Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 24STCV29335, Date: 2025-01-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV29335    Hearing Date: January 3, 2025    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            On November 7, 2024, Plaintiffs Karla Mendoza and Sergio Mendoza filed this action against Defendants NLC CA, Inc., Quanta Services, Inc., Matthew Clayton Compher, and Justin Vaughan. The complaint asserts causes of action for wrongful death and survivor based on the death of Plaintiffs’ son, Carlos Mendoza. Carlos Mendoza allegedly died as a result of a fall from a utility pole during an exercise at Northwest Lineman College. Plaintiffs allege that NLC CA, Inc. and its agents negligently failed to ensure the safety of the utility pole.

            On December 6, 2024, Defendants filed the instant motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiffs filed their opposition on December 16, 2024. Defendants filed their reply on December 26, 2024.  

LEGAL STANDARD

“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists….” (Code Civ. Proc, § 1281.2.) “The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as unconscionability.” (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236.)

Furthermore, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) states that “[a] written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” (9 U.S.C. § 2.) The FAA governs contracts “involving commerce,” which has been interpreted to mean simply “affecting commerce” to give the FAA the broadest reach possible, and does not require a transaction that is actually “within the flow of interstate commerce.” (See Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson (1995) 513 U.S. 265, 273-74; Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc. (2003) 539 U.S. 52, 56.) Moreover, parties may agree to apply the FAA notwithstanding any effect on interstate commerce. (Victrola 89, LLC v. Jaman Properties 8 LLC (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 355.)

DISCUSSION

I. Proof of Agreement

            “The moving party ‘can meet its initial burden by attaching to the motion or petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the opposing party's signature.’” (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.) An electronic signature has the same legal effect as a handwritten signature. (Civ. Code, § 1633.7(a).) An “electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was the act of the person. The act of the person may be shown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.” (Id., § 1633.9(a).) “[T]he burden of authenticating an electronic signature is not great.” (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 844.)

            Here, Defendants present evidence of the agreement through the declaration of Michael Daniels, the CEO of NLC CA, Inc. (Daniels Decl. ¶ 1.) Mr. Daniels avers that a student enrolling at NLC must create an online user profile with credentials and electronically sign an Enrollment Agreement. (Id., ¶ 3.) A student cannot begin coursework without first signing the Enrollment Agreement. (Ibid.) Carlos Mendoza’s student file indicates that he signed the Enrollment Agreement on August 22, 2023. (Id., ¶¶ 2, 6, Ex. 1.) Mr. Mendoza signed the overall Agreement and initialed the arbitration provision. (Id., Ex. 1.)

            The arbitration provision states the following: “The Student agrees that any dispute arising from enrollment at NLC CA, Inc. . . . or through use or entry at any NLC Premises . . . shall be resolved by binding arbitration under the substantive and procedural requirements of the Federal Arbitration Act by a single arbitrator, conducted by the American Arbitration Association (‘AAA’) under its Commercial Arbitration Rules.” (Daniels Decl., Ex. 1.) The provision further states that “[b]oth the Student and NLC irrevocably agree that any dispute between them shall be submitted to arbitration” and that “[n]either the Student nor NLC shall file or maintain any lawsuit in any court against the other.” (Ibid.)  

            Plaintiffs purport to “dispute the authenticity of the arbitration agreement” because there is “no corresponding electronic record or meta data detailing who signed, or when.” (Opp. 4:1-5.) However, at the initial step, “a movant need not ‘follow the normal procedures of document authentication’ and need only ‘allege the existence of an agreement and support the allegation.’” (Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 755.) Defendants have done that through the declaration of Mr. Daniels. “If the movant bears its initial burden, the burden shifts to the party opposing arbitration to identify a factual dispute as to the agreement's existence” through “admissible evidence creating a factual dispute as to the authenticity of their signatures.” (Ibid.) Plaintiffs have presented no such evidence and have therefore failed to raise a factual dispute over the authenticity of the agreement.  

Moreover, Plaintiffs cite no authority requiring “electronic record or meta data” to authenticate an electronic signature. (See Opp. 4:1-5.) An electronic signature may be authenticated “in any manner,” and the burden is “not great.” (Civ. Code, § 1633.9(a); Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 844.) Plaintiffs do not dispute that a student who enrolls at NLC must sign the Enrollment Agreement, which includes an arbitration provision. Plaintiffs do not dispute that Carlos Mendoza enrolled at NLC and therefore must have signed the Enrollment Agreement prior to beginning his coursework.

            Plaintiffs further contend that Mr. Daniels lacks the personal knowledge to testify to Carlos Mendoza’s signature on the agreement. (Opp. 4:6-12.) However, “the custodian of a document need not have been present or employed when the document was created or signed to authenticate a document in a company's files.” (Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 758.) “[A]ny qualified witness knowledgeable about documents may lay foundation for business records.” (Id. at p. 759.) There is “no strict requirement as to how a party authenticates a writing.” (Ibid.) Mr. Daniels is the CEO of NLC, is responsible for facilitating student enrollment, and reviewed Carlos Mendoza’s student file. (Daniels Decl. ¶¶ 1-2.) Mr. Daniels has sufficiently demonstrated his personal knowledge of NLC’s enrollment and document practices to authenticate Exhibit 1.

            Therefore, even if Plaintiffs had raised a factual dispute, Defendants have presented sufficient evidence to authenticate the arbitration agreement. The Court finds that a valid arbitration agreement exists between Carlos Mendoza and NLC.[1]   

II. Conflicting Proceedings

It is undisputed that Plaintiffs’ survivor claim, which is asserted on behalf of decedent Carlos Mendoza, falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement. (See Exarhos v. Exarhos (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 898, 905 [a decedent’s successor-in-interest stands in the same position as the decedent]; Thomas, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 613, fn. 5 [a successor-in-interest is bound by an arbitration agreement signed by the decedent].) Defendants acknowledge that “Plaintiffs’ individual wrongful death claim is not subject to arbitration.” (Mtn. 13:13.) Thus, Defendants only move to arbitrate the survivor claim and request a stay of the court action.  

Plaintiffs argue that arbitration should be denied under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2(c). Under that provision, a court may deny arbitration if “[a] party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2(c).) Plaintiffs argue that arbitrating the survivor claim while the wrongful death claim remains in court risks inconsistent rulings. 

However, the parties have expressly agreed to adopt the procedural rules of the FAA. (See Daniels Decl., Ex. 1 [disputes “shall be resolved by binding arbitration under the substantive and procedural requirements of the Federal Arbitration Act”].) Section 3 of the FAA states that a court “shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement.” (9 U.S.C. § 3.) Section 4 states that “the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement.” (Id., § 4.) Neither provision gives the court discretion to deny arbitration based on the risk of inconsistent rulings. In fact, the FAA requires “arbitration of pendent arbitrable claims when one of the parties files a motion to compel, even where the result would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums.” (Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd (1985) 470 U.S. 213, 217.) The FAA “leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed.” (Id. at p. 218, emphasis in original.)

Because the parties have expressly agreed to adopt the procedural rules of the FAA over the CAA, Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2(c) does not apply. (See Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Safety National Casualty Corp. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 471, 478-82.) Instead, sections 3 and 4 of the FAA apply, requiring the Court to compel arbitration and stay the civil action.  

CONCLUSION

            Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED as to the survivor cause of action only. The case is stayed in its entirety pending the outcome of arbitration.