Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 25STCV00179, Date: 2025-06-11 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 25STCV00179 Hearing Date: June 11, 2025 Dept: 32
YOLANDA TREJO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. PARKWOOD PLACE INVESTMENT COMPANY, et
al., Defendants. |
Case No.: 25STCV00179 Hearing Date: June 11, 2025 [TENTATIVE]
order RE: defendants’ demurrer and motion to
strike |
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|
BACKGROUND
On January 3, 2025, Plaintiffs filed
the instant action, alleging (1) breach of the implied warranty of
habitability, (2) tortious breach of the implied warranty of habitability, (3)
negligence, (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (5) private
nuisance, (6) violation of Civil Code section 1942.4, and (7) violation of
Business and Professions Code section 17200.
On May 5, 2025, Defendants filed the
instant demurrer and motion to strike. Plaintiffs have not filed an opposition.
LEGAL STANDARD
A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether
the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When
considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in
context. (Taylor v. City of Los
Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.)
In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the
pleading or by proper judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd.
(a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other
extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior
Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the
defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Ibid.) The only issue involved in a
demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with
extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)
Any party, within the time allowed to
respond to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the
whole or any part of that pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b).) The
court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it
deems proper, strike (1) any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in
any pleading and (2) all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in
conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.
(Id., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face
of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id., § 437.)
MEET AND CONFER
Before filing a demurrer or a motion to
strike, the demurring or moving party is required to meet and confer with the
party who filed the pleading demurred to or the pleading that is subject to the
motion to strike for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be
reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the
objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41, 435.5.)
The Court finds that Defendants have satisfied the meet and confer requirement.
(See Smyth Decl.)
DISCUSSION
I.
Demurrer
a. Alter Ego
“To succeed on their alter ego
claim, plaintiffs must be able to show (1) such a unity of interest and
ownership between the corporation and its equitable owner that no separation
actually exists, and (2) an inequitable result if the acts in question are treated
as those of the corporation alone.” (Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194
Cal.App.4th 399, 417.) “Whether a party is liable under an alter ego theory is
a question of fact.” (Id. at p. 418.)
Here, the complaint alleges
sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference of alter ego. (See Compl. ¶
23.) Similar facts were found sufficient to survive demurrer in Rutherford
Holdings, LLC v. Plaza Del Rey (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 221, 235-36.
Therefore, the complaint sufficiently pleads alter ego liability against
Defendants.
b. Tortious Breach of the
Implied Warranty of Habitability
“[T]here is a warranty of habitability
implied in residential leases in California.” (Erlach v. Sierra Asset
Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1296.) “The elements of such an
affirmative claim are the existence of a material defective condition affecting
the premises' habitability, notice to the landlord of the condition within a
reasonable time after the tenant's discovery of the condition, the landlord was
given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency, and resulting damages.” (Id.
at p. 1297.)
Plaintiffs allege a breach of the implied
warranty of habitability in their first cause of action. (Compl. ¶¶ 31-41.) The
second cause of action for tortious breach of the implied warranty “adds
nothing to the complaint by way of fact or theory” and is therefore
duplicative. (See Award Metals, Inc. v. Superior Court (1991) 228
Cal.App.3d 1128, 1135; Compl. ¶¶ 42-51.) To the extent that Defendants’ conduct
was tortious, Plaintiff may assert the corresponding tort claims.
The demurrer is SUSTAINED as to the second
cause of action.
c. Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress
To state a cause
of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must
establish: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s
intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing,
emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional
distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by
the defendant’s outrageous conduct. (Vasquez v. Franklin Management Real
Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 819, 832.) “For conduct to be
outrageous, it must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually
tolerated by a civilized community.” (Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222
Cal.App.4th 166, 172.) “Severe
emotional distress [is] emotional distress of such substantial quantity or
enduring quality that no reasonable man in a civilized society should be
expected to endure it.” (Fletcher v. Western Life Insurance Co. (1970)
10 Cal.App.3d 376, 397.)
The conduct alleged in the complaint is insufficiently
outrageous as a matter of law. Plaintiffs allege no aggravating facts
justifying a claim for IIED. Plaintiffs also fail to allege severe emotional
distress beyond conclusory allegations.
The demurrer is SUSTAINED as to the fifth
cause of action.
d. Violation of Civil Code Section 1942.4
A violation of Civil Code section 1942.4
does not occur unless certain conditions are met, including “[a] public officer
or employee who is responsible for the enforcement of any housing law, after
inspecting the premises, has notified the landlord or the landlord’s agent in
writing of his or her obligations to abate the nuisance or repair the
substandard conditions,” and the landlord fails to abate the conditions within
35 days. (Civ. Code, § 1942.4(a)(2).)
Here, the complaint alleges that “representatives
of the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health and/or other responsible
government agencies have inspected the Apartments and expressly informed
Defendants in writing that the Apartments are substandard and violate
applicable law.” (Compl. ¶ 74.) The complaint alleges that “failed to timely
abate all defects as required.” (Ibid.) This satisfies the requirements
of Civil Code section 1942.4.
Defendants argue that “[t]he Complaint
fails to specify which governmental agency issued the notice, when any notice
was issued, which apartments the notice applied to, what specific violations
were cited, and whether 35 days passed without abatement.” (Dem. 12:7-9.)
However, these are factual contentions beyond the purview of a demurrer. The
complaint alleges sufficient ultimate facts demonstrating a violation of the
statute.
The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the sixth
cause of action.
II.
Motion to Strike
“In an action for the breach of an
obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or
malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages
for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, §
3294, subd. (a).) “‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the
defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is
carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the
rights or safety of others.” (Id., subd. (c)(1).) “‘Oppression’ means
despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in
conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Id., subd. (c)(2).) Fraud
is “intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact
known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of
thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing
injury.” (Id., subd. (c)(3).)
The complaint alleges with
specificity the defective conditions in the subject property and alleges that
Defendants were on notice of the conditions. (Compl. ¶¶ 26.) Defendants were
allegedly on notice that such conditions posed serious health risks, yet
Defendants failed to remedy the defects. (Ibid.) For pleading purposes,
this sufficiently demonstrates a conscious disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights or
safety, or the imposition of unjust hardship. Therefore, the complaint
adequately pleads a basis for punitive damages.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ demurrer is SUSTAINED in
part as set forth above without leave to amend. The motion to strike is DENIED.