Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 24STCV17115, Date: 2024-11-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV17115    Hearing Date: November 8, 2024    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            On July 10, 2024, Plaintiff Kane Handel filed this action against Defendant 1706 North Stanley LLC, asserting causes of action for negligence and premises liability. The complaint stems from injuries Plaintiff sustained after a slip and fall at Defendant’s property.

            On October 15, 2024, Defendant filed the instant motion to strike punitive damages from the complaint. Plaintiff filed her opposition on October 25, 2024. Defendant filed its reply on October 30, 2024.

LEGAL STANDARD

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part of that pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b).) The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike (1) any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading and (2) all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id., § 437.)

MEET AND CONFER

Before filing a demurrer or a motion to strike, the demurring or moving party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to or the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41, 435.5.) The Court notes that Defendant has complied with the meet and confer requirement. (See Page Decl.)

DISCUSSION

“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Id., subd. (c)(1).) “‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Id., subd. (c)(2).) Fraud is “intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Id., subd. (c)(3).)

Here, the complaint alleges that tenants notified Defendant of slippery conditions caused by a storm but Defendant failed to remediate the issues. (Compl. ¶¶ 16-22.) This demonstrates negligence at most, which is insufficient for punitive damages. (See Jackson v. Johnson (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1354 [“Simple negligence cannot support an award of punitive damages”].) There are no aggravating facts amounting to malice, oppression, or fraud.

Plaintiff’s caselaw is distinguishable. For example, in Nolin v. National Convenience Stores, Inc. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 279, 284, the defendant removed signs warning gas pump customers of a slippery oil spill out of concern for the store’s image. The defendant also stopped warning customers of the danger through the loudspeaker. (Ibid.) The facts “reflected defendant's overriding concern for a minimum-expense operation, regardless of the peril involved.” (Id. at p. 288.) In Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 757, 813, a case involving the infamous Ford Pinto, the court found that “Ford could have corrected the hazardous design defects at minimal cost but decided to defer correction of the shortcomings by engaging in a cost-benefit analysis balancing human lives and limbs against corporate profits.” This constituted an “institutional mentality” of “callous indifference to public safety.” (Ibid.)   

By contrast, the allegations here show that Defendants set up a tenant portal to allow reporting of complaints and were reachable by text. This does not demonstrate malicious conduct like concealing the hazard or explicitly choosing profits over safety. Defendants’ failure to remedy the issues before Plaintiff’s injury amounts to no more than negligence. Thus, the complaint fails to plead a basis for punitive damages.

CONCLUSION

            Defendant’s motion to strike is GRANTED.