Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 24STCV12798, Date: 2024-10-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV12798    Hearing Date: October 21, 2024    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            On May 21, 2024, Plaintiffs Mia Brower, Ale Lubezki, and Alexandra Bakst filed this action against Defendants Atara Redstone LLC, Evergreen Grand Sequoia LLC, and Wayne Gam, asserting causes of action for (1) negligence, (2) breach of the warranty of habitability, (3) breach of the warranty of quiet enjoyment, (4) nuisance, (5) breach of contract, and (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

            From August 2021 to July 2022, Plaintiffs were tenants of a rental unit allegedly owned or operated by Defendants. (Compl. ¶¶ 1-2.) Plaintiffs allege that throughout their tenancy, the unit was subject to uninhabitable conditions including: insufficient ventilation; inadequate waterproofing; water damage; surface and airborne contaminants; toxic conditions; and violation of local ordinances. (Id., ¶ 15.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants had been notified since January 2022 of leaks, water damage, mold, and other substandard living conditions. (Id., ¶ 18.) Defendants allegedly failed to respond to Plaintiffs’ complaints, only sending an untrained and unlicensed handyman, who attempted to remove the moldy and water-damaged drywall without proper containment, causing toxic spores to propagate throughout the unit. (Id., ¶¶ 21-22.) Subsequently, mold and fungus contamination only increased, and Defendants took no remedial action despite being notified. (Id., ¶¶ 23-24.)

            On September 16, 2024, Defendants filed the instant demurrer to the fourth and sixth causes of action, accompanied by a motion to strike. Plaintiffs filed their opposition on October 4, 2024. Defendants filed their replies on October 14, 2024.

LEGAL STANDARD

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Ibid.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part of that pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b).) The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike (1) any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading and (2) all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id., § 437.)

MEET AND CONFER

Before filing a demurrer or a motion to strike, the demurring or moving party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to or the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41, 435.5.) The Court notes that Defendants have complied with the meet and confer requirement. (See Larsen Decl.)

DISCUSSION

I. Demurrer

            a. Nuisance

“Anything which is injurious to health . . . or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property . . . is a nuisance.” (Civ. Code, § 3479.) “It is settled that where conduct which violates a duty owed to another also interferes with that party's free use and enjoyment of his property, nuisance liability arises.” (Cutujian v. Benedict Hills Estates Assn. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1389.)

Defendants argue that the complaint contains no facts demonstrating how Defendants’ actions were unreasonable. The complaint sufficiently alleges that Defendants’ actions were unreasonable for pleading purposes. Specifically, Defendants allegedly hired an untrained and unlicensed handyman who failed to remediate the issue and actually made matters worse. (Compl. ¶¶ 21-24.) The complaint alleges that Defendants took no remedial measures yet continued to demand rent while knowing that Plaintiffs were living in mold-infested conditions. (Id., ¶ 24.)

Defendants argue that the complaint admits Defendants took remedial action by hiring someone to address the mold. Defendants also argue that because the complaint does not allege specific dates, it does not show how long Defendants waited before addressing the issue. Defendants essentially argue that if they hired someone promptly, they would be absolved from nuisance liability as a matter of law. Defendants cite no authority for this proposition. For pleading purposes, Defendants’ actions may be considered unreasonable because Defendant allegedly took no remedial action despite being on notice of the conditions and only hired an untrained and unlicensed handyman who made the situation worse. The precise timeline of events, and whether Plaintiffs specifically notified Defendants after the handyman, are factual matters for discovery.

Lastly, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to attribute specific actions to each defendant, instead grouping Defendants together. Defendants cite no authority suggesting that this defeats a nuisance claim. Plaintiffs are entitled to allege that all Defendants are responsible for the same defective conditions and failure to remediate. The specific involvement of any particular defendant is a factual matter for discovery. The complaint sufficiently puts Defendants on notice of the nature of the claims. 

Ultimately, Plaintiffs have adequately pled a nuisance cause of action.

b. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

To state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must establish: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. (Vasquez v. Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 819, 832.)

“For conduct to be outrageous, it must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated by a civilized community.” (Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 172.) “Severe emotional distress [is] emotional distress of such substantial quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to endure it.” (Fletcher v. Western Life Insurance Co. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 376, 397.) A landlord’s willful failure to correct defective conditions can constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Burnett v. Chimney Sweep (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1069.)

“[D]iscomfort, worry, anxiety, upset stomach, concern, and agitation” do not satisfy the severity standard. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1051.) Plaintiffs’ allegations are similarly generic and thus do not rise to the level of IIED. (See Compl. ¶¶ 34, 51, 60.) Therefore, the IIED claim is not properly pled.  

II. Motion to Strike

            a. Punitive Damages

“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Id., subd. (c)(1).) “‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Id., subd. (c)(2).) Fraud is “intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Id., subd. (c)(3).)

The allegations discussed above—where Defendants allegedly knew of the uninhabitable conditions for an extended period of time but ignored them while continuing to extract rent—sufficiently establish conscious disregard for Plaintiffs’ rights and safety, as well as conduct that subjected Plaintiffs to unjust hardship. The allegations are sufficiently specific, and Plaintiffs are entitled to attribute the offending conduct to all Defendants. Thus, the complaint properly pleads a basis for punitive damages. 

b. Attorney’s Fees

“[A]n attorney who chooses to litigate in propria persona and therefore does not pay or become liable to pay consideration in exchange for legal representation cannot recover ‘reasonable attorney’s fees’ . . . .” (Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 292.) Plaintiffs are pro per litigants and therefore cannot incur or recover attorney’s fees. Therefore, the prayer for attorney’s fees is stricken. Plaintiffs may amend the complaint if a basis for attorney’s fees arises later.

CONCLUSION

            Defendants’ demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend as to the sixth cause of action and OVERRULED as to the fourth cause of action. Defendants’ motion to strike is GRANTED as to attorney’s fees and DENIED as to punitive damages.