Judge: David A. Hoffer, Case: 30-2022-01252920, Date: 2023-05-15 Tentative Ruling
Defendants/Cross-Complainant Signal Hill Auto Enterprises, Jeffrey Lerma, Michael Marriot, and Jeicel Perez’s (together “defendants”) Motion for Terminating, Issue, and Evidentiary Sanctions for spoliation of evidence against Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Elisa Crawford (“plaintiff”) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. More specifically, the court grants in part (as discussed below) the request for evidentiary sanctions and denies the request for issue and terminating sanctions.
As a threshold matter, defendants have met their burden of showing that plaintiff intentionally destroyed evidence after contacting a lawyer and while considering litigation. In her deposition, plaintiff admitted that, prior to turning in her computer to her employer, she downloaded certain files onto thumb drives and used a special program to entirely wipe the computer. Furthermore, although we do not know the precise contents of the computer, at a minimum it contains client contact information, which is one of the subjects of the cross-complaint. This conduct justifies sanctions. (See Code of Civ. Procedure, § 2023.030 (“To the extent authorized by the chapter governing any particular discovery method or any other provision of this title, the court, after notice to any affected party, person, or attorney, and after opportunity for hearing may impose …. sanctions against anyone engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process[.]”); Williams v. Russ (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1223) (granting discovery sanctions for spoliation of evidence)).
Nor is plaintiff’s argument that her work computer was actually her personal computer availing in this case. First of all, she admits to receiving her computer from work and returning it to work. Any claim to a private agreement to receive a free computer from her employer (devoid of any documentation or company policy to support it) is flimsy at best. Secondly, as defendants’ argue in their reply, it is the information on the computer, not the computer itself, which constitutes the evidence -- and this evidence was intentionally erased.
The issue in this matter is not whether to impose sanctions, but which sanctions the court should choose. (See Sauer v. Superior Court (1987)195 Cal.App.3d 213, 228 (granting trial courts “broad discretion” in imposing discovery sanctions). On this issue, the court sharply parts company from the defendants’ argument.
In selecting the sanction, “[t]he discovery statutes evince an incremental approach . . . starting with monetary sanctions and ending with the ultimate sanction of termination. Discovery sanctions should be appropriate to the dereliction, and should not exceed that which is required to protect the interests of the party entitled to but denied discovery.” (City of Los Angeles v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLC (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 466, 499). Importantly, “the sanction should not operate in such a fashion as to put the prevailing party in a better position than he would have had if he had obtained the discovery sought and it had been completely favorable to his cause.” (Sauer, supra., 195 Cal.App3d at 228). Furthermore, “the trial court cannot impose sanctions for misuse of the discovery process as a punishment.” (City of Los Angeles, supra., 84 Cal.App.5th at 499).
With these principles in mind, the court rejects the request for terminating and issue sanctions. With regard to the termination of the lawsuit, this sanction is simply too extreme for the dereliction identified. As plaintiff points out, there has been no prior discovery order which plaintiff violated and no prior sanction. In a situation such as this one (where the spoliation occurred before the litigation started and was not in violation of a preexisting discovery order), the court declines to jump straight to termination, essentially deciding that the lawsuit was over before it began. Moreover, despite having performed some discovery to date, defendants have failed to identify any particular evidence lost in the deletion. While the court is sympathetic to defendants’ predicament in not have the electronically stored information to review, the court will not terminate the lawsuit based upon pure speculation that the computer contained relevant evidence. This is especially true in this situation where the complaint is based on interpersonal relationships within the work environment which are unlikely to be shown or refuted by anything on or off the computer.
The issue sanctions are also too extreme. The proposed issue sanctions conclusively decide all of the issues in the complaint (see proposed issue sanctions 2 thorough 9) and one of the main issues in the cross-complaint (see proposed issue sanction 1) against the plaintiff. Thus, the issue sanctions have the same effect as the terminating sanctions – resolving the lawsuit in favor of the defendants. Furthermore, the proposed issue sanctions would place the defendants in a far better position than they would have attained if they had the discovery. For example, the allegations in the complaint are connected to inter-personal relationships within the office which are rarely recorded on a work computer, and yet the proposed issue sanctions would treat them as resolved in defendants’ favor. Even the one issue sanction related to the cross-complaint (regarding the misappropriation of trade secrets) greatly exceeds what the computer is likely to show (i.e., the computer might show the presence of, for example, customer information, not its “misappropriation”). (See Rutledge v. Hewlett-Packard Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1164, 1193 (“A discovery sanction should not provide a windfall to the other party, by putting the prevailing party in a better position that if he or she had obtained the discovery sought and it had been favorable.”).
Lastly, the court rejects terminating and issue sanctions because the court finds that evidentiary sanctions are appropriate to the dereliction at issue here. Though imperfect, evidentiary sanctions will prevent the plaintiff from taking advantage of the absence of the deleted evidence without putting the defense in a better position than if the evidence has been preserved.
With regard to the specific evidentiary
sanctions proposed, the court grants evidentiary sanction number one (the
jury instruction) as the jury should be apprised of the destruction of the
evidence from the computer. The court denies proposed evidentiary sanction
number two (precluding the plaintiff from offering evidence on a whole list
of items). However, this denial is without prejudice to raising this
issue again in a further noticed motion or in motions in limine prior to the
trial. The court concurs with plaintiff that the precise sanctions depend,
in part, on what evidence is available from other sources (which requires
completion of the discovery process). Thereafter, at defendants’ request,
the court will consider more specific sanctions (e.g., prohibiting plaintiff
from testifying as to what information was on, and not on, the computer at
issue).
The court declines to rule on the parties’ mutual objections to the evidence presented as these objections were not relevant to the court’s ruling (which was based on the admissions at the deposition and the court’s discretion). Defendants’ request for monetary sanctions is DENIED as the court granted only a small part of defendants’ motion.
The moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.