Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 24STCV25161, Date: 2025-01-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV25161 Hearing Date: January 17, 2025 Dept: 32
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BRYAN ELLIS THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC., et
al., Defendants.
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Case No.: 24STCV25161 Hearing Date: January 17, 2025 [TENTATIVE]
order RE: defendant’s motion to disqualify
plaintiff’s counsel |
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BACKGROUND
On September 30, 2024, Plaintiff Bryan
Ellis Thomas filed this action against Defendants Volkswagen Group of America,
Inc. and Volkswagen of Downtown LA, alleging violations of the Song-Beverly
Act.
On December 23, 2024, Defendant
Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. filed the instant motion to disqualify Anthony
Paul Greco, an attorney with Plaintiff’s counsel, The Lemon Pros, LLP.
LEGAL STANDARD
“A trial court's authority to disqualify
an attorney derives from its inherent power to ‘control in furtherance of
justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in
any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in every matter
pertaining thereto.’” (Clark v. Superior Court (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th
37, 47, quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 128(a)(5).) “An attorney is required to
avoid the representation of adverse interests and cannot, without the informed
written consent of the client or former client, accept employment adverse to
the client or former client where, by reason of the representation of the
client or former client, the member has obtained confidential information
material to the employment.” (Jessen v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co.
(2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 698, 705.)
“[W]hether an attorney should be
disqualified in a successive representation case turns on two variables: (1)
the relationship between the legal problem involved in the former
representation and the legal problem involved in the current
representation, and (2) the relationship between the attorney and the former
client with respect to the legal problem involved in the former representation.”
(Jessen, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 709.)
DISCUSSION
I.
Substantial Relationship
“The substantial relationship test
requires comparison not only of the legal issues involved in successive
representations, but also of evidence bearing on the materiality of the
information the attorney received during the earlier representation.” (Khani
v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 916, 921.) “The attorney's
acquisition of general information about the former client's overall structure
and practices would not of itself require disqualification unless it were found
to be material—i.e., directly in issue or of critical importance—in the second
representation. The same is true about information such as the first
client's litigation philosophy or key decision makers.” (Ibid.,
citing Farris v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 671,
680.) “[M]ere exposure to the confidences of an adversary does not, standing
alone, warrant disqualification.” (Sundholm v. Hollywood Foreign Press Assn.
(2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1330, 1340.)
Mr. Greco represented Volkswagen in
Song-Beverly litigation from July 2021 to March 2024. (Johnson Decl. ¶¶ 2-3.)
In that position, Mr. Greco regularly communicated with Volkswagen’s general
counsel and participated in “meetings to discuss Volkswagen’s strategy.” (Id.,
¶ 6.) Mr. Greco also “developed and recommended strategies, reviewed
confidential and privileged documents, prepared responses to discovery,
prepared Volkswagen corporate representatives to testify at depositions (and
defended the depositions), and prepared discovery and dispositive motions.” (Id.,
¶ 7.) This meant that Mr. Greco had knowledge of Volkswagen’s “operations,
automotive technology, and litigation objectives,” as well as its “overall
strategy for . . . defense in breach of warranty related lawsuits.” (Id.,
¶¶ 14-15.)
On some cases, “Mr. Greco was also
designated as lead trial counsel and tasked with planning and leading the trial
strategy.” (Conboy Decl. ¶ 11.) Mr. Greco further attended conferences with
Volkswagen, where he “discussed with Volkswagen’s Senior Counsel strategies and
tactics that would assist in Volkswagen’s defense when facing California lemon
lawsuits.” (Id., ¶ 13.) Mr. Greco also represented Volkswagen-authorized
dealerships, exposing him to “Volkswagen’s business information, . . .
dealership management and personnel, as well as to dealership policies,
business practices, and documents.” (Id., ¶ 14.)
Khani is informative on
whether this is sufficient to warrant disqualification. In Khani, Ford
similarly moved to disqualify the plaintiff’s counsel, Payam Shahian, due to
Shahian’s prior representation of Ford in lemon law cases. (Khani, supra,
215 Cal.App.4th at p. 919.) Ford similarly argued that Shahian “was ‘privy to
confidential client communications and information relating to the defense of’
such cases, as well as to ‘pre-litigation strategies, tactics, and case
handling procedures.’” (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal rejected Ford’s
argument because “[w]hile Ford presented evidence that Shahian represented it
in California lemon law cases, it did not establish that any confidential
information about the defense in those cases would be at issue in this case.” (Id.
at p. 922.) “The trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the prior
cases were substantially related to the current case just because they involved
claims under the same statute.” (Ibid.) “The court also incorrectly
assumed that Shahian's exposure to playbook information in prior lemon law
cases was sufficient to disqualify him in this case without any showing of its
materiality.” (Ibid.)
Here, Volkswagen has similarly failed to
show that Mr. Greco gained confidential information from his prior
representation of Volkswagen that is material to the current representation of
Plaintiff Thomas. Volkswagen’s vague references to “strategies,” “business
information,” “personnel,” “discussions,” and “confidential information” are
insufficient to warrant disqualification. “Such generalized assertions cannot
establish a substantial relationship.” (Victaulic Co. v. American Home
Assurance Co. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 485, 512.) Volkswagen has not
identified any particular information gained from the prior representation that
is “directly at issue in, or ha[s] some critical importance to, the second
representation.” (Ibid.) As in Khani, there is no indication that
the subject vehicle in this case or its repair history were the subject of any
prior action in which Mr. Greco represented Volkswagen. (See Khani, supra,
215 Cal.App.4th at p. 922.) Mr. Greco’s knowledge amounts to no more
than the typical “playbook” knowledge found insufficient in Khani and Victaulic.
Because Volkswagen has failed to
demonstrate a substantial relationship between the prior and current
representations under the standards set forth in Jessen and Khani,
there is no basis for disqualification.
II.
Screening
In any event, proper screening of
Mr. Greco would allow The Lemon Pros, LLP to represent Plaintiff even if Mr. Greco
were found to have a conflict. (See Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Rule
1.10(a)(2).) “The specific elements of an effective screen will vary from case
to case,” with focus on “whether the court is satisfied that the tainted
attorney has not had and will not have any improper communication with others
at the firm concerning the litigation.” (Kirk v. First American Title Ins.
Co. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 776, 811.)
Here, Mr. Greco has been barred from
accessing any files involving Volkswagen. (Saeedian Decl. ¶ 3.) Mr. Greco does
not handle any cases involving Volkswagen and is excluded from all
communications, discussions, and meetings regarding Volkswagen. (Id., ¶
4.) Mr. Greco has his own office and is thus physically separated from other
personnel such that he is not exposed to discussions involving Volkswagen. (Id.,
¶ 5.) All personnel at the firm have been barred from discussing matters
involving Volkswagen with Mr. Greco. (Id., ¶ 6.) Volkswagen and its
counsel were notified on December 4, 2024 of Mr. Greco’s employment at The
Lemon Pros, LLP, as well as the screening measures described above. (Id.,
¶ 8, Ex. 2.)
The Court finds that The Lemon Pros, LLP
has satisfied the requirements of Rule 1.10(a)(2). Because Mr. Greco has been
properly screened from cases involving Volkswagen, the conflict (if it exists)
is not imputed to the firm. Accordingly, The Lemon Pros, LLP may continue to
represent Plaintiff even if Mr. Greco cannot.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s motion to disqualify
counsel is DENIED.