes.’” (Carter, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 825.) Defendant cites no case where a public entity was deemed beyond the scope of the Unruh Act solely because it was a public entity.

            Here, the operation of a metro line involves providing transportation services in exchange for monetary payment. In this way, Defendant “appears to have been operating in a capacity that is the functional equivalent of a commercial enterprise.” (See Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club (1995) 10 Cal.4th 594, 622.) Defendant “furnish[es] goods, services or facilities to its clients, patrons or customers.” (See Stamps v. Superior Court (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1449.) Brennon does not preclude application of the Unruh Act under the particular circumstances of this case.

            The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the third cause of action.

d. Disabled Persons Act (Fourth COA)

            “Individuals with disabilities or medical conditions have the same right as the general public to the full and free use of the streets, highways, sidewalks, walkways, public buildings, medical facilities, including hospitals, clinics, and physicians’ offices, public facilities, and other public places.” (Civ. Code, § 54(a).)

            Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant operated a public transport system but failed to provide safety accommodations for disabled passengers with wheelchairs. (Compl. ¶¶ 49-50.) This sufficiently establishes a violation of the DPA. Citing to federal cases interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege deliberate indifference or discriminatory animus. (Mtn. 9:7-21.) However, the DPA is a California statute, and Defendant cites no authority imposing such a requirement under the DPA.

            The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the fourth cause of action.

e. Strict Products Liability (Fifth COA)

                        1. No “Product”

            “Products liability is the name currently given to the area of the law involving the liability of those who supply goods or products for the use of others to purchasers, users, and bystanders for losses of various kinds resulting from so-called defects in those products.” (Johnson v. United States Steel Corp. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 22, 30.) “A ‘product’ is broadly defined to include any ‘tangible personal property distributed commercially for use or consumption.’” (Id. at p. 31.) “Generally, the imposition of strict liability hinges on the extent to which a party was ‘responsible for placing products in the stream of commerce.’” (Hernandezcueva v. E.F. Brady Co., Inc. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 249, 258.) “However, products liability does not reach a party who is delivering a service to the consumer rather than supplying the product at issue.” (Sharufa v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 493, 502.)

            “In a given transaction involving both products and services, liability will often depend upon the defendant’s role. For example, an airline passenger injured because of a defect in the craft would have a strict liability claim against the manufacturer,” but “the airline operating the plane would be primarily involved in providing a service, i.e., transportation. The airline is itself the end user of the product and imposition of strict liability would be inappropriate.” (Ferrari v. Grand Canyon Dories (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 248, 258.) In Ferrari, the plaintiff was injured while taking a guided tour on a river raft and sued the tour company for products liability. (Id. at pp. 251-52.) The court held that the claim was invalid because “Defendants did not provide plaintiff with a raft for her to use. They provided a service, i.e., recreational raft transportation on the Colorado River.” (Id. at p. 259.) The raft “was merely an incident to this service.” (Ibid.)

            Similarly, Defendant in this case primarily provided a transportation service, and the trains were merely an incident to this service. Defendant was not “responsible for placing products in the stream of commerce.” (See Hernandezcueva, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 258.) While Plaintiff may have a claim against the manufacturer or distributor of the trains, Defendant is neither. Instead, Defendant is an ultimate user like the airline or tour company described in Ferrari.

This case is not analogous to Sharufa, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 503, where the court found a triable issue over whether a water park primarily provided a product (the slides) or a service (food, ride attendants, lifeguards, retail, etc.). Whereas guests visiting a waterpark arguably do so specifically to use the waterslides for their inherent entertainment value, passengers on a metro train primarily seek the service of being moved from one place to another. The product (the train) is merely an incident to this service. Passengers ride the train to go somewhere, not for the sake of the train itself. Unlike Ferrari, Sharufa did not involve a transportation service. Thus, Sharufa is not authority for whether products liability is viable against the Defendant in this case, who is a transportation provider, not an amusement park operator. Ferrari is more on point and precludes products liability under the facts of this case.

Because Defendant did not provide a product, it cannot be held liable for products liability.   

2. Government Immunity

As established above, government liability must be specifically enumerated in a statute. However, “[s]trict products liability is a unique, court-fashioned doctrine.” (Tolan v. State of California ex rel. Dept. of Transportation (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 980, 986-87.) “Hence, strict products liability has no place in governmental tort law, directly or by analogy.” (Id. at p. 987.) Plaintiff’s opposition does not respond to this point, much less cite any statute imposing strict products liability on public entities. Therefore, the claim fails as a matter of law for this independent reason.  

            The demurrer is SUSTAINED as to the fifth cause of action.

II. Motion to Strike

            a. Negligent Hiring

            The Tort Claims Act prescribes two sources of liability for a public entity: (1) liability based on the entity’s own conduct; and (2) vicarious liability for the acts of employees of the entity. (de Villers v. County of San Diego (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 238, 251.) While a public entity is generally liable for any act of its employees that is within the course of employment, the entity’s liability for its own conduct is limited to that prescribed by statute. (Id. at pp. 251-52; Gov. Code, § 815.) A negligent hiring claim fails to the extent that it seeks direct liability for an entity’s own negligence because there is no statutory basis for such liability. (Id. at pp. 252-53; Munoz v. City of Union City (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1111-14.)

However, a public entity may be vicariously liable for the negligence of its supervisory employees in hiring and supervising incompetent staff. In C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 874-75, the court held that a school district could be vicariously liable for the negligence of its administrators in hiring and supervising a known child molester. Such a theory was not possible in de Villers because “there was no evidence supporting a conclusion any County employee had undertaken a special protective relationship toward de Villers,” a husband whose wife murdered him using poison she stole from the county coroner’s office where she worked. (Id. at p. 874.) In other words, “the toxicologist's supervisors and coworkers owed her husband no duty to prevent his murder and could therefore not be personally liable for his death.” (Ibid.) Without any such liability on the individual employees, the County could not be vicariously liable. (Ibid.)

            By contrast, the court in C.A. found that “school personnel ‘have a duty to protect students from harm, which includes an obligation to exercise ordinary care in hiring, training, supervising, and discharging school personnel.’” (C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 874.) It follows that when school personnel negligently perform their duties, including by hiring incompetent teachers who harm children, the school district is vicariously liable for such negligence. (Id. at pp. 874-75.) 

            In this case, Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant’s employees negligently hired and supervised the staff who operated and maintained the metro rail system. (Compl. ¶ 20.) Unlike in de Villers, where employees of the county coroner owed no duty to prevent a coworker from poisoning her husband, Defendant’s employees owe metro passengers a duty to ensure their safety while riding, which arguably includes properly hiring and supervising the staff who operate and maintain the trains. Assuming Defendant’s employees negligently hired and supervised incompetent staff, Defendant may be vicariously liable for this negligence under Government Code section 815.2. Thus, for pleading purposes, the alleged facts support Defendant’s vicarious liability for negligent hiring.

            The motion to strike is DENIED as to the allegations pertaining to negligent hiring and supervision.

            b. Prejudgment Interest

            “A person who is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in the person upon a particular day, is entitled also to recover interest thereon from that day, except when the debtor is prevented by law, or by the act of the creditor from paying the debt. This section is applicable to recovery of damages and interest from any debtor, including the state or any county, city, city and county, municipal corporation, public district, public agency, or any political subdivision of the state.” (Civ. Code, § 3287(a), emphasis added.)

            Defendant argues that prejudgment interest is unrecoverable against a public entity under Civil Code section 3291. Section 3291 prescribes prejudgment interest when a plaintiff makes a settlement offer that the defendant does not accept, and the plaintiff obtains a more favorable result at trial. Section 3291 does not apply to public entities. However, section 3287 expressly allows recovery against public entities in situations where damages are certain or capable of being made certain. Thus, Plaintiff may allege prejudgment interest under section 3287. Whether Plaintiff is ultimately entitled to any prejudgment interest is not currently at issue.

CONCLUSION

            Defendant’s demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend as to the fifth cause of action and OVERRULED in all other respects. The motion to strike is DENIED.