Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 24STCV14339, Date: 2025-03-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV14339    Hearing Date: March 17, 2025    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            On June 6, 2024, Plaintiffs Ashia Johnson (individually and on behalf of minor Plaintiffs Dynasty Sanders and Alashia Johnson), and Rhonda Wise filed this action against Defendants Fame Housing Corporation, Trillium Property Management, Inc., and Does 1 through 100.

            On February 5, 2025, Defendant Fame Gardens Limited Partnership (Doe 1) filed the instant demurrer and motion to strike against the complaint. Plaintiffs filed their opposition on February 28, 2025. Defendant filed its reply on March 10, 2025.

LEGAL STANDARD

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Ibid.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part of that pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b).) The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike (1) any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading and (2) all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id., § 437.)

MEET AND CONFER

Before filing a demurrer or a motion to strike, the demurring or moving party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to or the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41, 435.5.) The Court notes that Defendant has complied with the meet and confer requirement. (See Levine Decl.)

DISCUSSION

I. Demurrer

            a. Uncertainty

            A demurrer for uncertainty is disfavored and is only granted “if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (A.J. Fistes Corp. v. GDL Best Contractors, Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 677, 695.) A complaint does not need to be a “model of clarity” to survive a demurrer because most ambiguities can be clarified through discovery. (Ibid.)

            Defendant argues that the complaint is uncertain because the contract attached to the complaint is signed by Plaintiff Wise and another person not a party to the action. (See Compl., Ex. A.) However, Defendant provides no explanation for why this renders the complaint uncertain. Not every party to a contract has to be involved in an action on the contract.

            Defendant argues that the complaint is uncertain because the contract contains a conflict resolution procedure, and there is no indication that Plaintiffs exhausted it before filing this suit. However, Plaintiffs have alleged that they satisfied all of their obligations under the agreement. (Compl. ¶ 45.) This allegation must be assumed true at the pleading stage. Whether Plaintiffs actually satisfied their obligations under the contract is a factual question for discovery.

            Lastly, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs fail to explain why they resided in the property for so long if the conditions were uninhabitable. This is also a factual issue that has no bearing on uncertainty. The complaint sufficiently puts Defendant on notice of the claims regardless of how improbable the claims may be. (See Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406 [“we accept as true even the most improbable alleged facts, and we do not concern ourselves with the plaintiff's ability to prove its factual allegations”].) Defendant cites no authority for its proposition that living in the residence for an extended time constitutes an admission that the premises was not uninhabitable.     

            b. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

To state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must establish: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. (Vasquez v. Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 819, 832.)

“For conduct to be outrageous, it must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated by a civilized community.” (Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 172.) “Severe emotional distress [is] emotional distress of such substantial quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to endure it.” (Fletcher v. Western Life Insurance Co. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 376, 397.)

The conduct alleged in the complaint is not sufficiently outrageous as a matter of law. Plaintiffs allege no aggravating facts justifying a claim for IIED. Plaintiffs also fail to allege severe emotional distress beyond conclusory allegations.

Therefore, the demurrer is SUSTAINED as to the third cause of action.

II. Motion to Strike

“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Id., subd. (c)(1).) “‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Id., subd. (c)(2).) Fraud is “intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Id., subd. (c)(3).)

The actions alleged in the complaint sufficiently demonstrate “a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of” Plaintiffs and their children, as well as subjecting Plaintiffs to “unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (See Civ. Code, § 3294(c).) Defendants allegedly knew of the substandard conditions and knew that Plaintiffs were suffering health issues as a result. (See Compl. ¶¶ 20-42.) Nonetheless, Defendants allegedly refused to address the issues for an extended period of time. (Ibid.) This is sufficient to support a prayer for punitive damages at the pleading stage.

Defendant also argues that the complaint fails to allege facts establishing corporate ratification. (See Civ. Code, § 3294(b).) However, the complaint alleges that the acts were ratified by Defendants. (Compl. ¶ 8.) This must be taken as true on a demurrer. The evidentiary facts proving corporate ratification should be left for discovery.

            The motion to strike is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

            Defendant Fame Gardens Limited Partnership’s demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend as to the third cause of action and OVERRULED in all other respects. The motion to strike is DENIED.