Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 24STCV24617, Date: 2025-06-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV24617    Hearing Date: June 11, 2025    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            On September 23, 2024, Plaintiff Charles C. Wright, Jr. filed this action against various defendants, asserting quiet title and declaratory relief. Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (FAC) on March 12, 2025, alleging (1) quiet title, (2) declaratory relief, (3) fraud, and (4) conversion/unjust enrichment.

            The action concerns a parcel of real property located in Los Angeles, of which Plaintiff alleges he owns one-half interest. (FAC ¶¶ 16-17.) The property was subject to various transfers between 1974 and 1988. (Id., ¶¶ 18-25.) This culminated in a dispute over ownership which settled in 1990. (Id., ¶ 26.) Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the property was transferred to Plaintiff and his sister, Diane Wright (Diane), as joint tenants. (Id., ¶ 27.) Diane allegedly waived any other rights or claims to the property under the settlement agreement. (Id., ¶ 28.)

            However, in November 1993 and April 2022, Diane allegedly purported to transfer the property to herself by executing grant deeds. (FAC ¶¶ 30-33.) Plaintiff alleges that the 1993 and 2022 grant deeds are void and unenforceable. (Ibid.) Plaintiff alleges that Diane executed the deeds in order to falsify title in her name. (Id., ¶ 34.) In September 2023, Diane sold the property to Defendant Home Allies LLC. (Id., ¶¶ 35-37.) Home Allies allegedly purchased the property with knowledge of Plaintiff’s rights in the property and has attempted to evict Plaintiff through unlawful detainer. (Id., ¶¶ 38-50.)  

            On May 5, 2025, Defendant Home Allies LLC and its alleged managers, Defendants Andres Hinostroza and Jennifer Hinostroza, filed the instant demurrer and motion to strike against the FAC. Plaintiff filed his opposition on May 23, 2025. Defendants filed their reply on June 4, 2025.

LEGAL STANDARD

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Ibid.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part of that pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b).) The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike (1) any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading and (2) all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id., § 437.)

MEET AND CONFER

Before filing a demurrer or a motion to strike, the demurring or moving party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to or the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41, 435.5.)

The declaration of defense counsel fails to demonstrate adequate efforts to meet and confer. Defense counsel emailed Plaintiff’s counsel, asking for a phone call to discuss the FAC. (Rawi Decl., Ex. A.) Plaintiff’s counsel replied, asking for a summary of purported deficiencies before setting up a call. (Ibid.) Defense counsel considered this a “precondition” which prevented the parties from reaching an agreement. (Id., ¶ 3.) This motion followed. Thus, defense counsel made no real effort to meet and confer.

However, inadequate meet and confer is not a reason to overrule a demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a)(4).) The parties’ respective positions are set forth in their briefs, and it is apparent they have reached an impasse. Therefore, the Court proceeds on the merits.

DISCUSSION

I. Demurrer

            a. Individual Liability

            Defendants argue that Andres and Jennifer Hinostroza cannot be liable in either their individual capacities or as trustees of the IRDA Trust because they are not alleged to have acted in those capacities. Defendants argue that the Hinostrozas only acted as agents of Home Allies, and “agents are not vicariously liable for the torts of their principals.” (Peredia v. HR Mobile Services, Inc. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 680, 692.)       

            However, the FAC alleges that “Defendants claim some legal or equitable right, title, estate, lien, or interest in the Property.” (FAC ¶ 56.) The FAC also alleges that “[a]n actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Plaintiff and Defendants, and each of them, as to the parties’ respective rights and obligations to the Property.” (Id., ¶ 60.) It is possible, for example, that the Hinostrozas could claim some right to the property through their interest in Home Allies. Thus, the Hinostrozas are properly included as defendants for purposes of settling the title dispute, even if they are not liable for any torts.

            b. Quiet Title

                        1. Statute of Limitations

            “The limitations period for a quiet title cause of action depends on the underlying theory of relief.” (Kumar v. Ramsey (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1110, 1122.) “[W]hether a statute of limitations bars an action to quiet title may turn on whether the plaintiff is in undisturbed possession of the land.” (Mayer v. L&B Real Estate (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1231, 1237.) “Alternatively, the question can be stated as (1) when were plaintiffs no longer owners ‘in exclusive and undisputed possession’ of the land; (2) when was defendants’ adverse ‘claim … pressed against’ plaintiffs; or (3) when was defendants’ hostile claim ‘asserted in some manner to jeopardize the superior title’ held by plaintiffs.” (Salazar, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 478, citations omitted.) “[M]ere notice of an adverse claim is not enough to commence the owner’s statute of limitations.” (Ibid.)

Defendants argue that the allegations here sound in fraud, which has a three-year statute of limitations. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 338.) Defendants argue that the statute of limitations began running in 1993, when Diane allegedly first attempted to transfer the property to herself. (See FAC ¶ 30.) However, the claim against Defendants is based on their purchase of the property in 2023. (Id., ¶ 35.) Defendants could not have pressed an adverse claim sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations until then. Defendants do not explain how the statute of limitations could have expired before they were even involved in the events in question. A cause of action accrues upon completion of the wrongful conduct, or discovery of such. (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 397.) This could not have occurred as to Defendants until 2023 at the earliest.

Moreover, even if Diane’s purported title transfer was sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations as to Defendants, Defendants acknowledge that this requires “the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.” (Reply 4:4-7, quoting Ankoanda v. Walker-Smith (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 610, 615.) Plaintiff alleges that he did not know about the 1993 transfer. (FAC ¶ 69.) Thus, the claim is not time-barred on the face of the pleadings.

            2. Plaintiff’s Claim to Title

Defendants argue that the FAC is vague as to Plaintiff’s claim to title. However, the FAC clearly alleges that Plaintiff owns one-half of the property as a tenant in common pursuant to the deed executed in 1990, which Plaintiff alleges is the current operative deed. (FAC ¶¶ 17, 27, 29.)

Defendants also argue that the allegations reveal Plaintiff does not have a legal claim to title because the 1990 deed was not recorded before Defendants recorded their deed. (See Civ. Code, §§ 1214, 1217.) However, Defendants only speculate that the 1990 deed “appears to remain unrecorded.” (Dem. 1:15-16.) There is no indication from the face of the pleadings that the 1990 deed remains unrecorded or that Defendants recorded their deed before Plaintiff recorded the 1990 deed. This is a matter of proof beyond the purview of a demurrer.

Defendants argue that they are not signatories to, nor did they know about, the 1990 settlement agreement and deed. Defendants also argue that the validity and enforceability of those documents is under question. None of this defeats the quiet title claim at the pleading stage. Plaintiff alleges that the 1990 deed is valid and operative, that Diane improperly transferred the property to herself and then to Defendants, and that Defendants knew of Plaintiff’s interest at the time they purchased the property. (FAC ¶¶ 29, 34-37, 50.) This is sufficient to state a claim for quiet title. The truth of the allegations and the validity of the various implicated instruments are matters of proof beyond the purview of a demurrer.

In sum, Plaintiff has adequately pled a quiet title claim. The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the first cause of action.

c. Declaratory Relief

“Any person . . . who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another . . . may, in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an original action or cross-complaint in the superior court for a declaration of his or her rights and duties . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.) “Declaratory relief operates prospectively to declare future rights, rather than to redress past wrongs.” (Canova v. Trustees of Imperial Irrigation Dist. Employee Pension Plan (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1497.) “The fundamental basis of declaratory relief is an actual, present controversy.” (Tashakori v. Lakis (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1003, 1012.)

Here, the allegations demonstrate a present controversy over the parties’ respective rights to the property and the validity of the various deeds. (FAC ¶¶ 59-65.) Defendants argue that the declaratory relief claim is duplicative of the quiet title claim. However, “[a] plaintiff may plead cumulative or inconsistent causes of action.” (Gherman v. Colburn (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 544, 565.) “[M]odern rules of pleading generally permit plaintiffs to ‘set forth alternative theories in varied and inconsistent counts.’” (Klein v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1388.)   

Therefore, Plaintiff has adequately pled a declaratory relief claim. The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the second cause of action.

d. Fraud

“The elements of fraud that will give rise to a tort action for deceit are: ‘(a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.’” (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 974, quoting Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.) Fraud must be pleaded with specificity rather than with general and conclusory allegations. (Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 184.) The specificity requirement means a plaintiff must allege facts showing how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were made. (Lazar, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 645.)

The FAC alleges no actionable statement of fact made by Defendants to Plaintiff which could form the basis for a fraud claim. In fact, the FAC alleges that Defendants never spoke to Plaintiff. (FAC ¶ 69.) Any purported statements or filings Defendants made in connection with the unlawful detainer proceedings would be covered by the litigation privilege. (Civ. Code, § 47.) And in any case, those are not statements of fact made to Plaintiff upon which Plaintiff relied to his detriment. Defendants’ alleged attempt to interfere with Plaintiff’s title may be wrongful under another legal standard, but it does not constitute fraud.

The only allegation that could potentially be considered fraud is Defendants’ failure to inform Plaintiff of (i) the 1993, 2022, and 2023 deeds; (ii) the Deed of Trust; and (iii) Diane’s attempt to sell the property to Home Allies. (See FAC ¶ 69.) This sounds in fraudulent concealment. However, “[t]o state a cause of action for fraudulent concealment, the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose some fact to the plaintiff.” (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 745.) The FAC articulates no basis upon which Defendants would be obligated to disclose the abovementioned facts to Plaintiff.

Therefore, the FAC fails to plead a fraud claim. The demurrer is SUSTAINED as to the third cause of action without leave to amend.

e. Conversion/Unjust Enrichment

The elements of conversion are: (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of the personal property; (2) the defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (3) damages. (Welco Electronics, Inc. v. Mora (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 202, 208.) “The tort of conversion applies to personal property, not real property.” (Salma v. Capon (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1295.) The fourth cause of action alleges no personal property taken from Plaintiff. A conversion claim cannot otherwise be based on the real property at issue. Thus, there is no conversion as a matter of law.

However, the fourth cause of action also alleges unjust enrichment. The elements for a claim of unjust enrichment are: (1) receipt of a benefit; and (2) unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of another. (Elder v. Pacific Bell Telephone Co. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 841, 857.) Courts have construed unjust enrichment claims as quasi-contract claims seeking restitution. (Rutherford Holdings LLC v. Plaza Del Rey (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 221, 231.) The FAC sufficiently alleges that Defendants wrongfully acquired real property that belongs to Plaintiff, thus receiving a benefit at Plaintiff’s expense for which restitution may be warranted. The fact that Defendants paid Diane for the property does not mean they owe no restitution to Plaintiff.

The demurrer is SUSTAINED as to conversion and OVERRULED as to unjust enrichment.

II. Motion to Strike

            Defendants move to strike references to their filing of two prior unlawful detainer actions, arguing that such allegations are irrelevant and barred by the litigation privilege. However, the allegations provide relevant context. The litigation privilege bars liability, but it does not preclude references to litigation proceedings. 

CONCLUSION

            Defendants’ demurrer is SUSTAINED in part as set forth above without leave to amend. The motion to strike is DENIED.