Judge: David A. Hoffer, Case: 30-2023-01307946, Date: 2023-08-28 Tentative Ruling
The Demurrer to the Complaint filed by Defendant Endeavor Schools, LLC on 4/28/23 is SUSTAINED with 30 days leave to amend as to all causes of action.
Here, Defendant demurs to each of the nine causes of action in the complaint.
First Cause of Action: Breach of Contract
Here, it is undisputed that the contract attached to the Complaint as Exhibit A contains the following clause: “You understand that your employment with the School will be on an at-will basis, which means that either you or the School may terminate the employment relationship at any time without cause or notice.” Plaintiff argues that the document also references execution of a contract of employment, making the terms of the contract ambiguous. However, she does not allege that a second employment contract as referenced was ever executed or that the terms of such a contract contradict the at-will provision she undisputedly agreed to in the agreement referenced and attached to the Complaint. Plaintiff’s allegations that the contract was breached by failing to inform plaintiff of the reason for her unpaid administrative leave and termination fail, as the contract allows for termination without cause or notice. Further, the agreement does not contain any terms that require Defendant to investigate complaints and/or allegations of suspected child abuse by Plaintiff or to accurately communicate to parents and/or correct rumors about Plaintiff. As such, the demurrer to the first cause of action is sustained.
Second Cause of Action: Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Defendant asserts that an employee cannot maintain a
tort action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against an employer. (Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 683-700.) Plaintiff cites to Gould v. Maryland Sound Industries, Inc. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1151, in which a court analyzed whether a claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing could survive where there was no evidence of an implied-in-fact contract that termination required good cause. There the court noted “The covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not transform a terminable-at-will employment contract into a terminable-only-for-good-cause contract.” (Gould v. Maryland Sound Industries, Inc. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1152.) As Plaintiff’s arguments are largely based on the existence of an implied-in-fact contract in which “SALEH would not be terminated absent good cause” (See Complaint ¶ 34), in the face of a written contract for terminable-at-will employment, the claim fails. As such, the demurrer to the second cause of action is sustained.
Third Cause of Action: Breach of Implied Contract (Wrongful Termination)
Defendant argues that an implied-in-fact contract term cannot contradict the plain language of the written contract. The plain language of the offer letter not only governs but prevails. (See Melican v. Regents of Univ. of Calif. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 168, 174-175 citing Gautier v. General Telephone Co.(1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 302; see also California Code of Civil Procedure § 1638.) Plaintiff cites Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d at 677-678: “The absence of an express written or oral contract term concerning termination of
employment does not necessarily indicate that the employment is actually intended by the parties to be "at will," because the presumption of at-will employment may be overcome by evidence of contrary intent. Generally, courts seek to enforce the actual understanding of the parties to a contract, and in so doing may inquire into the parties' conduct to determine if it demonstrates an implied contract.” However, this quote does not support Plaintiff’s position, as this case involves an express written contract term indicating the parties intended the employment to be at-will. Plaintiff provides no authority for finding an implied in fact contract in a situation where there is an express written contract term to the contrary. As such, the demurrer to the third cause of action is sustained.
Fourth Cause of Action: Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy
Wrongful termination in violation of public policy, or a Tameny claim, is limited to claims “finding support in an important public policy based on a statutory or constitutional provision.” (Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167; Chin et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Employment Litigation, supra, pp. 5-6, ¶ 5:47, quoting Green v. Ralee Eng. Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 79.) Plaintiff’s opposition notes that an employer must show the employer violated a policy that is (a) enumerated in a constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision of state or federal law, (b) “public” in the sense that it “inures to the benefit of the public” (rather than an individual interest), (c) well established at the time of the discharge, and (d) substantial and fundamental. (Stevenson v. Superior Ct. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 894; Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 79). However, neither the Complaint nor the opposition point to any constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision of state or federal law that Defendant is alleged to have violated in terminating Plaintiff. The Complaint only vaguely asserts that Defendant’s actions violated public policies “express and implied in the California Constitution and California law.” The only statute referenced in the opposition is Education Code § 32282 which includes a requirement that school safety plans comply with child abuse reporting procedures that require Defendant to report any suspected child abuse to the proper agencies. There is no allegation that Defendant failed to report to proper agencies or that such failure is the basis of Plaintiff’s claims. As such, the demurrer to the fourth cause of action is sustained.
Fifth Cause of Action: Negligence
The elements of negligence are (a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; and (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury. (Ladd v. Cnty. Of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917.) While Plaintiff asserts that Defendants had a legal duty to use due care when investigation allegations of suspected child abuse, she provides no legal basis for that assertion or that the duty would be owed to her rather than the children in Defendant’s care. The complaint alleges Defendant had a duty to Plaintiff “to protect her from harm, promptly investigate complaints made against her prior to taking any adverse employment action, protect [her] privacy by keeping any such investigation confidential, and to keep [her] informed of the results of any such investigation.” (Complaint ¶ 57.) Plaintiff does not plead any facts or law that would impose those duties on Defendant. As Plaintiff has not pled a basis for a legal duty owed by Defendant, the demurrer to the fifth cause of action is sustained.
Sixth Cause of Action: Defamation Per Se
To plead defamation, Plaintiff must plead “(a) a publication that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage.” (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ employees spread information to parents at the school that Plaintiff had committed acts of child abuse. (Complaint ¶ 64.) However, that allegation is qualified as being based on the fact that Plaintiff “was contacted by parents whose children attend LNMC, who informed her that they had learned SALEH was terminated because she had committed acts of child abuse against her students.” (Complaint ¶ 64.) The fact the allegation is based on does not support the conclusion that Defendants’ employees were telling parents that Plaintiff had abused her students. There are no assertions that the parents told Plaintiff they had learned the information from Defendant or its employees or what exactly those parents were told. As such, the Complaint does not plead facts sufficient to constitute a defamation claim. Therefore, the demurrer is sustained.
Seventh Cause of Action: Invasion of Privacy/False Light
While Defendant alleges that the false light claim is based on the defamation claim and must similarly fail, the complaint alleges that “Defendants continued to publish information and material, verbally and in writing, that showed Plaintiff in a false light… communicating to the LNMC community, including parents, that Plaintiff was terminated from LNMC because she had committed acts of child abuse against her students.” The allegations appear to be separate from those in the defamation claim.
However, like the defamation claim, plaintiff’s false light claim suffers from uncertainty in that it is not clear what information defendants allegedly published. Is this claim asserting that the note saying there was rough handling of a student (which did not identify plaintiff) was the publication or that Defendant somehow published information by failing to contradict a rumor? It is simply unclear, and the lack of detail makes it impossible for Defendant to meaningfully investigate or respond to Plaintiff’s claim. Nor can Defendant determine whether the alleged defamatory statement(s) were true or whether one of several privileges apply. As such, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a claim for invasion of privacy false light, and the demurrer to the seventh cause of action is sustained.
Eighth and Ninth Causes of Action: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (NIED)
While Plaintiff’s opposition asserts that the claims for emotional distress are premised not on her unexplained termination, but rather on the defamation claims, the allegations in the Complaint illustrate otherwise. The Complaint alleges that Defendant’s extreme and outrageous conduct included “failing to conduct an investigation into any complaints and/or allegations of suspected child abuse by
Plaintiff SALEH, failing to inform SALEH of the reason(s) for her unpaid administrative leave and termination, and failing to accurately communicate to LNMC parents and/or correct rumors in the community that SALEH had allegedly committed acts of child abuse against her students.” (Complaint ¶ 78 and 86.) There are no assertions that the conduct causing Plaintiff’s distress was Defendant telling other people that Plaintiff had committed child abuse. At most, the allegations are that Defendant’s failure to correct rumors as to Plaintiff’s child abuse caused distress, but Plaintiff provides no authority or argument to indicate that failure to correct a rumor constitutes extreme or outrageous conduct, nor that Defendant had a responsibility to correct the rumors.
To the extent Plaintiff’s emotional distress claims are premised on the employment actions taken against her, or an alleged failure by Defendant in carrying out the employment relationship, those claims are barred by worker’s compensation exclusivity. IIED and NIED distress claims based on physical or emotional damages resulting from an employment relationship are barred under the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act. (Livistanos v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 744, 754 citing Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection District (1987) 43 Cal.3d 148, 152–153.) Accordingly the demurrer to the eighth and ninth causes of action is sustained.
Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.