Judge: David A. Hoffer, Case: 30-2021-01196990, Date: 2022-09-26 Tentative Ruling

The Motion to Determine Good Faith Settlement (ROA 170) filed by Cross-Defendants Mofid Albitar (“Albitar”); Ward Maksoud (“Maksoud”); and Natalia Husri (“Husri”) (collectively, “Moving Parties”) is GRANTED. (C.C.P. § 877.6.)

There is no precise yardstick for measuring “good faith” of a settlement with one of several tortfeasors. But a court must harmonize the public policy favoring settlements with the competing public policy favoring equitable sharing of costs among tortfeasors. To accomplish this, the settlement must be within the “reasonable range” (within the “ballpark”) of the settling tortfeasor’s share of liability for the plaintiff’s injuries. (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assoc. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499.) Even a settlement that seems disproportionately low may be justified by showing that damages or liability are speculative, or that a settling defendant was uninsured, underinsured or insolvent. (Id.)

The California Supreme Court in Tech-Bilt v. Woodward-Clyde & Assoc. set forth the factors to determine good faith, which include: (1) a rough approximation of plaintiffs’ total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability; (2) the amount paid in settlement; (3) the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs; (4) the recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial; (5) the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants; and (6) the existence of collusion, fraud or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants. (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at 499-500.)

Here, an analysis of the Tech-Bilt factors supports granting Moving Parties’ motion. As to the first factor, Moving Parties submitted evidence showing that at the time the settlement was reached, Plaintiff Dinh Thuc Ha’s (“Plaintiff”) medical bills made available to Moving Parties showed billed charges of $20,332.10. (Mallory Decl. at ¶10, Exh. C, Medical Bills.) Plaintiff’s claimed injuries do not appear severe. (Mallory Decl. at ¶9, Exh. B, Form Interrogatory Responses.) Further, Plaintiff’s treatment lasted approximately one year and was largely conservative. (Mallory Decl. at ¶10, Exh. C, Medical Bills.) In addition, Plaintiff is not making a claim for loss of income or earning capacity. (Mallory Decl. at ¶9, Exh. B, Form Interrogatory Responses.)

Additionally, Moving Parties’ proportionate liability may be minimal as the evidence shows that Mr. Khorasanian was found to have caused the original collision by rear-ending Albitar’s vehicle. (Mallory Decl., Exh. A, Traffic Collision Reports.) In addition, although Albitar’s vehicle may not have had its lights turned on after the collision, the evidence shows that both Ms. Turley and Mr. Tran were distracted by people standing on the right shoulder of the highway and that neither reduced their speed nor took timely evasive maneuvers. (Id.)

The second Tech-Bilt factor favors granting the Motion as the settlement is for Moving Parties’ $15,000.00 policy limits. (Mallory Decl. at ¶¶12-15, Exhs. E, Insurance Policy, F-H, Releases.)

The third factor is inapplicable here as there is only one plaintiff, and the fourth factor, the recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial, favors approving Moving Parties’ motion.

As to the fifth Tech-Bilt factor, Moving Parties each submitted declarations stating that they have no other insurance policies that could potentially cover the claims at issue and evidencing that they currently have minimal income and assets. (Declarations of Mofid Albitar, Ward Maksoud, and Natalia Husri [ROAs 157, 159, 165].) Thus, even if the court were to find the settlement was disproportionately low, this would not preclude granting the motion as a showing has been made that the settling defendants currently have minimal income and assets with which to contribute to a settlement.  (Tech-Bilt, Inc., supra, 38 Cal.3d at 499.)

As to the sixth Tech-Bilt factor, there is no evidence presented that the settlement was the result of collusion, fraud or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interest of nonsettling defendants.

In opposition, Cross-Complainant Cang Tran (“Tran”) argues that the settlement is not in good faith because Plaintiff served a Statement of Damages two weeks prior to the Notice of Settlement with Moving Parties in which Plaintiff sought $4,350,000 in damages and served Form Interrogatory responses indicating that she is still treating for her injuries and may require future treatment. (Declaration of Abigail Lloyd, Exh. C., Statement of Damages and Exh. D, Form Interrogatory Responses.) While Plaintiff did serve a Statement of Damages seeking $4,350,000 in damages and stated in discovery responses that she is still treating, the medical bills made available to Moving Parties at the time of settlement showed only $20,332.10 in medical charges to date with conservative treatment. Plaintiff’s discovery responses also showed that her injuries were not extremely serious in nature. (See Exhs. B and C to Mallory Decl.) As our Supreme Court has recognized, “practical considerations obviously require that the evaluation be made on the basis of information available at the time of settlement.” (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 499.)

Given the amount of medical bills, the conservative nature of the injuries and treatment rendered as of the time of settlement, and given Moving Parties’ potentially minimal liability as discussed above, the court finds the $15,000 settlement to be within the “reasonable range” of Moving Parties’ share of liability.

Tran also argues that the settlement is premature because he has not been able to conduct necessary discovery. This argument lacks merit as this matter has been pending for over one year and all cross-defendants have appeared. Tran offers no reasoned explanation for why he has not yet been able to conduct discovery of cross-defendants.

Thus, Tran failed to meet his burden of demonstrating lack of good faith. (C.C.P. § 877.6(d).)

As demonstrated above, substantial evidence supports a finding that the settlement between Moving Parties and Plaintiff was made in good faith. (City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1263-1265.)

Accordingly, the Motion is granted.

Moving Parties are dismissed from Tran’s Cross-Complaint, with prejudice. (C.C.P. § 877.6(c); CRC 3.1382.)

Tran’s Motion to Contest Good Faith Settlement (ROA 125) is MOOT in light of the Court’s ruling granting Moving Parties’ motion.

Moving Parties are ordered to give notice of these rulings.