Judge: David A. Hoffer, Case: 30-2018-991306, Date: 2022-10-31 Tentative Ruling

Cross-defendants California Department of Parks and Recreation and State of California’s (“State” together) Demurrer to defendants/cross-complainants Michael L. Dodge, Kristyn M. Dodge, William D. Ransford, and Victoria L. Ransford’s (“Defendants” together) First Amended Cross-Complaint (“FACC”) is SUSTAINED (with 20-days leave to amend).

A)  Cause of Action No. 1

“The [State Park System] is authorized to provide means of ingress to and egress from all state parks in order to provide ready access thereto by the public and to provide means of ingress and egress to highways and roads across state parks from lands separated from such highways and roads by state parks, and for that purpose may enter into contracts or agreements with cities, counties, and other political subdivisions of the State and with other state agencies or with persons, firms or corporations for the acquisition, construction, and maintenance of suitable roads, trails, and pathways.

When application is received by the department. . . from any person, firm or corporation for right-of-way across a state park for ingress and egress to a highway or road from their lands separated from such highway or road by the state park, the department shall determine whether any reasonable access exists outside the boundaries of the park, or could be economically constructed. Where reasonable access does not exist or cannot be economically constructed outside the boundaries of the park, the department shall grant a permit for right-of-way across the park over such route and subject to such conditions and construction and maintenance specifications as the department may determine which will cause minimum alteration to the physical features of the park and minimum interference with the use of the park by the public. The permittee shall at his own expense construct and maintain the means of ingress and egress in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the permit, noncompliance with which in any part shall be due cause for revocation of such permit. The department may require a permittee or permittees to allow the use of such means of ingress and egress by any other applicant whose lands are similarly situated. The department shall grant a permit for such use under terms and conditions imposed upon existing users, upon payment of a reasonable compensation for construction and maintenance of the road, by the applicant to the existing permittee, or permittees.”  (Pub. Res. Code § 5003.5.)

Pub. Res. Code § 5003.5 provides an administrative remedy for individuals/entities whose land is cut off from public roads by a state park to obtain right-of-way across the park.  “This is the doctrine of ‘exhaustion of administrative remedies. In brief, the rule is that where an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must be sought from the administrative body and this remedy exhausted before the courts will act. [Citation.]  [E]xhaustion of the administrative remedy is a jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the courts. [Citation.]  However, [t]he exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine has never applied where there is no available administrative remedy. [Citations.]”  (Mammoth Lakes Land Acquisition, LLC v. Town of Mammoth Lakes (2010) 191 Cal. App. 4th 435, 454.)

Exhaustion of administrative remedies, “is not a matter of judicial discretion, but is a fundamental rule of procedure ... binding upon all courts.”  (Monterey Coastkeeper v. State Water Res. Control Bd. (2018) 28 Cal. App. 5th 342, 359.)  “The primary purpose of the doctrine is to afford administrative tribunals the opportunity to decide in a final way matters within their area of expertise prior to judicial review. [Citation.] The essence of the exhaustion doctrine is the public agency's opportunity to receive and respond to articulated factual issues and legal theories before its actions are subjected to judicial review. [Citations.] The doctrine prevents courts from interfering with the subject matter of another tribunal. [Citation.]  Another purpose of the doctrine  ‘is to lighten the burden of overworked courts in cases where administrative remedies are available and are as likely as the judicial remedy to provide the wanted relief. (Id.)  To advance the purpose of the exhaustion doctrine, the exact issue, not merely generalized statements, must be raised.  [Citation.]  The petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the issues raised in the judicial proceeding were first raised at the administrative level.”  (Id.)

“Where a petitioner has not exhausted its administrative remedies a trial court has no jurisdiction to decide the dispute.”  (Browning-Ferris Indus. v. City Council (1986) 181 Cal. App. 3d 852, 859.)

Under Pub. Res. Code § 5003.5, Defendants have failed to bear their burden of demonstrating 1) the issues in their FACC were formally raised at the administrative level; and 2) that a final ruling was issued by the applicable administrative tribunal(s) within the State Park System which would exhaust the applicable administrative remedies.  As such, this court has no jurisdiction to decide the issues in the FACC at this time.

More specifically, although defendants claim in very general terms and on information and belief that an application was made, they do not allege any particulars, such as who that application was made to or when the application was made and they do not attach the application to the complaint.  Similarly, although defendants allege generally that the application was denied, they do not allege who denied the application, when it was denied, or whether the person or entity who denied the application had authority to do so and they do not attach the denial to the complaint for the court’s review.  The administrative remedy must be determined by the state entity governing/responding to a Pub. Res. Code § 5003.5 request.  It is not enough that a Deputy Attorney General or an employee of one the parks gave an opinion on the issue as there is nothing to suggest the applicable entity examined the issues and made a final determination.

Finally, the court concurs with the State that the allegations necessary to establish the narrow exception for futility have also not been made. (See Sea & Sage Audubon Society, Inc. v. Planning Com. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 412, 418.)

State’s demurrer is sustained as to this cause of action.

B)  Cause of Action No. 2

The second cause of action also fails as, again, an administrative procedure exists and it does not appear that it has been fully utilized before this complaint was filed.

State’s demurrer is sustained as to this cause of action.

Leave is granted to file an amended complaint within 20-days written notice of the court’s ruling. 

State is ordered to give notice of this ruling.