Judge: David A. Hoffer, Case: 30-2022-01297242, Date: 2023-08-14 Tentative Ruling

Before the Court at present are two Motions to Strike, filed by defendants Asad Holdings LLC (“Asad”) and Arman Tehrani (“Tehrani”) (together the "Defendants"), on 3/14/23 and 4/20/23, respectively.

Both Motions are directed to the same three portions of the Complaint – specifically, to the Prayer at ¶¶ 2-4 – and are based on essentially the same arguments. Both Motions are   GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

With regard to the portion of the Prayer seeking prejudgment interest, Civil Code § 3291 does not apply to wrongful termination actions. (Holmes v. General Dynamics Corp. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1418, 1436; 6 Witkin, Summary 11th Torts § 1828 (2023); Gourley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 53 C.3d 121.)  As the gravamen of the claim here is wrongful termination, § 3291 is inapplicable, and no other basis for prejudgment interest is apparent. The Complaint, as pled, thus fails to support the prejudgment interest claim.  Since the oppositions offer no basis to amend to allow prejudgment interest in a case such as this one, no leave to amend is granted.  

With regard to the portion of the Prayer seeking punitive damages, the claim is governed by Civil Code § 3294. Such a claim must be supported by specific factual allegations: conclusory characterizations are insufficient to state a claim under Civil Code § 3294.  (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.) And wrongful termination, without more, is insufficient to warrant punitive damages. (Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 702, 716-717)  Read broadly (as the court is required to do), the complaint alleges that plaintiff was terminated for refusing to make supposedly unlawful bookkeeping entries and then felt threatened when plaintiff appeared at her residence.  Thus, the complaint identifies facts sufficient to support a punitive damages claim.

With regard to the portion of the Prayer seeking attorney’s fees, the Complaint makes some claims which appear to be based on FEHA and attorney’s fees are available thereunder. (Gov. Code §12965(a)(6) [“In civil actions brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award to the prevailing party, including the department, reasonable attorney's fees and costs… except that…a prevailing defendant shall not be awarded fees and costs unless the court finds the action was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless when brought, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.”].  Although it might be preferable if plaintiff set forth which causes of action allow attorney’s fees and which do not, it is not required, and the general prayer for attorney’s fees is permissible.  

Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice (as belatedly filed on 4/3/23, with an objection thereto filed on 8/7/23) is GRANTED under Ev. Code §452(c), as to the existence of the record, but not as to the truth of any disputed facts asserted therein. (Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 264; Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 482.)

Counsel for Defendant is ordered to give notice of this ruling.