Judge: David A. Rosen, Case: 19STCV43802, Date: 2023-01-20 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 19STCV43802 Hearing Date: January 20, 2023 Dept: E
Case No: 19STCV43802
Hearing Date: 01/20/2023 – 10:00am
Trial Date: 10/23/2023
Case Name: ORLANDO PRICE v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY
METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, and DOES 1-20
TENTATIVE RULINGS ON
DEMURRER AND MOTION TO STRIKE
MOTION 1 - DEMURRER
Moving
Party: Defendant, Los Angeles
County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, a Public Entity
Responding Party: Plaintiff, Orlando Price
(Opposition and Reply Submitted)
Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC Rule
3.1300): Ok
16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP 1005(b)): Ok
Proper Address: Ok
RELIEF REQUESTED
Defendant, Los Angeles
County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, a Public Entity, demurs to
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (FAC) pursuant to CCP §430.10, et seq. on
the following grounds:
1.
The filing of Plaintiff s FAC was procedurally defective as
Plaintiff failed to serve Metro and attach a proof of service at the time of
the filing of the FAC.
4.
Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action fails to
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendant and is
uncertain.
5.
Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action fails
to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendant and
is uncertain.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed its FAC
on 07/18/2022 alleging the following causes of action – (1) Negligence, (2)
Premises Liability, (3) Violation of Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ. Code §53,
et seq, and (4) Violation of Unruh Act, Cal. Civ. Code §51, et seq.
Plaintiff
alleged that Defendant is a government entity and that Defendant owned, leased,
operated, maintained, designed, built, managed, supervised, inspected, and/or
otherwise controlled the property located at 3901 Lankershim Blvd., Studio
City, California 91604 (Premises).
Plaintiff
alleges that on November 16, 2018, the Premises were unsafe and dangerous
conditions were created or caused to exist, including failure to maintain and
warn all invitee’s that Defendant’s elevators were out of service obligating
Plaintiff to take the stairs which violated applicable building codes, ADA
regulations, and other industry standards, which led to an incident wherein
Plaintiff tripped and fell while at the Premises and suffered severe bodily
harm, including a fractured cervical vertebrae requiring emergency surgery.
(FAC ¶10.)
Plaintiff
alleges that on November 16, 2018, Plaintiff was lawfully at and upon the
Premises when he fell down the stairway as a result of the dangerous conditions
on the Premises. (FAC ¶11.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges he fell down the
stairway as a result of Defendants failure to provide a safe and alternative
route. (Id.)
PROCEDURAL
Meet
and Confer
A party filing a
demurrer “shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who
filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining
whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be
raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ.
Proc., §430.41, subd. (a).) “The parties
shall meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive
pleading is due. If the parties are not able to meet and confer at least five
days prior to the date the responsive pleading is due, the demurring party
shall be granted an automatic 30-day extension of time within which to file a
responsive pleading, by filing and serving, on or before the date on which a
demurrer would be due, a declaration stating under penalty of perjury that a
good faith attempt to meet and confer was made and explaining the reasons why
the parties could not meet and confer.”
(Code Civ. Proc., §430.41, subd. (a)(2).) Failure to sufficiently meet
and confer is not grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. (Id., §430.41(a)(4).)
Here,
Defendant’s counsel alleged it met and conferred prior to filing the demurrer.
(Decl. Ashour ¶5.)
LEGAL STANDARDS FOR DEMURRERS
Demurrer
– Sufficiency
A demurrer for
sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda, (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th
740, 747.) When considering demurrers,
courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of
Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) The court “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting
all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or
conclusions of fact or law ….” (Berkley
v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.)
In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of
the pleading or via proper judicial notice.
(Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968,
994.) A demurrer tests the pleadings
alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters; therefore, it lies only
where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially
noticed. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.30,
430.70.) The only issue involved in a
demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with
extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147
Cal.App.4th at 747.)
The
general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not
evidentiary facts. (Doe v. City of
Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.)
“All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter of pleading … is that
his complaint set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable
precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the
nature, source and extent of his cause of action.” (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.
(1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157.)
On
demurrer, a trial court has an independent duty to “determine whether or not
the … complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any
legal theory.” (Das v. Bank of
America, N.A. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 727, 734.) Demurrers do not lie as to only parts of
causes of action, where some valid claim is alleged but “must dispose of an
entire cause of action to be sustained.”
(Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97,
119.) “Generally
it is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if
there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by
amendment.” (Goodman v. Kennedy
(1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.)
Demurrer – Uncertainty
A special demurrer for uncertainty, CCP section 430.10(f), is disfavored
and will only be sustained where the pleading is so bad that defendant cannot
reasonably respond—i.e., cannot reasonably determine what issues must be
admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against
him/her. (Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Moreover, even if the pleading is somewhat vague,
“ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Ibid.)
ANALYSIS
Ground 1
Defendant
argues that the demurrer should be sustained because the filing of Plaintiff’s
FAC was procedurally defective as Plaintiff failed to serve Metro and attach a
proof of service at the time of the filing of the FAC.
Defendant states that when the Plaintiff filed the FAC
on July 18, 2022, Plaintiff failed to serve Defendant and failed to include a
proof of service. Defendant states it was not aware of the filing of the FAC
until almost ten days later, on July 27, 2022.
In Opposition, Plaintiff states as follows :
Plaintiff received
notice that the FAC had been received. Plaintiff received a CONFORMED copy of
the FAC on July 27, 2022, and immediately effectuated service onto Defendant [a
conformed copy is required to properly effectuate service]. Defendant raises
frivolous arguments and fails to cite any relevant Codes of Civil procedures
they claim were defective in the filing and service of Plaintiff’s FAC.
Defendant knew of this Motion since April 8, 2022 and was present at the
hearing when the FAC was granted. The current trial date in this matter is
April 27, 2023. Thus, there is no prejudice as Defendant claims. Further,
Defendant has already appeared on behalf of Defendant, no new Defendants have
been added. Plaintiff and Defendant have been litigating this case since
December 2019. Thus, Defendant’s claims of Plaintiff’s FAC being procedurally
defective have no standing. [Madison Dec. ¶ 5]
(Oppo. p. 4-5.)
In Reply, Defendant argues:
Plaintiffs Opposition
admits that in his Motion for Leave to Amend, Plaintiff only requested for an
Order that "the attached Proposed First Amended Complaint be deemed to be
the operative amended pleading", and the Court's Minute Order on
Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend did NOT issue any such Order. In fact.
Plaintiff was later advised by the clerk that he still had to file his First
Amended Complaint. Despite of such facts. Plaintiff repeatedly used terms and
phrases such as "...the FAC was granted" to mislead the Court.
Further, Plaintiffs Opposition argues that Defendant is somehow properly served
because "Defendant knew of [Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend] since
April 8, 2022." Metro should not be expected to assume the proposed First
Amended Complaint will be the same one as Plaintiff eventually file, nor should
Metro be expected to prepare its litigation based on a proposed First Amended
Complaint. Moreover, Plaintiff did not dispute the fact that NO proof of
service was included in his First Amended Complaint.
(Reply p. 2.)
TENTATIVE RULING
GROUND 1
Problematic with both parties’ arguments
is that they cite no case law or statutes to support their arguments. While
Defendant states that Plaintiff failed to serve Defendant and that Plaintiff
failed to provide Defendant with a proof of service, Defendant clearly has
notice of this FAC as indicated by the fact that Defendant filed the instant
demurrer to the FAC. Since Defendant provided no case law or statutes to
support its argument that the demurrer can be sustained on this basis,
Defendant’s demurrer under this theory is OVERRULED.
Ground 2
Defendant
argues that Plaintiff failed to file
the FAC within a reasonable time after his Motion for Leave to File a First
Amended Complaint was granted on May 23, 2022, thus Plaintiff waived his right
to file the FAC. Defendant argues that Plaintiff delayed the filing of the FAC
until almost two months later, on July 18, 2022.
TENTATIVE RULING GROUND 2
Defendant cited no case
law or statutes that the demurrer can be sustained under the theory that Plaintiff
did not file his FAC in a reasonable time after Plaintiff’s motion for leave to
file a first amended complaint was granted. Additionally, the Minute Order on
May 23, 2022, does not state a specific date or time period in which Plaintiff
must file his FAC. Defendant’s demurrer under this theory is OVERRULED.
Ground 3
Defendant’s
third ground for its demurrer is that there is a material variance between a
cause of action asserted against a public entity and the pre-litigation claim
filed with the public entity. Plaintiff cited Fall River Fall River Joint
Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court, 206 Cal.App.3d 431,434-435 (1988) in
its notice of motion. Defendant appears to make two arguments under this
theory.
Defendant’s first argument is that
Plaintiff completely changed the facts in the FAC compared to Plaintiff’s Claim
for Damages. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Claim for Damages alleges that
Plaintiff was “walking down Metro station stairs because the elevator was out
of order, he was using a cane, and he fell down several starts.” (Def. Mot. p.
7-8.) Defendant argues this is completely different than what Plaintiff is now
alleging in the FAC which is that Plaintiff “tripped and fell.” (Def. Mot.
p.8.)
The Court does not find Defendant’s
argument availing. The difference highlighted by Defendant is of no
significance and not grounds for sustaining the demurrer.
Defendant’s second argument is that the
since the Claim for Damages does not include a theory of liability based on an
ADA violation or the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Plaintiff’s demurrer to the third
and fourth causes of action should be sustained. Defendant specifically argues,
“A public entity is under no obligation to defend a lawsuit based upon a set
of facts entirely different from those first notice in the Claim for Damages.
Fall River, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at 435. [Emphasis added.] If there is
a substantial variance between the facts in the complaint and those contained
in the claim for damages, a public entity may be able to challenge the
complaint on the ground that the plaintiff failed to comply with the claim’s
statute. Id.” (Def. Mot. p.7.)
The Court does not find Defendant’s
argument availing. There is no substantial variance between the facts in the
FAC and those contained in the claim for damages. All four of Plaintiff’s
causes of action in the FAC are based on the same set of facts that arose in
the Claim for Damages; therefore, Defendant was put on notice of the
possibility of the claims it would be facing.
TENTATIVE RULING GROUND 3
There
is no material variance between the facts asserted in Plaintiff’s Claim for
Damages and Plaintiff’s causes of action in the FAC. The demurrer as to this
ground is OVERRULED.
Ground 4
Defendant
argues that Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action fails to state facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action against Defendant and is uncertain.
Plaintiff’s third cause of action is for
Violation of Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ. Code §54, et seq.
In relevant part, Plaintiff’s FAC alleges
as follows:
Plaintiff was denied full and equal
enjoyment of and access to Defendants’ Premises in violation of the California
Disabled Persons Act (CDPA). Pursuant to Civil Code §54.1(b)(1) “Individuals
with disabilities shall be entitled to full and equal access, as other members
of the general public, subject only to the conditions and limitations
established by law, or state or federal regulation, and applicable alike to all
persons.” As set forth above, Defendants breached said duty and discriminated
against Plaintiff by failing to maintain an accessible entrance and paths of
travel throughout the Premises in compliance with the ADA, applicable building
codes, and/or other industry standards, denying Plaintiff the benefits of safe
ingress and egress of his home, and thereby violating the CDPA.
(FAC ¶31-33.)
First, it appears clear to the Court that
Plaintiff meant to cite CA Civil Code, section 54.1(a)(1), and not
54.1(b)(1). The Court thus views
Plaintiff’s third cause of action as alleged pursuant to CA Civil Code, section
54.1(a)(1) of the CDPA.
Defendant appears
to be arguing that that Plaintiff’s did not allege a cause of action that
creates a mandatory duty. Defendant argues that [Civil Code §54.1(b)(1)] the
CDPA does not impose any specific requirements on Metro but rather requires
reasonable efforts to accommodate patrons with disabilities. Defendant argues
that a mandatory duty must clearly state the specific act that needs to be
done, not provide general guidance or goals. But the CDPA is applicable to
governmental entities. Carter v. City of Los Angeles (2d Dist. 2014) 224
Cal. App. 4th 808, 814.
In Coronado v.
Cobblestone Village Community Rentals, L.P. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 831, 842
– 846, the court notes that violation of the CDPA [Civil Code section 54.1] may
be alleged against a public entity, but that violation may have to be based on
either one of the Government Code Sections or Health and Safety Code sections,
or, it seems to this Court, Education Code sections. Plaintiff here fails to
allege the same specifically.
In Wilkins-Jones
v. County of Alameda (2012) 859 F.Supp.2d 1039, 1053-1054 the court held that
a county jail was a place of “public accommodation” within the meaning of the
California Disabled Persons Act. See also, People ex rel. Deukmejian v. CHE,
Inc. (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 123, 131-135.
Defendant further argues that the type of
harm of Civil Code 54.1(b)(1) is aimed to protect against is not the type of
harm suffered in this case by Plaintiff. Defendant argues that 54.1(b)(1) is
about providing access and not protecting against injuries. The Court notes
that Defendant provides no support for this argument as to the type of harm
Civil Code 54.1(b)(1) is designed to protect against. The Court finds this argument unpersuasive in
view of the pleading herein and the case law discussed hereinabove.
Defendant also argues that the breach of
the alleged mandatory duty here is not the proximate cause of the injury.
However, on Demurrer, the Court is focused only upon the allegations, not the
proof thereof.
TENTATIVE RULING GROUND 4 - Third Cause of
Action
Under
our law, plaintiff may allege a cause of action under the California Disabled
Persons Act against Defendant, a government/public entity. But, as a result of
the uncertainty and lack of specificity in Plaintiff’s pleading of this cause
of action, Defendant’s demurrer as to the third cause of action is sustained.
20 day’s leave to amend is granted as to the third cause of action.
Ground 5
Defendant
argues that Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action fails to state facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action against Defendant and is uncertain.
Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action in the
FAC is for Violation of the Unruh Act, Cal. Civ. Code §51, et seq.
In relevant part, Plaintiff alleges as
such in the FAC:
California Civil
Code section 51(b), the Unruh Civil Rights Act, provides: All persons within
the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their
sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, or mental
condition is entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages,
facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every
kind, whatsoever. [FAC ¶37.]
At all times
herein mentioned, Plaintiff was an individual with a disability as defined by
Civil Code § 51, et seq., and Government Code §§ 12926 and 12926.1. [FAC ¶38.]
Defendant LACMTA
and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, violated Plaintiff’s right to full, fair and
equal services under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code Section
51 et seq. by failing and refusing to provide free and equal access. Defendant
failed to protect and provide adequate safety measures, failed to maintain and
warn all invitees within reason that its elevators were out of service, the
disabled PLAINTIFF, thereafter was obligated with no other means but to take
the stairs, causing the disabled Plaintiff to fall down the stairway. Defendants
had prior knowledge that its elevators were out of service and was aware of the
substantial risk of injury to its invitees if they did not comply and provide
reasonable and safe walkways throughout the PREMISES. Defendants’ actions
toward Plaintiff constitute discriminatory conduct within the ambit of the
California Unruh Civil Rights Act. [FAC ¶39.]
As set forth
above, Defendants breached said duty and discriminated against Plaintiff by
failing to maintain an accessible entrance and paths of travel throughout the
PREMISES in compliance with the ADA, applicable building codes, and/or other
industry standards and thereby violating the Unruh Act. [FAC ¶40.]
(FAC ¶37-40.)
Defendant also
argues that the type of harm of Civil Code 51(b) is aimed to protect against is
not the type of harm suffered in this case by Plaintiff. Defendant argues that
51(b) is about providing access and not safety. [The Court notes that Defendant
provides no support for this argument as to the type of harm Civil Code 51(b)
is designed to prevent.]
Defendant also argues
that the breach of the alleged mandatory duty here is not the proximate cause
of the injury.
TENTATIVE RULING GROUND 5 – Fourth Cause
of Action
Plaintiff cannot allege a cause of action under
the Unruh Act against Defendant, a public entity, because Defendant is not a
“business establishment” under the Unruh Act. Brennon B v. Superior Court (2022)
13 Cal.5th 662. Demurrer as to the fourth cause of action is sustained. 20
day’s leave to amend is granted.
Motion to Strike
Moving Party: Defendant, Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation
Authority, a Public Entity
Responding Party: Plaintiff, Orlando Price
(Opposition and Reply Submitted)
Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC Rule
3.1300): Ok
16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP 1005(b)): Ok
Proper Address: Ok
RELIEF REQUESTED
Defendant, Los Angeles County
Metropolitan Transportation Authority, a public entity, moves the Court for an
order striking the following language alleged in Plaintiff’s FAC:
1.
Page
3, paragraph 8
2.
Page
3, paragraph 9
3.
Page
3, paragraph 10, line 17-20: “…which violated applicable building codes, ADA
regulations, and other industry standards, which led to an incident wherein
Plaintiff tripped and fell while at the Premises…”
4.
Page
6, line 18-20
5.
Page
6-7, paragraphs 30-35
6.
Page
7, line 16-18
7.
Page
7-8, paragraphs 36-42
8.
Page
8, line 26: “For pre-and post-judgment interest as allowable by law.”
Legal Standard – Motion to Strike
Any party, within the
time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to
strike the whole or any part thereof. (CCP § 435(b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court,
Rule 3.1322(b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion
and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or
improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of
any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a
court rule, or an order of the court. (CCP §§ 436(a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz
(1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the
claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or
disregarded”].)
The
grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way
of judicial notice. (Code. Civ. Proc. § 437; Turman v. Turning
Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63 [“judges
read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all
parts in their context, and assume their truth”].)
“A notice of
motion to strike a portion of a pleading must quote in full the portions sought
to be stricken except where the motion is to strike an entire paragraph, cause
of action, count, or defense. Specifications in a notice must be numbered
consecutively.” (Cal. Rules of Ct. Rule 3.1322(a).)
Procedural Analysis – Meet and Confer
Moving
party alleged it met and confer via email. (Decl. Ashour ¶5.)
ANALYSIS
As
a preliminary matter, both the Defendant’s and the Plaintiff’s arguments are not
on point. They each fail to argue according to the applicable law for the
instant motion.
For example, Defendant makes the same
arguments asserted in the demurrer that the FAC alleges facts and theories of
liability materially different than the allegations set forth in the
Plaintiff’s claims for damages.
Likewise, the Plaintiff’s Opposition is
entirely unhelpful because its arguments are also not on point.
However, for other reasons, this Court grants
in part and denies in part Defendant’s motion to strike as mentioned below.
TENTATIVE RULING- MOTION TO STRIKE: The Court
GRANTS Defendant’s motion as to Requests numbered 4 – 7 because all of those
requests appear to pertain to both the third and fourth causes of action, and
this Court sustained the demurrer as to the those causes of action with leave
to amend. 20 day’s leave to amend is granted here.
Request 1 (Page 3, paragraph 8) states: “Upon
information and belief, Defendant LACMTA was required, to install an accessible
entrance and paths of travel throughout the subject property in compliance with
the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et
seq.” The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion as to Request 1 because the Court
fails to see how this paragraph is relevant considering the fact that Plaintiff
did not allege any causes of action for violation of the ADA. 20 day’s leave to
amend is granted.
Request 2 (Page 3, paragraph 9) states: “At
the time of Plaintiff’s incident, the PREMISES was in such a condition that it
was in violation of the ADA, and therefore the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civil
Code § 51, et seq. (“Unruh Act”), as well as the California Disabled Persons
Act, Civil Code § 54, et seq. (“CDPA”).” The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to
strike as to Request 2 because the court sustained the demurrer as to the Unruh
claim and the CDPA claim and because the Plaintiff did not allege a cause of
action for violation of the ADA. 20 day’s leave to amend is granted.
Request 3 (Page 3, paragraph 10, line
17-20 “…which violated applicable building codes, ADA regulations, and other
industry standards, which led to an incident wherein Plaintiff tripped and fell
while at the Premises…”). The Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part request
3. The Court strikes the language that states, “which violated applicable
building codes, ADA regulations, and other industry standards,” because the FAC
does not make any allegations pertaining to these building codes, industry
standards, and does not allege a cause of action for violation of the ADA. 20
day’s leave to Amend is granted. The Court DENIES the portion of the Motion that
states, “which led to an incident wherein Plaintiff tripped and fell while at
the Premises…” because this provides background information.
Request 8 (Page 8,
line 26) states, “For pre-and post-judgment interest as allowable by law.” The
Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to strike as to request 8. Civil Code 3291
states, “In any action brought to recover damages for personal injury sustained
by any person resulting from or occasioned by the tort of any other person,
corporation, association, or partnership, whether by negligence or by willful
intent of the other person, corporation, association, or partnership, and
whether the injury was fatal or otherwise, it is lawful for the plaintiff in
the complaint to claim interest on the damages alleged as provided in this
section. If the plaintiff makes an offer pursuant to Section 998 of the Code of
Civil Procedure which the defendant does not accept prior to trial or within 30
days, whichever occurs first, and the plaintiff obtains a more favorable
judgment, the judgment shall bear interest at the legal rate of 10 percent per
annum calculated from the date of the plaintiff’s first offer pursuant to
Section 998 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is exceeded by the judgment,
and interest shall accrue until the satisfaction of judgment. This
section shall not apply to a public entity, or to a public employee for an act
or omission within the scope of employment, and neither the public entity nor
the public employee shall be liable, directly or indirectly, to any person for
any interest imposed by this section.” (Ibid. emph. added.) As
noted by Defendant, this section shall not apply to a public entity, and it
shall not be liable for any interest imposed by this section. Motion to strike
request 8 is Granted without leave to amend.