Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 25STCV00179, Date: 2025-06-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25STCV00179    Hearing Date: June 11, 2025    Dept: 32

 

YOLANDA TREJO, et al.,

                        Plaintiffs,

            v.

 

PARKWOOD PLACE INVESTMENT COMPANY, et al.,

                       

                        Defendants.

 

  Case No.:  25STCV00179

  Hearing Date:  June 11, 2025

 

     [TENTATIVE] order RE:

defendants’ demurrer and motion to strike

 

 

BACKGROUND

            On January 3, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the instant action, alleging (1) breach of the implied warranty of habitability, (2) tortious breach of the implied warranty of habitability, (3) negligence, (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (5) private nuisance, (6) violation of Civil Code section 1942.4, and (7) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200.

            On May 5, 2025, Defendants filed the instant demurrer and motion to strike. Plaintiffs have not filed an opposition.

LEGAL STANDARD

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Ibid.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part of that pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b).) The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike (1) any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading and (2) all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id., § 437.)

MEET AND CONFER

Before filing a demurrer or a motion to strike, the demurring or moving party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to or the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41, 435.5.) The Court finds that Defendants have satisfied the meet and confer requirement. (See Smyth Decl.)

DISCUSSION

I. Demurrer

            a. Alter Ego

            “To succeed on their alter ego claim, plaintiffs must be able to show (1) such a unity of interest and ownership between the corporation and its equitable owner that no separation actually exists, and (2) an inequitable result if the acts in question are treated as those of the corporation alone.” (Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399, 417.) “Whether a party is liable under an alter ego theory is a question of fact.” (Id. at p. 418.)

            Here, the complaint alleges sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference of alter ego. (See Compl. ¶ 23.) Similar facts were found sufficient to survive demurrer in Rutherford Holdings, LLC v. Plaza Del Rey (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 221, 235-36. Therefore, the complaint sufficiently pleads alter ego liability against Defendants.

            b. Tortious Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability

“[T]here is a warranty of habitability implied in residential leases in California.” (Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1296.) “The elements of such an affirmative claim are the existence of a material defective condition affecting the premises' habitability, notice to the landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant's discovery of the condition, the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency, and resulting damages.” (Id. at p. 1297.)

Plaintiffs allege a breach of the implied warranty of habitability in their first cause of action. (Compl. ¶¶ 31-41.) The second cause of action for tortious breach of the implied warranty “adds nothing to the complaint by way of fact or theory” and is therefore duplicative. (See Award Metals, Inc. v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1128, 1135; Compl. ¶¶ 42-51.) To the extent that Defendants’ conduct was tortious, Plaintiff may assert the corresponding tort claims.

The demurrer is SUSTAINED as to the second cause of action.

c. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

To state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must establish: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. (Vasquez v. Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 819, 832.) “For conduct to be outrageous, it must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated by a civilized community.” (Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 172.) “Severe emotional distress [is] emotional distress of such substantial quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to endure it.” (Fletcher v. Western Life Insurance Co. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 376, 397.)

The conduct alleged in the complaint is insufficiently outrageous as a matter of law. Plaintiffs allege no aggravating facts justifying a claim for IIED. Plaintiffs also fail to allege severe emotional distress beyond conclusory allegations. 

The demurrer is SUSTAINED as to the fifth cause of action.

d. Violation of Civil Code Section 1942.4

A violation of Civil Code section 1942.4 does not occur unless certain conditions are met, including “[a] public officer or employee who is responsible for the enforcement of any housing law, after inspecting the premises, has notified the landlord or the landlord’s agent in writing of his or her obligations to abate the nuisance or repair the substandard conditions,” and the landlord fails to abate the conditions within 35 days. (Civ. Code, § 1942.4(a)(2).)

Here, the complaint alleges that “representatives of the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health and/or other responsible government agencies have inspected the Apartments and expressly informed Defendants in writing that the Apartments are substandard and violate applicable law.” (Compl. ¶ 74.) The complaint alleges that “failed to timely abate all defects as required.” (Ibid.) This satisfies the requirements of Civil Code section 1942.4.

Defendants argue that “[t]he Complaint fails to specify which governmental agency issued the notice, when any notice was issued, which apartments the notice applied to, what specific violations were cited, and whether 35 days passed without abatement.” (Dem. 12:7-9.) However, these are factual contentions beyond the purview of a demurrer. The complaint alleges sufficient ultimate facts demonstrating a violation of the statute.

The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the sixth cause of action.

II. Motion to Strike

            “In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Id., subd. (c)(1).) “‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Id., subd. (c)(2).) Fraud is “intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Id., subd. (c)(3).)

            The complaint alleges with specificity the defective conditions in the subject property and alleges that Defendants were on notice of the conditions. (Compl. ¶¶ 26.) Defendants were allegedly on notice that such conditions posed serious health risks, yet Defendants failed to remedy the defects. (Ibid.) For pleading purposes, this sufficiently demonstrates a conscious disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights or safety, or the imposition of unjust hardship. Therefore, the complaint adequately pleads a basis for punitive damages.

CONCLUSION

            Defendants’ demurrer is SUSTAINED in part as set forth above without leave to amend. The motion to strike is DENIED.

 





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