Judge: David A. Hoffer, Case: 30-2021-01235260, Date: 2023-08-14 Tentative Ruling
Defendant DVA Healthcare Renal Care, Inc. dba Westminster South Dialysis’ (“DVA”) Motion for Summary Judgment, or Alternatively, Summary Adjudication (“Motion”), is GRANTED.
Plaintiff requests summary adjudication as to both of Plaintiff’s causes of action (“COA”).
1) COA No. 1 – Negligence
“The elements of a cause of action for negligence are well established. They are '(a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; [and] (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.' ” (Ladd v. Cty. of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal. 4th 913, 917.) “[T]he existence of a duty is a question of law for the court.” (Kentucky Fried Chicken of Cal., Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 14 Cal. 4th 814, 819.)
“It is fundamental that in order to take charge of a person in such a manner as will create a duty to control his conduct, one must possess the ability to control that person's conduct.” (Megeff v. Doland (1981) 123 Cal. App. 3d 251, 261.)
Plaintiff’s allegations under this COA are that DVA “owed a duty to patients using the center’s services.” (FAC ¶ 17.) DVA owed a duty “to act a reasonably prudent owner of a medical facility servicing its patients.” (FAC ¶ 18.) DVA allegedly breached its duty by failing to adequately monitor patients leaving DVA while still on “its” property (FAC ¶ 19a); failing to hire personnel to assist patients leaving DVA but while still on “its” property (FAC ¶ 19b); failing to institute protocol or policy to ensure reasonably safe ingress of patients/clientele onto medical transport vehicle (FAC ¶ 19c); failing to provide sufficient or adequate lighting at or near the entrance of the Property during evening or nighttime hours (FAC ¶ 19d); failing to assist Plaintiff after the incident and at the site of the incident (FAC ¶ 19e).
“Under traditional tort law principles, one is ordinarily not liable for the actions of another and is under no duty to protect another from harm, in the absence of a special relationship of custody or control. [Citations.] Moreover, in determining the existence of a duty of care in a given case, we must consider several factors, including the “foreseeability of harm to [the injured party], the degree of certainty that [he] suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between [defendants'] conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to [defendants], the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant[s] and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.” (Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church (1988) 47 Cal. 3d 278, 293.)
The relationship between DVA and Plaintiff is that of a dialysis provider to its patient. While there is a duty of care owed by a medical care provider to a patient, Plaintiff was injured falling out of a third-party transport vehicle (“Vehicle”) owned/operated by defendant TLC Courtesy Coach, Inc. (“TLC”), which would not generally fall under the duty owed by a medical care provider.
DVA had no part in assisting Plaintiff to the Vehicle, nor, as Plaintiff admitted, was DVA responsible for assisting Plaintiff into the Vehicle. (Sun Decl., Ex. B at RFA No. 12.) Plaintiff had finished her dialysis treatment (Sun Decl., Ex. C at 41:14-22), left the facility (Sun Decl., Ex. B at RFA No. 2; Ex. C at 42:5-17), and was already inside the front seat of the Vehicle at the time of the incident (Sun Decl., Ex. C at 42:12-17, 44:5-46:4). Plaintiff admitted she was in the care and custody of TLC at the time of the subject incident. (Sun Decl., Ex. B at RFA No. 6.) Plaintiff also admitted that DVA, “was not responsible for assisting Plaintiff into the transport vehicle driven by [TLC] at the time of the subject incident.” (Sun Decl., Ex. B at RFA No. 12.) Plaintiff also did not notify DVA of any injury until after she had returned home. (Sun Decl., Ex. B at RFA No. 5.)
As to the factors imposing a duty on DVA for Plaintiff’s care after Plaintiff had finished dialysis and left the facility, it is not foreseeable that a patient would be injured trying to get out of the front seat of a third-party owned/operated transport vehicle (“Vehicle”) and into the back seat at the order of a third-party driver. Since the injury occurred when plaintiff was in the custody of TLC, there is no moral blame put on DVA for Plaintiff’s injuries. To require DVA to prevent similar future harms would require that DVA provide an employee to assist patients before and after they leave the facility and to wait until patients had been driven off the property before the employee could return to their normal job functions. This burden on DVA would likely be high and would likely require the hiring of additional staff to assist multiple overlapping patients throughout the day and require DVA to be responsible for third-parties actions (such as the driver and owner of the vehicle). The above factors support that there is no duty owed by DVA to Plaintiff to ensure that Plaintiff is able to get into and out of third-party owner and/or operated transport vehicles.
Plaintiff’s sole argument is that DVA’s position (that Plaintiff was not in DVA’s custody or control) is misguided. This argument is unavailing. As noted, in order to create a duty, one must possess the ability to control another’s conduct. (Megeff, supra, 123 Cal. App. 3d at 261.) In this case, plaintiff has admitted she was in the care and custody of TLC and that she was inside the van just prior to the incident. (Sun Decl., Ex. B at RFA No. 6; Ex. C at 42:12-17, 44:5-46:5). As DVA did not have the ability to control Plaintiff’s conduct once she left the facility and got into the TLC van, Plaintiff has failed to make any showing of a duty owed to Plaintiff by DVA.
Since the duty element cannot be established, the Motion must be granted as to this COA.
2) COA No. 2 – Premises Liability
“The owner of premises is under a duty to exercise ordinary care in the management of such premises in order to avoid exposing persons to an unreasonable risk of harm. A failure to fulfill this duty is negligence.” (Brooks v. Eugene Burger Mgmt. Corp. (1989) 215 Cal. App. 3d 1611, 1619.) “To prevail in its summary judgment motion, defendant must negate at least one of the elements of each cause of action; here, it attempted to negate the elements of duty and proximate cause. The determination that a [] defendant owed the plaintiff no duty of care is a complete defense to a cause of action for negligence.” Id., at 1619–20. “A defendant need not own, possess and control property in order to be held liable; control alone is sufficient.” (Alcaraz v. Vece (1997) 14 Cal. 4th 1149, 1162.)
The Complaint only alleges DVA was negligent in its use and maintenance of the property. (FAC ¶ 25.)
Plaintiff testified that she was already sitting in the front seat of the Vehicle prior to the time of the incident. (Sun Decl., Ex. C at 42:12-17, 44:5-46:4, 47:15-18.) She was told (and motioned to) by the driver of the Vehicle to get into the backseat. (Id., at 46:15-47:18.) As soon as Plaintiff opened the door to try to get out of the Vehicle, she missed a step, stumbled, tried to reach out for the handle, fell out, and her right head/shoulders/neck hit the inside of the van door. (Id., at 7-22-28:4, 48:17-50:8.) Plaintiff did not fall on the ground, but caught herself on the door; and hitting the door caused her injuries. (Id., at 53:10-19.) After she stumbled out of the front seat, she went back into the front seat and was driven home. (Id., at 54:25-55:7.)
While the Vehicle may have been parked in the parking lot near to DVA’s facility, Plaintiff testified that she was already sitting in the Vehicle, that the injuries she suffered were caused by the Vehicle in her attempt to exit the Vehicle. Plaintiff did not fall to the ground and suffered no injury from any dangerous condition of the Property. There is no evidence DVA owed a duty to upkeep the Vehicle, nor has Plaintiff cited to any law or case that demands such.
As Plaintiff testified her injuries were caused by the Vehicle, and not by any dangerous condition of the property, a premises liability claim cannot be made, and the Motion is granted as to this COA.
Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend is DENIED. None of the cases or code sections cited by Plaintiff involve summary judgment motions, nor do they permit a plaintiff to amend a pleading following a ruling on a successful motion. Additionally, Plaintiff had the opportunity in her complaint, first amended complaint, and in opposing the present motion to present facts and evidence that would support her claims against DVA, but she failed to make any such showing. Even if an amendment at this stage were permissible, Plaintiff has not shown what amendments could be made to support her claims against DVA.
DVA is ordered to give notice of this ruling and to provide a proposed order to the court.