Judge: David A. Hoffer, Case: 30-2021-01193090, Date: 2023-07-31 Tentative Ruling

Before the Court are the following motions: (1) Motion to Seal filed by Defendants International Paper Company and Eric Anderson (“Defendants”); (2) Motion to Compel Independent Mental Examination (“IME”) of Plaintiff Janel Grimm (“Plaintiff”) filed by Defendants; and (3) Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena filed by Plaintiff.

 

Motion 1: Motion to Seal (ROA 287)

 

Defendants move for an order permitting them to file under seal Exhibits C, J, K, and M in their Index of Exhibits in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment.  The Court determines that an overriding interest exists that overcomes the right of public access to the records at issue, as the materials to be sealed involve private personnel information concerning Defendant International Paper Company’s employees, and a substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the records at issue are not sealed.  Defendants have submitted appropriately redacted versions of the documents which are narrowly tailored to seal only the confidential materials at issue, and no less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest.  Accordingly, the unopposed motion is GRANTED.  (C.R.C. 2.550(d); McGuan v. Endovascular Technologies, Inc. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 974, 988.)

 

Counsel for Defendants are ordered to give notice of this ruling.

 

Motion 2: Motion to Compel IME (ROA 251)

 

A court order is required to obtain discovery by means of a mental examination.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 2032.310(a).)  The motion to compel a mental examination shall be granted only for good cause shown.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 2032.320(a).)  A showing of good cause requires “that the party produce specific facts justifying discovery and that the inquiry be relevant to the subject matter of the action or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”  (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 840.)

 

An order granting a mental examination shall specify the person or persons who may perform the examination, as well as the time, place, manner, diagnostic tests and procedures, conditions, scope, and nature of the examination.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 2032.320(d).)

 

The Court finds the motion complies with the requirements of C.C.P. § 2032.310(b) and that Defendants have demonstrated good cause for the examination.  Good cause has been shown here as Plaintiff placed her mental state at issue in this case in her discovery responses and deposition testimony.  (Exhs. A-C to Motion.)

 

Plaintiff failed to rebut Defendants’ showing of good cause and failed to demonstrate that the requested testing is intrusive and intended to harass Plaintiff.  Plaintiff cites no authority in support of her argument that a mental examination is not warranted where the information sought by the examination is available through less intrusive means such as through medical records and depositions of treating providers.  As Defendants point out, the availability of a plaintiff’s treating physicians for deposition and preexisting medical records are not a substitute for a clinical evaluation.  (See, e.g., Ashley v. City and County of San Francisco, 2013 WL 2386655, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 30, 2013).)

 

Accordingly, the Court finds Defendants have demonstrated good cause for a mental exam.  The motion is thus GRANTED.

 

With respect to Plaintiff’s requests to record the exam pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.530, for the exam to be conducted on a mutually agreeable date and time, for counsel to have the right to attend the exam, and for Defendants to disclose Dr. Haywood’s post-examination report, as these conditions are reasonable and/or permitted by code, the Court’s Order will reflect said conditions.

 

With respect to Plaintiff’s proposed limitations on the scope of the IME discussion, Plaintiff failed to offer any authority, evidence or reasoned argument demonstrating why such limitations should be imposed in this instance.  Thus, the Court declines to impose such conditions on the exam.

 

As for the length of the exam, while the court does not find it reasonable to restrict the exam to 3 hours (as Plaintiff requests), the court does not find the full 8 hours demanded by defendants to be necessary either.  Thus, the court will limit the exam to 6 hours.  This time limit will protect the defendants’ rights without unnecessarily harassing plaintiff.  As the defense has made a sufficient showing regarding the proposed tests (See Reply at 5:13-6:1; 10:1-7, fn 10.), the court declines to limit the tests that can be administered in this time frame.      

 

Plaintiff is ordered to appear for her mental examination within 35 days of the date of the hearing.  Counsel for Defendants are to submit a proposed order in accordance with this ruling pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.320(d), within 5 days.

 

Counsel for Defendants are ordered to give notice of this ruling.

 

Motion 3: Motion to Quash Subpoena (ROA 291)

 

Pursuant to C.C.P. §1987.1(a), upon motion by a party to an action, a Court “may make an order quashing [a] subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms and conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders.”  Additionally, “the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.”  (Id.)

 

Plaintiff seeks an order quashing or modifying the deposition subpoena issued on February 9, 2023, by Defendants to Burns Law Group seeking Plaintiff’s entire worker’s compensation file.

 

Plaintiff is correct that she has a right to privacy in her medical records and employment records.  (John B. v. Superior Court (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1198; Board of Trustees v. Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 516, 528-529.)  However, the right of privacy is not absolute.  It is balanced against other important interests which include an opponent’s right to a fair trial.  Courts attempt to balance the right of civil litigants to discover relevant information against the privacy interests of persons subject to discovery.  (John B. v. Superior Court, supra, at 1199.)

 

“[A]lthough in seeking recovery for physical and mental injuries plaintiffs have unquestionably waived their physician-patient and psychotherapist-patient privileges as to all information concerning the medical conditions which they have put in issue, past cases make clear that such waiver extends only to information relating to the medical conditions in question, and does not automatically open all of a plaintiff's past medical history to scrutiny.”  (Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 849.) (Emphasis in original.)  “[T]he scope of the inquiry permitted depends upon the nature of the injuries which the patient-litigant himself has brought before the court.”  (Id. at 864; Davis v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1017.)

Here, Plaintiff disclosed that she made a workers’ compensation claim against a former employer for “back, neck, [] nervous system, stress and psychological” injuries for which she received state benefits from November 2018 to February 2020.  (Miyar Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. B.)  Plaintiff, in alleging emotional distress injuries and exacerbation of fibromyalgia symptoms due to Defendants’ conduct, has not waived the physician-patient privilege with respect to all of her past medical conditions.  Given what is known, it appears to the Court that back and neck injuries would have no relevance to the issues in the present case.  However, stress and psychological injuries would appear to be directly relevant to Plaintiff’s claimed injuries in this case as they are very similar in nature to Plaintiff’s claims of emotional distress.  Thus, the subpoena is overbroad to the extent it seeks Plaintiff’s entire workers’ compensation file, as said file may include records for medical conditions unrelated to Plaintiff’s claimed injuries.  In addition, as Plaintiff notes, the file may also contain Plaintiff’s confidential employment records.  Defendants have not shown how said records are relevant to the claims in this case.

The motion is thus DENIED to the extent it seeks to quash the subpoena, but GRANTED to the extent it seeks to modify the subpoena.  The subpoena shall be limited to records pertaining to Plaintiff’s medical conditions put in issue in this litigation, i.e., emotional distress, anger, frustration, lack of sleep, stress, trauma, and anxiety, and fibromyalgia.

As the court’s decision is split, the court DENIES the parties’ criss-crossing requests for sanctions.

Counsel for defendants are ordered to give notice of this ruling.