Judge: David A. Hoffer, Case: 30-2020-1158205, Date: 2022-08-08 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Lyndon Brown’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Attorney Fees (“Motion”) is GRANTED – in a reduced amount (as discussed below).

Under the SBA:

“(d) If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.

(e)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subdivision, if the buyer establishes a violation of paragraph (2) of subdivision (d) of Section 1793.2, the buyer shall recover damages and reasonable attorney's fees and costs, and may recover a civil penalty of up to two times the amount of damages.”  (Civ. Code § 1794(d) and (e).)

“The starting point of every fee award, once it is recognized that the court's role in equity is to provide just compensation for the attorney, must be a calculation of the attorney's services in terms of the time he has expended on the case. Anchoring the analysis to this concept is the only way of approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.”  (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal. 3d 25, 49.)

“The lodestar adjustment method requires the trial court first to determine a touchstone or lodestar figure based on actual time spent and reasonable hourly compensation for each attorney. [Citation.]  “The touchstone figure may then be augmented or diminished by taking various relevant factors into account, including (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; and (3) the contingent nature of the fee award, based on the uncertainty of [] prevailing on the merits and of establishing eligibility for the award.” [Citation.]  For Song–Beverly Consumer Warranty Act claims, “[a] prevailing buyer has the burden of ‘showing that the fees incurred were “allowable,” were “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation,” and were “reasonable in amount.”  (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal. App. 4th 967, 998.)

Plaintiff seeks lodestar fees of $86,365, plus a multiplier of 1.5 on the fees, for a total of $129,547.50, pursuant to Civ. Proc. Code § 1794(d).  (O’Connor Decl. ¶¶ 22-23, Exs. 12-13.)

The court, having carefully reviewed and analyzed the submitted evidence in support of the requested attorney fee amounts, finds the requested billing rates are more or less reasonable and will permit them.  Regarding the amount of time billed, the court has calculated that approximately 11.6% of the overall bills were not reasonable.  (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 785, 817.)  The court also finds there was approximately $2,617.50 in  “anticipated billing” on a motion to strike which has not been filed and which, therefore, has not been incurred.  The court will award the following base amount in reasonable attorney fees:

($86,365 - $2,617.50) x (1 - 0.116) = $74,032.79

Plaintiff requests a 1.5 multiplier on attorney fees.  A multiplier is permissible under Civ. Code § 17945(e).  Generally, this case was not particularly long and/or complex and it settled instead of going to trial.   Furthermore, the court (although reducing the billings somewhat) accepted all the billings rates as proposed, including the high-side rate of $695 per hour for plaintiff’s lead counsel.  Thus, the court finds that plaintiff’s counsel was sufficiently compensated and declines the multiplier in this case.

Plaintiff is awarded a total of $74,032.79 in attorney fees in this action from defendants FCA US LLC and Tuttle-Click, Inc.

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this ruling.