Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 25STCV01776, Date: 2025-05-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25STCV01776    Hearing Date: May 12, 2025    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

On January 22, 2025, Plaintiff Sophie Mokhtari (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint for Rescission and Damages against Defendant Riot Games, Inc. (“Defendant”) and DOES 1 through 50, alleging a sole cause of action for Intentional Misrepresentation.

On April 4, 2025, Defendant filed the instant Petition to Compel Arbitration and Stay Case. On April 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Non-Opposition to Petition to Compel Arbitration.

LEGAL STANDARD

Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.2 permits a party to file a petition to request that the Court order the parties to arbitrate a controversy.  Under Section 1281.2, a party is permitted to file a motion to request an order directing the parties to arbitrate a controversy.  Section 1281.2 also states that the Court may grant the motion if the Court determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists.  

When a motion to compel arbitration is filed and accompanied by prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy, the court itself must determine whether the agreement exists and, if any defense to its enforcement is raised, whether it is enforceable.  (Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial Sec. Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.)  The moving party bears the burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence because the existence of the agreement is a statutory prerequisite to granting the petition.  (Ibid.)  

A party opposing a motion to compel arbitration based on a defense to enforcement bears the burden establishing the defense by producing evidence and proving the defense by a preponderance of the evidence.  (Ibid.)  The facts are to be proven by affidavit or declaration and documentary evidence, with oral testimony taken only in the court’s discretion.  (Id. at pp. 413-414.)  The trial court’s role is to resolve these factual issues, not merely to determine whether evidence opposing the petition has sufficient substantiality.  (Id. at p. 414.)  

Since binding arbitration is a matter of contract, the parties may freely delineate the area of its application, and a proceeding to compel arbitration is in essence a suit in equity to compel specific performance of a contract.  (Freeman v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 473, 479; Morris v. Zuckerman (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 91, 96.)  Arbitration, as a general rule, should be upheld by the court, unless it can be said with assurance that an arbitration clause is not susceptible to an interpretation covering the asserted dispute.  (Bos Material Handling, Inc. v. Crown Controls Corp. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 99, 105; O’Malley v. Wilshire Oil Co. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 482, 490-491.)  The court should, nonetheless, give effect to the parties’ intentions in light of the usual and ordinary meaning of the contractual language and the circumstances under which the agreement was made.  (Victoria v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 734, 744.)  

There is a strong policy in favor of enforcing agreements to arbitrate, but there is no policy compelling persons to accept arbitration of controversies which they have not agreed to arbitrate.  (State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1301-1302.) 

DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to compel Plaintiff to arbitrate her sole cause of action for intentional misrepresentation on the grounds that there is a valid written agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant to arbitrate this controversy.

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff filed a Non-Opposition to the Petition on the grounds that the discovery stay (after Defendant prevailed on its ex parte app) has prevented her from obtaining evidence necessary to effectively oppose the Petition on the merits. However, Plaintiff fails to provide the Court with any details as to the type of discovery she needs and what information it would disclosed. As such, Plaintiff’s request for the order compelling arbitration reflect that she does not expressly admit or concede that the Arbitration Agreement or any of its provisions are valid, enforceable, or applicable is denied. Furthermore, Defendant has provide sufficient evidence proving the existence of a valid, written agreement to arbitrate between the parties. Specifically, the Arbitration Agreement expressly states employment-related claims must be arbitrated excluding claims for workers’ compensation, unemployment, and unfair labor practices. (See Compendium, Ex. C – Employment Arbitration Agreement, ¶¶1-2.)

Nevertheless, the Arbitration Agreement contains a delegation clause, which states, “the Arbitrator shall have the exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability, or formation of [the Arbitration] Agreement, including, but not limited to, any Claim that all or any part of [the] Agreement is unenforceable, void or voidable.” (Compendium, Ex. C – Employment Arbitration Agreement, ¶5.)

In Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson (2010) 561 U.S. 63, the court held that “[t]he delegation provision is an agreement to arbitrate threshold issues concerning the arbitration agreement. We have recognized that parties can agree to arbitrate “gateway” questions of “arbitrability,” such as whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate or whether their agreement covers a particular controversy.” (Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson (2010) 561 U.S. 63, 68–69.) However,  “[t]here are two types of validity challenges under § 2: ‘One type challenges specifically the validity of the agreement to arbitrate,” and “[t]he other challenges the contract as a whole, either on a ground that directly affects the entire agreement (e.g., the agreement was fraudulently induced), or on the ground that the illegality of one of the contract's provisions renders the whole contract invalid.’ ” (Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson (2010) 561 U.S. 63, 70.) “Accordingly, unless Jackson challenged the delegation provision specifically, we must treat it as valid under § 2, and must enforce it under §§ 3 and 4, leaving any challenge to the validity of the Agreement as a whole for the arbitrator.” (Id. at 72.)

Although Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that Defendant made misrepresentations related to Defendant’s culture, policies and practice, otherwise she would not have agreed to the delegation clause (Pet., ¶¶4-5; Compendium, Ex. D – Plf.’s Complaint, ¶¶5, 12), Plaintiff does not challenge the delegation clause itself or allege misrepresentations as it relates to the delegation clause.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendant Riot Games, Inc.’s Petition to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED. This matter is stayed pending arbitration.