Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 24STCV28906, Date: 2025-03-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV28906    Hearing Date: March 28, 2025    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            On November 4, 2024, Plaintiff Elvira Nikolaev filed this habitability action against Defendant Mayer Beverly Park, LP. Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint on January 28, 2025, asserting causes of action for (1) breach of the implied covenant of habitability, (2) breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, (3) breach of contract, (4) negligence, (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (6) constructive eviction.

            On March 3, 2025, Defendant filed the instant demurrer and motion to strike against the FAC. Plaintiff filed her opposition on March 17, 2025. Defendant filed its reply on March 21, 2025.

LEGAL STANDARD

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Ibid.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part of that pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b).) The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike (1) any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading and (2) all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id., § 437.)

MEET AND CONFER

Before filing a demurrer or a motion to strike, the demurring or moving party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to or the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41, 435.5.) The Court finds that Defendant has satisfied the meet and confer requirement. (See Liston Decl.)

DISCUSSION

I. Demurrer

            a. Quiet Enjoyment

“[E]very lease contains an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment.” (Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1300.) The covenant “insulates the tenant against any act or omission on the part of the landlord, or anyone claiming under him, which interferes with a tenant’s right to use and enjoy the premises for the purposes contemplated by the tenancy.” (Ibid.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant knew of but failed to remediate a cockroach infestation from 2022 to 2024. (FAC ¶ 9.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant ordered her to vacate the premises in July 2023 for a purported kitchen repair, whilst requiring her to pay full rent and providing no relocation assistance. (Id., ¶ 10.) Defendant allegedly failed to fix a mold infestation from August 2023. (Id., ¶ 11.) Defendant was allegedly put on notice of these conditions through multiple complaints by Plaintiff and intentionally refused to take corrective measures. (Id., ¶¶ 12-14.) For pleading purposes, these facts establish an interference with Plaintiff’s right to use and enjoy the premises, thus constituting a breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to plead a violation of Civil Code section 1940.2. However, while that statute is cited under the quiet enjoyment cause of action (FAC ¶ 28), it is not the sole basis for the claim. The claim also incorporates all prior allegations. (Id., ¶ 24.) The complaint must be read as a whole. As discussed above, the FAC contains sufficient facts demonstrating a breach of quiet enjoyment.

The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the second cause of action.

b. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

To state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must establish: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. (Vasquez v. Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 819, 832.)

“For conduct to be outrageous, it must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated by a civilized community.” (Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 172.) “Severe emotional distress [is] emotional distress of such substantial quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to endure it.” (Fletcher v. Western Life Insurance Co. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 376, 397.)

The conduct alleged in the complaint is not sufficiently outrageous as a matter of law. Plaintiff alleges no aggravating facts justifying a claim for IIED. Plaintiff also fails to allege severe emotional distress beyond conclusory allegations. 

Therefore, the demurrer is SUSTAINED as to the fifth cause of action.

c. Constructive Eviction

“‘[A]ny disturbance of the tenant's possession by the lessor or at his procurement . . . which has the effect of depriving the tenant of the beneficial enjoyment of the premises, amounts to a constructive eviction, provided the tenant vacates the premises within a reasonable time.’” (Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 292, quoting Pierce v. Nash (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 606, 612-13.)

As discussed above, Plaintiff has pled facts demonstrating a deprivation of her enjoyment of the premises. Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not alleged she voluntarily vacated the premises or did so in a reasonable time. However, these are factual questions unsuited for resolution at the pleading stage. For pleading purposes, Plaintiff has alleged that she “was compelled to vacate the Premises” as a result of the deplorable conditions, thus demonstrating constructive eviction. (See FAC ¶ 51.)

            The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the sixth cause of action.

II. Motion to Strike

a. Punitive Damages

“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Id., subd. (c)(1).) “‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Id., subd. (c)(2).) Fraud is “intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Id., subd. (c)(3).)

            As discussed above, the allegations sufficiently demonstrate that Defendant intentionally and knowingly refused to remediate deplorable conditions. For pleading purposes, this constitutes “a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of” Plaintiff, as well as subjecting Plaintiff to “unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (See Civ. Code, § 3294(c).) Thus, the FAC adequately pleads punitive damages.

            The motion to strike is DENIED as to punitive damages.

            b. Attorney’s Fees

“Except as attorney’s fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.) Thus, “[a]ttorney fees are not recoverable unless a fee award is expressly authorized by either statute or the parties’ contract.” (Ilshin Investment Co., Ltd. v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 612, 627.)

Here, the lease agreement attached to the complaint contains an attorney’s fees clause. (See FAC, Ex. A, § 22(T) [“In any legal proceeding brought by either Landlord or Resident against the other, in addition to any other relief granted, the prevailing party will recover reasonable attorneys’ fees from the other party, not to exceed the Attorney’s Fee Cap”].) The FAC prays for “attorney fees as allowed by contract” and then attaches the contract, which sufficiently notifies Defendant of the basis for attorney’s fees. (FAC, Prayer No. 5, Ex. A.) Thus, the FAC properly pleads a basis for attorney’s fees.

The motion to strike is DENIED as to attorney’s fees.

CONCLUSION

            Defendant’s demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend as to the fifth cause of action and OVERRULED in all other respects. The motion to strike is DENIED.