Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: BC588216, Date: 2023-09-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: BC588216    Hearing Date: September 15, 2023    Dept: 32

 

paula boyd,

                        Plaintiff,

            v.

 

DAVID FREEMAN,

                        Defendant.

 

  Case No.:  BC588216

  Hearing Date:  September 15, 2023

 

     [TENTATIVE] order RE:

(1)   defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees; and

 

 

 

 

 

BACKGROUND

            On November 10, 2015, Plaintiff Paula Boyd filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against Defendants David Freeman and T.D. Service Company, alleging causes for action for (1) wrongful foreclosure, (2) set aside trustee sale, (3) void trustee’s deed, (4) unjust enrichment, and (5) quiet title.

            In December 2005, Freeman loaned Boyd $425,000 pursuant to a written promissory note. In January 2007, Boyd defaulted under the note by failing to make the required monthly payment. Boyd thereafter retained an attorney and asserted that the interest rate on the note was usurious. In September 2007, Freeman and Boyd entered into a written settlement agreement, which was a good faith attempt by the parties to agree on a new set of obligations free from usury. In a statement of decision dated July 27, 2021, this Court held that while the original note contained a usurious interest rate, the subsequent settlement agreement purged the usury. Boyd’s attempt to void the settlement agreement based on duress, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct was unavailing. Boyd’s attempt to rescind the agreement was also time-barred. As a result, judgment was entered in favor of Freeman as the prevailing party, and the court awarded Freeman attorney fees. The judgment and attorney fees order were affirmed on appeal.

            Freeman now seeks to recover attorney fees incurred on the appeal.

            Boyd has not filed any opposition to Freeman’s motion.      

LEGAL STANDARD

a. Motion for Attorney’s Fees

When authorized by contract, statute or law, reasonable attorney fees are allowable costs. (Code Civ. Proc, § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(A).) A prevailing party is entitled to recover costs including attorney fees except when expressly not authorized by statute. (Id., § 1032, subd. (b).) “In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs.” (Id., § 1717, subd. (a).)

The lodestar method for calculating attorney fees applies to any statutory attorney fees award, unless the statute authorizing the award provides for another method of calculation. (Glaviano v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 744, 750-751.) “Under the lodestar method, the trial court must first determine the lodestar figure—the reasonable hours spent multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate—based on a careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney involved in the presentation of the case.” (Id. at p. 751.) The trial court has broad authority to determine the amount of a reasonable fee. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)

II. Reasonableness of Fees

Pursuant to the lodestar method, the Court must determine whether Defendant’s requested fees are reasonable. Defendant requests a total amount of $26,637.50. Defense counsel spent 106.5 hours in connection with the appeal. Plaintiff does not dispute the reasonableness of this amount. The Court finds the hours spent to be reasonable. Defense counsel bills at a rate of $250 per hour. Plaintiff does not dispute the reasonableness of this rate. The Court finds the hourly rate to be reasonable. Thus, the amount of attorney’s fees requested by Defendant is reasonable, and Plaintiff is entitled to $26,637.50.

Since Defendant was not required to respond to an opposition, the court declines to award any additional fees concerning the motion for attorney fees.

CONCLUSION

            Defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees is GRANTED in the amount of $26,637.50.