Judge David A. Rosen, Case Number: 22GDCV00037, Date: 2023-08-18 Tentative Ruling

Judge: David A. Rosen, Case: 22GDCV00037, Date: 2023-08-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22GDCV00037 Hearing Date: August 18, 2023 Dept: E

Hearing Date: 8/18/2023 – 8:30am

Case No: 22GDCV00037
Trial Date: 09/26/2023

Case Name: JUAN GOMEZ, an individual v. KENNETH HOWARD, an individual; and DOES -10 inclusive

Tentative Rulings on 2 MOTIONS to COMPEL RESPONSES

MOTION 1

RELIEF REQUESTED

Plaintiff , Juan Gomez, moves for an order compelling Defendant, Kenneth Howard, to serve on him a response to Plaintiff’s Form Interrogatories, Set No. One, which he served on Defendant Kenneth Howard on April 5, 2023, and will further move this Court for an order requiring Defendant Kenneth Howard to pay monetary sanctions to Plaintiff.

PROCEDURAL

Moving Party: Plaintiff, Juan Gomez

Responding Party: No Opposition Submitted

Moving Papers: Motion

Opposition Papers: No Opposition

Reply: Notice of Non-Opposition; Proof of Service

Procedural
16/21 Day Lapse (CCP §12c and §1005(b): Ok
Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, Rule 3.1300): Ok
Correct Address (CCP §1013, §1013a): Ok. Defendant is not represented in this action. eCourt lists Defendant’s address as PO Box 10398, Glendale, CA 91209. Plaintiff served Defendant, Kenneth Howard, at the address that the Court has on file in eCourt. Plaintiff additionally served Defendant at 537 Hazel Street, Glendale, CA, 91201, which appears to be the location of the property involved in this lawsuit.

LEGAL STANDARD– COMPEL RESPONSES, INTERROGATORIES
Within 30 days after service of interrogatories, the party to whom the interrogatories are propounded shall serve the original of the response to them on the propounding party, unless on motion of the propounding party the court has shortened the time for response, or unless on motion of the responding party the court has extended the time for response. (CCP 2030.260(a).)

If a party to whom interrogatories are directed fails to serve a timely response, the party propounding the interrogatories may move for an order compelling response to the interrogatories. (CCP §2030.290(b).)

“The party to whom the interrogatories are directed waives any right to exercise the option to produce writings under Section 2030.230, as well as any objection to the interrogatories, including one based on privilege or on the protection for work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010). The court, on motion, may relieve that party from this waiver on its determination that both of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) The party has subsequently served a response that is in substantial compliance with Sections 2030.210, 2030.220, 2030.230, and 2030.240. (2) The party’s failure to serve a timely response was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.” (CCP §2030.290(a).)

Unlike a motion to compel further responses, a motion to compel responses is not subject to a 45-day time limit, and the propounding party does not have to demonstrate either good cause or that it satisfied a “meet and confer” requirement. (Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4^th 390, 404 citing Weil and Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2006) ¶¶8:1137 to 8:1144, pp. 8F-59 to 8F-60, ¶¶ 8:1483 to 8:1489, pp. 8H-29 to hH-30 (Weil & Brown).)

ANALYSIS

On April 5, 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel served Form Interrogatories, General, Set One, on Defendant’s former attorney Susan Murphy. (Calsada Decl. ¶2, Ex. 1.)

On May 8, 2023, Ms. Murphy requested an extension of time to respond to this discovery request, and Plaintiff’s counsel granted an extension to May 19, 2023. (Calsada Decl. ¶3.) [Plaintiff’s counsel also notes that on May 19, 2023, this Court granted Ms. Murphy’s motion to be relieved as counsel for Defendant. (Decl. Calsada ¶3.)]

On May 25, 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel mailed a meet and confer letter to Defendant demanding a response to Form Interrogatories by noon on Friday, June 2, 2023. (Calsada Decl. ¶4.)

As of June 9, 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel has not received any response to the requested discovery demand.

TENTATIVE RULING MOTION 1
Plaintiff’s motion to compel responses to Plaintiff’s Form Interrogatories, Set One, is GRANTED. Defendant did not timely respond to the instant discovery.

Sanctions
CCP §2030.290 states in relevant part:

The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.

(CCP §2030.290(c).)

“The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed.” (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1348(a).)

Here, the notice of motion indicates a request for sanctions, but the notice page does not indicate the amount of sanctions sought.

The “Statement of Facts” section in Plaintiff’s memorandum states that Plaintiff has incurred $2,120 on account of Defendant’s failure to timely respond to Plaintiff’s discovery requests and to compel a response by this court. [This amount for the sanctions request is surprisingly not listed in the portion of the memorandum related to sanctions.]

As to Calsada’s declaration, Calsada states:

6. My contract with my client is $500 per hour. I spent 4 hours on this matter preparing two motions to compel. $1000 (2 hours) on this motion and $1000 (2 hours) on a companion motion to compel responses. Each motion cost $60.00 to file. Total Fees and Costs: $2120. The amount allocated to this motion is $1060.00.

7. I am a practicing business attorney since 1988 and a California State certified specialist in Bankruptcy Law since 1999. My hourly rate is customary for my practice area and my law office is in the City of Glendale.

(Calsada Decl. ¶6-7.)

Therefore, it appears as if the “Statement of Facts” reference of $2120 for a sanctions request is not the amount requested for this particular motion, but instead the request for both motions to compel filed by Plaintiff. Instead, based on the declaration, it appears as if the sanctions request with respect to this motion is $1,060. [Again, this amount of $1060 is not mentioned anywhere in the motion or notice of motion. It’s only mentioned in the declaration.]

As the moving party did not give proper notice of the sanctions being requested, CCP 2023.040; Weinstein v. Blumberg (2d dist.-2018) 25 Cal. App. 5^th 316, 321, the Court finds that it would be unjust to award sanctions.

MOTION 2

RELIEF REQUESTED

Plaintiff, Juan Gomez, moves for an order compelling Defendant, Kenneth Howard, to serve on him a response to Plaintiff’s Request to Identify and to Produce Documents, Set No. One, which he served on Defendant Kenneth Howard on April 5, 2023, and will further move this court for an order requiring Defendant Kenneth Howard to pay monetary sanctions to Plaintiff.

PROCEDURAL

Moving Party: Plaintiff, Juan Gomez

Responding Party: No Opposition Submitted

Moving Papers: Motion

Opposition Papers: No Opposition

Reply: Notice of Non-Opposition; Proof of Service

LEGAL STANDARD – COMPEL RESPONSES, INSPECTION DEMANDS
Within 30 days after service of a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the party to whom the demand is directed shall serve the original of the response to it on the party making the demand, and a copy of the response on all other parties who have appeared in the action, unless on motion of the party making the demand, the court has shortened the time for response, or unless on motion of the party to whom the demand has been directed, the court has extended the time for response. (CCP §2031.260(a).)

If a party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is directed fails to serve a timely response to it, the party making the demand may move for an order compelling response to the demand. (CCP §2031.300(b).)

If a party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is directed fails to serve a timely response to it, the party to whom the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is directed waives any objection to the demand, including one based on privilege or on the protection for work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010). (CCP §2031.300(a).) “The court, on motion, may relieve that party from this waiver on its determination that both of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) The party has subsequently served a response that is in substantial compliance with Sections 2031.210, 2031.220, 2031.230, 2031.240, and 2031.280. (2) The party’s failure to serve a timely response was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.” (CCP §2031.300(a)(1)-(2).)

ANALYSIS
On April 5, 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel served Request to Identify and to Produce Documents, Set One, on Defendant’s former attorney Susan Murphy. (Calsada Decl. ¶2, Ex. 1.)

On May 25, 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel mailed a meet and confer letter to Defendant demanding a response to discovery by noon on Friday, June 2, 2023. (Calsada Decl. ¶4.)

As of June 9, 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel has not received any response to the requested discovery demand.

TENTATIVE RULING MOTION 2
Plaintiff’s motion to compel responses to Plaintiff’s Request to Identify and to Produce Documents, Set One, is GRANTED. Defendant did not timely respond to the instant discovery.

Sanctions
In relevant part, 2031.300(c) states as follows:

Except as provided in subdivision (d), the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.

(CCP §2031.300(c).)

Here, the notice of motion indicates a request for sanctions, but the notice page does not indicate the amount of sanctions sought.

As to Calsada’s declaration, Calsada states:

(Calsada Decl. ¶6-7.)

Therefore, it appears as if the “Statement of Facts” reference of $2120 for a sanctions request is not the amount requested for this particular motion, but instead the request for both motions to compel filed by Plaintiff. Instead, based on the declaration, it appears as if the sanctions request with respect to this motion is $1,060. [This amount of $1060 is not mentioned anywhere in the motion or notice of motion. It’s only mentioned in the declaration.]

Hearing Date: 8/18/2023 – 8:30am

Case No: 22GDCV00037

Trial Date: 09/26/2023

Case Name: JUAN GOMEZ, an individual v. KENNETH
HOWARD, an individual; and DOES -10 inclusive

TENTATIVE
RULING ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY AJUDICATION

RELIEF REQUESTED

Plaintiff, Juan Gomez, moves this Court for Summary Adjudication of
Issues in favor of Plaintiff Juan Gomez and against Defendant Kenneth Howard,
on the following issues:

Issue No. 1 - Is Plaintiff entitled to judgment on
the First Cause of Action (Declaratory Relief) because Plaintiff was not a
“creditor” within the meaning of the TILA at the time of loan transaction?

Issue No. 2 - Is
Plaintiff entitled to judgment on the First Cause of Action (Declaratory
Relief) because Defendant has no credible evidence that the alleged May 10,
2019 letter of rescission was ever mailed or delivered to Lender or his agents
within the time allowed to rescind the loan transaction?

Issue No. 3 - Is
Plaintiff entitled a judgment on the First Cause of Action (Declaratory Relief)
because Defendant has no present ability to tender the borrowed funds back to
the Lender?

PROCEDURAL

Moving Party: Plaintiff,
Juan Gomez

Responding Party: No Opposition submitted by Defendant, Kenneth Howard

Proof of service timely filed (CRC 3.1300(c)): Ok

Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013(a)):Ok. Defendant is not
represented in this action. eCourt lists Defendant’s address as PO Box 10398,
Glendale, CA 91209. Plaintiff served Defendant, Kenneth Howard, at the address
that the Court has on file in eCourt. Plaintiff additionally served Defendant
at 537 Hazel Street, Glendale, CA, 91201, which appears to be the location of
the property involved in this lawsuit.

75/80 Days

Under 437c(2), notice of the motion and supporting
papers shall be served on all other parties to the action at least 75 days
before the time appointed for hearing. If the notice is served by mail, the
required 75-day period of notice shall be increased by 5 days if the place of
address is within the State of California. If the notice is served by facsimile
transmission, express mail, or another method of delivery providing for
overnight delivery, the required 75-day period of notice shall be increased by
two court days. (CCP §437c(a)(2).)

Here, Plaintiff’s moving papers were served by United
States mail on 05/23/2023; therefore, this motion is timely.

Moving Papers: Notice; Memorandum; Separate Statement;
Proposed Order; Calsada Declaration; Exhibits 1-6 in Support of Plaintiff’s
MSA; Declaration of Juan Gomez in Support of Default Judgment Pursuant to CCP
585(d); Laurie Allread Declaration; Sylvia Ramos Declaration; Declaration of
Kenneth Howard as Filed in U.S. Bankruptcy Court on 11/4/2022; Proof of Service

Opposition Papers: No Opposition submitted

Reply Papers: Notice of Non-Opposition; Proof of
Service

BACKGROUND

Preliminary Matter

This Court notes that the Background of this case based on the allegations
in the Complaint and the Memorandum in support of this motion are unclear
because Plaintiff’s moving papers are somewhat incomprehensible. Some of the
allegations in the Complaint, for example, are contrary to the section titled
“Statement of Undisputed Material Facts” in Plaintiff’s motion.

Procedural

Plaintiff filed this Complaint on 01/19/2022. The caption of the Complaint
says, “Complaint for Declaratory Relief or, in the alternative, For Damages Due
to Breach of Promissory Note And Common Count for Money Lent At Defendant’s
Request.” However, the body of the Complaint alleges three causes of action
titled: (1) First Cause of Action Declaratory Relief, (2) Second Cause of
Action in the Alternative For Damages Due to Breach of Promissory Note, and (3)
Third Cause of Action in the Alternative Common Count for Money Lent.

On 06/01/2022, this Court signed a Default Judgment, and in
the section 7 titled “Other” the Judgment says, “Judgement in favor of
Plaintiff Juan Gomez and against Defendant Kenneth Howard on First Cause of
Action for Declaratory Relief on terms set forth in Attachment 7a.”

On 04/03/2023, this Court issued a Minute Order which
stated, “The Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default and / or Default Judgment filed
by Kenneth Howard, an individual on 08/22/2022 is Granted. The motion is
granted pursuant to California Civil Code of Procedure §473 and §473.5.”

Background as to this Motion According to Plaintiff’s
Moving Papers and the Complaint

In relevant part, Plaintiff’s “Introduction” section to this motion states:

Plaintiff
JUAN GOMEZ’s (“Plaintiff” or “Lender”) filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief
(First Cause of Action) against Defendant Kenneth Howard (“Borrower”) to
resolve a controversy in regards to a Promissory Note secured by a Deed of
Trust recorded against the Defendant’s principal residence. Defendant contends
that the July 13, 2016, loan transaction was rescinded by operation of law on
account of a May 10, 2019 letter allegedly timely mailed and delivered under
the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) [15 U.S.C. §1635(f)]. Under 15 U.S.C. §1638,
an obligor has a right of rescission for three years from the date of
consummation of the loan. See, Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 135 S.
Ct. 790 (2015). Plaintiff contends he is not a “creditor” within the meaning of
the TILA and Defendant has no credible evidence that the alleged May 10, 2019
letter of rescission was ever mailed or delivered to Lender or his agents
within the time allowed to rescind the loan transaction. Furthermore, assuming
Defendant has a valid TILA claim/defense against the Lender, Defendant has no
present ability to tender the borrowed funds back to the Lender and is not
entitled to the remedy of rescission.

(Pl. Mot. p.
1.)

In Plaintiff’s
motion in the section titled “Statement of Undisputed Material Facts,”
Plaintiff provides further background to the case. In relevant part, Plaintiff
stated:

1. In June
of 2016, Defendant was facing the loss of his home and needed to refinance his
real property located at 537 Hazel St., Glendale, CA 91201 - APN: 5627-011-009
and legally described as: “The North Easterly ½ of Lot 14 of Tract No. 4593 in
the City of Glendale, County of Los Angeles, State of California, as per map
recorded in Book 105 Page(s) 48 of Maps in the Office of the County Recorder of
Los Angeles County” (hereinafter the “Property”). (UMF 1)

2. A Notice
of Trustee’s Sale (“NOS”) by his prior institutional lender had been recorded
in the Official Records on June 24, 2016 as Instrument No. 20160730328 against
his Property. A foreclosure sale was set to occur in mid-July 2016. (UMF 2)

3. Defendant
located Plaintiff, a widower and private lender, and requested a short-term Loan
or “bridge financing” so that Plaintiff could have time to find an
institutional lender for a long-term refinancing loan or to sell the Property
in order to save his equity. (UMF 3)

(Pl. Mot. p.
1-2.)

The Court notes
that as to Plaintiff’s UMF 3, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleged the following, “Plaintiff
located Defendant, a widower and private lender, and requested a short-term
Loan or "bridge financing" so that Plaintiff could have time to find
an institutional lender for a long-term refinancing loan or to sell the
Property in order to save his equity.” (Compl. ¶7.)

Plaintiff’s
motion then goes on to state:

4. On or
about July 13, 2016, Defendant executed a Promissory Note Secured by Deed of
Trust (“Note”) promising to pay Defendant Juan Gomez the sum of $219,470.00
with interest at the rate of 12% per annum. Principal and interest due in
monthly installments of Two Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Seven and 50/100 Dollars
($2,257.50) commencing August 15, 2016 and continuing until the July 15, 2017
at which time the entire unpaid principal balance, together with interest due
thereon, shall become all due and payable. The note is fully amortized for
thirty years but and payable in full in one year. (See, Exhibit 1 to Verified
Complaint - a true and correct copy of the Promissory Note). (UMF 4)

5. A Short
Form Deed of Trust and Assignment of Rents in favor of Plaintiff was signed by
the Defendant on July 13, 2016 and recorded in the County Records as Instrument
No. 20160832845. (See, Exhibit 2 - a true and correct copy of the Deed of
Trust). This was recorded as a 1st Deed of Trust on the Property. (UMF 5)

(Pl. Mot. p.
2.)

Then, in summary,
Plaintiff alleges as follows in its memorandum with respect to UMF 6-17 :
Defendant made some payments on the Loan but failed or refused to make further
payments on the Note; Mr. Howard filed multiple bankruptcy cases preventing enforcement
of the Note and Deed of Trust; Plaintiff caused a Notice of Default and
Election to Sell under Deed of Trust to be recorded against the Property; Sylvia
Ramos received an email from Defendant telling Ramos to cancel the Notice of
Default because it is in violation of several Federal Acts since you received
my notice to rescind this loan and your security interest in my home is void
per 15 U.S.C. §1635 and 12 C.F.R. §226.23; the alleged letter of Notice of
Recission was never delivered to any named addresses; Defendant has no credible
evidence that he mailed the May 10, 2019 letter of Recission; Defendant has no
viable defense to the First Cause of Action; Defendant has no ability to tender
the borrowed funds back to the Lender; and Mr. Gomez is not a “creditor” within
the meaning of the TILA and, therefore, the Debtor’s claim of violations of the
TILA by Mr. Gomez must fall as a matter of law. (Pl. Mot. p. 2-5.)

LEGAL STANDARD

The function of a
motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to
whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or
claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary
judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits
or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact
within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima
(1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)

CCP §437c(f)(1) states:

A party may move for summary
adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more
affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of
duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there
is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative
defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for
damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more
defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A
motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes
of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue
of duty.

(CCP §437c(f)(1).)

Further, CCP §437c(f)(2) provides:

A motion for summary adjudication
may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and
shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. A
party shall not move for summary judgment based on issues asserted in a prior
motion for summary adjudication and denied by the court unless that party
establishes, to the satisfaction of the court, newly discovered facts or
circumstances or a change of law supporting the issues reasserted in the
summary judgment motion.

(CCP §437c(f)(2).

“The motion for summary judgment
shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. In determining if the papers show that there is no
triable issue as to any material fact, the court shall consider all of the
evidence set forth in the papers, except the evidence to which objections have
been made and sustained by the court, and all inferences reasonably deducible
from the evidence, except summary judgment shall not be granted by the court
based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence if contradicted by
other inferences or evidence that raise a triable issue as to any material
fact.” (CCP §437c(c).)

Moving party Plaintiff has also
failed to provide a satisfactory Separate Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts (UMFs), as many of the UMFs listed are unintelligible, or not supported
by competent evidence. CCP 437c(b)(1).

ANALYSIS

Again,
Plaintiff’s moving papers are incomprehensible at many points. It is difficult
to decipher exactly what Plaintiff seeks and what the relief is related to.

As an example, Plaintiff has sections in the MSA
titled, “First Cause of Action (Declaratory Relief),” “Answer,” and “Issues.”

In the section titled “First Cause of Action
(Declaratory Relief),” it is unclear what argument Plaintiff is trying to make.
Plaintiff mentions how he desires a judicial determination of their respective
rights and duties of the parties. It is unclear if Plaintiff is arguing he has
met all the elements to prove a successful claim of declaratory relief.
Plaintiff also does not mention what the elements are for declaratory relief and
how he met those elements.

In Plaintiff’s section titled “Answer,” Plaintiff states:

On April 4, 2023, Defendant filed an Answer to Plaintiff’s Juan
Gomez’s Unverified Complaint. The Answer generally and specifically denies each
and every allegation contained in the Complaint and asserts 38 boilerplate
affirmative defenses. None of the affirmative defenses are supported by a
statement of facts. Defendant has not filed a cross-complaint seeking
affirmative relief against Plaintiff.

The 22nd Affirmative Defense alleges a number of violations of TILA.
However, the alleged violations described in the 22nd Affirmative Defense are
all dependent upon the mailing and delivery of a timely notice of rescission.
The Answer does not specifically allege the mailing and delivery of the May 10,
2019 letter of rescission.

(Pl. Mot. p. 7.)

It is entirely unclear what Plaintiff is trying to argue with respect
to the Answer.

Plaintiff then has three subsections within the “Issues,” section of
his motion titled: (1) “Mr. Gomez was not a “Creditor within the meaning of
Regulation Z (“TILA”)”; (2) “The May 10, 2019 Notice of Rescission (Exhibit 5)
was not in fact timely mailed or delivered to the Lender or his agents.”; and
(3) “Defendant has no the present ability to tender the borrowed funds in full
back to the Lender.”

It is
entirely unclear to the Court what arguments Plaintiff is making in the
“Issues” section of the MSA and how they relate to either the declaratory
relief cause of action or possibly an affirmative defense. In the three
subsections under “Issues,” Plaintiff cites only one case from the state of
California, and Plaintiff cites several cases that are not binding on this
Court. To further highlight the Court’s confusion, Plaintiff stated in issue 3,
“In addition to mailing a timely notice of rescission, a claim for rescission
under TILA requires the borrower to prove he can or will tender the borrowed
funds back to the lender.” (Pl. Mot. p. 10.) Here, the Court has no idea what
Plaintiff is talking about because Plaintiff has not brought a claim for
rescission, and to the Court’s knowledge, the Defendant has not made a counterclaim
for rescission.

TENTATIVE
RULING

This
motion is so incomprehensibly written that the Court cannot tell what arguments
Plaintiff is making, how they relate to this case, a cause of action in the
Complaint, or an affirmative defense. No foundation is provided for some of the
documents upon which Plaintiff is apparently relying. No evidence is cited,
much less provided, for some of the UMF’s. Additionally, Plaintiff cites almost
no binding case law. Plaintiff did not meet its burden on a motion for summary
adjudication because Plaintiff could not comprehensibly, much less persuasively
explain the relief sought, Plaintiff’s arguments, and how the arguments are
relevant to this case, the claims, or affirmative defenses.

Plaintiff’s
motion for summary adjudication is DENIED.