Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 24STCV31856, Date: 2025-06-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV31856    Hearing Date: June 18, 2025    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            On December 3, 2024, Plaintiff Kimberly Evans filed this action against Defendants Loyal Source Government Services, LLC and Christopher Wegner, asserting causes of action for harassment, discrimination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate.

            On May 16, 2025, Defendant Loyal Source Government Services, LLC filed the instant motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff filed her opposition on June 6, 2025. Defendant filed its reply on June 11, 2025.

LEGAL STANDARD

“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists….” (Code Civ. Proc, § 1281.2.) “The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as unconscionability.” (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236.)

Furthermore, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) states that “[a] written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” (9 U.S.C. § 2.) The FAA governs contracts “involving commerce,” which has been interpreted to mean simply “affecting commerce” to give the FAA the broadest reach possible, and does not require a transaction that is actually “within the flow of interstate commerce.” (See Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson (1995) 513 U.S. 265, 273-74; Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc. (2003) 539 U.S. 52, 56.) Moreover, parties may agree to apply the FAA notwithstanding any effect on interstate commerce. (Victrola 89, LLC v. Jaman Properties 8 LLC (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 355.)

DISCUSSION

I. Proof of Agreement

            “The moving party ‘can meet its initial burden by attaching to the motion or petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the opposing party's signature.’” (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.)

            Here, Plaintiff signed three agreements containing the same arbitration clause. (Rodriguez Decl., Ex. A-C.) The clause covers “any and all claims or disputes arising out of, related to, or in connection with [Plaintiff’s] . . . employment with or termination from LSGS.” (Ibid.) Plaintiff does not dispute the existence of the agreements or her signature on them. Therefore, Defendant has satisfied its burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement.

II. Sexual Harassment Complaint

            The federal Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act (EFAA) provides that “no predispute arbitration agreement or predispute joint-action waiver shall be valid or enforceable with respect to a case which is filed under Federal, Tribal, or State law and relates to the sexual assault dispute or the sexual harassment dispute.” (9 U.S.C. § 402.) “Under the EFAA, when a plaintiff's lawsuit contains at least one claim that fits within the scope of the act, the arbitration agreement is unenforceable as to all claims asserted in the lawsuit.” (Liu v. Miniso Depot CA, Inc. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 791, 800.)

            Plaintiff invokes the EFAA to avoid arbitration, arguing that her complaint asserts a claim for sexual harassment. However, the complaint does not assert a claim for sexual harassment. The complaint alleges harassment based on disability, race, and gender. Assuming Plaintiff is referring to her seventh cause of action for “gender harassment,” that claim alleges that Defendant’s employee “engaged in the following conduct: (a) Purporting to give plaintiff orders and criticizing her work, at a time when they were at the same level; (b) arranging to have plaintiff demoted; (c) communicating to plaintiff in a rude and demeaning manner; and (d) providing unjustified discipline.” (Compl. ¶ 45.) This does not describe conduct amounting to sexual harassment. Nor does the complaint allege any claim “relating to” sexual harassment. (See Liu, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 804, fn. 5.)

FEHA provides that “‘harassment’ because of sex includes sexual harassment, gender harassment, and harassment based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” (Gov. Code, § 12940(j)(4)(C).) This shows that FEHA distinguishes between sexual harassment and gender harassment. The EFAA only applies to sexual harassment. Because Plaintiff’s claim is for gender harassment, and the complaint contains no facts describing sexual harassment, the EFAA does not apply.

Separately, the EFAA only applies to claims accruing on or after March 3, 2022. (Doe v. Second Street Corp. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 552, 559.) Here, Plaintiff alleges that her employment ended “in or about March 2022.” (Compl. ¶ 7.) The complaint does not show that any of the alleged acts occurred after the effective date of the EFAA. For this independent reason, the EFAA does not apply.  

Beyond the EFAA, Plaintiff articulates no other reason to avoid enforcement of the arbitration agreement. Therefore, the case must be compelled to arbitration.

CONCLUSION

            Defendant Loyal Source Government Services, LLC’s motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED.