Judge: David A. Rosen, Case: 22GDCV01058, Date: 2023-05-19 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22GDCV01058 Hearing Date: May 19, 2023 Dept: E
Hearing Date: 05/19/2023 – 8:30am
Case No: 22GDCV01058
Trial Date: Unset
Case Name: ARSEN MANGASARIAN and CAROLINE MANGASARIAN, individuals, v.
MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, a limited liability company; MERCEDES-BENZ OF ARCADIA,
a business entity, form unknown; and DOES 1-40 inclusive
TENTATIVE
RULING ON MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
Moving Party: Defendant, Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC
Responding Party: Plaintiffs, Arsen Mangasarian and
Caroline Mangasarian
Moving Papers: Motion; Proposed Order; Ameripour Declaration;
Request for Judicial Notice;
Opposing Papers: Opposition; Proof of Service; Request
for Judicial Notice; Evidentiary Objections; Proposed Order
Reply Papers: Reply; Ameripour Declaration; Request
for Judicial Notice
Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC Rule 3.1300): Ok
16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP 1005(b)): Ok
Correct Address (CCP §1013, §1013a, §1013b): Ok
CCP §1290.4 is not applicable.
RELIEF REQUESTED
“Defendants
Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (“Defendant”) will move, and hereby move the Court for an
order (i) compelling Plaintiffs Arsen Mangasarian and Caroline Mangasarian to
arbitrate all of their claims in accordance with the arbitration agreement; and
(ii) staying this action pending the outcome of arbitration. This motion is authorized
by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, California Code of
Civil Procedure § 1281 et seq. and supported by the accompanying Memorandum of
Points and Authorities, Request for Judicial Notice and exhibits thereto,
Declaration of Ali Ameripour and exhibits thereto any reply memorandum that
Defendants may file; all of the records on file in this action; and by such
other written and oral argument as may be presented to the Court.” (Def. Mot.
p.1-2.)
[The Court notes that it appears to be a
typographical error when Defendant referred to itself as “Defendants
Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (“Defendant”).” The plural usage of Defendants appears
to be an error based on several indicators – (1) The motion indicates in the
top left corner of the motion that this motion is filed by attorney for
“defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC”; (2) The Defendant referring to only
“Defendant” on page 1, line 23 in quotations; (3) The entire motion refers to
one singular Defendant, Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (MBUSA), and the motion does not
refer to the other Defendant not making this motion (Mercedes-Benz of Arcadia).
Therefore, the Court will assume the only Defendant moving here is
Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (MBUSA).]
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs,
Arsen Mangasarian and Caroline Mangasarian, filed a Complaint on 12/19/2022
against Defendants, Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (MBUSA) and Mercedes-Benz of
Arcadia.
Plaintiffs alleged three
causes of action against MBUSA: (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of
Express Warranty, (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Implied
Warranty, (3) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2. The Complaint
alleges that MBUSA is the manufacturer of the Subject Vehicle.
Plaintiffs allege one
cause of action, the fourth cause of action, against Mercedes-Benz of Arcadia
for Negligent Repair. Plaintiffs allege that Mercedes-Benz of Arcadia breached
its duty to Plaintiffs to use ordinary care and skill by failing to properly store,
prepare and repair the Subject Vehicle in accordance with industry standards.
The instant motion
pertains to whether or not Defendant (MBUSA) a nonsignatory to the “Retail
Installment Sale Contract – Simple Finance Charge (With Arbitration
Provision)”, can compel arbitration under the RISC when it was not a party to
the RISC.
LEGAL STANDARD – MOTION TO COMPEL
ARBITRATION
CCP
§1281.2, governing orders to arbitrate controversies, provides in pertinent
part:
On petition of a
party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement
to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to
arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the
respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to
arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that:
(a)
The
right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or
(b)
Grounds
exist for recission of the agreement.
(CCP
§1281.2(a)-(b).
Under
the Federal Arbitration Act, arbitration agreements “shall be valid,
irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such grounds that exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of a contract.”
(9 U.S.C. section 2.)
There
is a strong public policy in favor of arbitration of disputes and any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable disputes should be resolved in favor of
arbitration. (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 9
(“courts will ‘indulge every intendment to give effect to such proceedings.’”)
(quotation omitted)). (See also AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion
(2011) 563 U.S. 333, 339.)
ANALYSIS
Preliminary Matter
In
purchasing the subject vehicle, Plaintiff, Arsen Mangasarian, executed a
“Retail Installment Sale Contract – Simple Finance Charge (With Arbitration
Provision)” (RISC) with the Seller-Creditor, Calstar Motors Inc.
The RISC contains an arbitration provision that
provides in relevant part:
1.
EITHER YOU OR WE MAY CHOOSE TO HAVE ANY DISPUTE BETWEEN US DECIDED BY ARBITRATION
AND NOT IN COURT OR BY JURY TRIAL…
Any
claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise (including
the interpretation and scope of this Arbitration Provision, and the
arbitrability of the claim or dispute), between you and us or our employees,
agents, successors or assigns, which arises out of or relates to your credit
application, purchase or condition of this Vehicle, this contract or any
resulting transaction or relationship (including any such relationship with
third parties who do not sign this contract) shall, at your or our election, be
resolved by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action…
(Ameripour
Decl. ¶4, Ex. 2.)
On
the first page of the RISC, “You” is defined as the Buyer and Co-Buyer, if any,
and “we” or “us” is defined as Seller-Creditor.
Here,
the Buyer is Arsen Mangasarian, and the Seller-Creditor is Calstar Motors Inc.
Procedural/Authentication
In
Opposition, Plaintiff argues how Defendant did not properly authenticate the
RISC because Declarant Ameripour failed to describe how he came to possess this
RISC. Therefore Opposition argues that Ameripour lacked personal knowledge, did
not authenticate it properly, and did not have the proper foundation.
In
Reply Defendant argued that it properly authenticated the RISC.
Here,
whether or not Plaintiffs’ argument is on-point, the Court does not find it of
significance because either way, the Court denies the motion on the merits.
FAA
Requiring Compliance with the Agreement to Arbitrate
Defendant
argues that the FAA requires enforcement of Plaintiff’s arbitration agreement.
The
Court does not find this argument convincing because it presumes the existence
of an arbitration agreement between the parties. Here, Defendant has not shown
the existence of an arbitration agreement between Plaintiff (or Plaintiffs) and
Defendant. The RISC, which contains the arbitration provision, was between
Plaintiff Arsen Mangasarian and non-party Calstar Motors Inc. Moving Defendant,
MBUSA, was not a party to the RISC. Defendant’s citations starting on page 10,
line 10, through page 13, line 16 are not appropriate in the relevant context
to the instant set of facts.
Claims
Within the Scope of the Arbitration Clause
Defendant argues that all of
Plaintiff’s claims fall within the scope of the arbitration provision because
the relevant language provides, “Any claim or dispute, whether in contract,
tort, statute or otherwise (including the interpretation and scope of this
Arbitration Provision, and the arbitrability of the claim or dispute), between
you and us or our employees, agents, successors or assigns, which arises out of
or relates to your credit application, purchase or condition of this vehicle,
this contract or any resulting transaction or relationship (including any such
relationship with third parties who do not sign this contract) shall, at your
or our election, be resolved by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court
action.” (Ameripour Decl. Ex. 2.)
Here,
again, the Court does not find this argument convincing because it presumes the
existence of an arbitration agreement between the parties. Here, Defendant has
not shown the existence of an arbitration agreement between Plaintiff (or
Plaintiffs) and Defendant. The RISC, which contains the arbitration provision,
was between Plaintiff Arsen Mangasarian and non-party Calstar Motors Inc.
Moving Defendant, MBUSA, was not a party to the RISC.
Equitable Estoppel
Equitable estoppel associated with a
nonsignatory compelling arbitration arises as follows:
To
summarize, under both federal and California decisional authority, a
nonsignatory defendant may invoke an arbitration clause to compel a signatory
plaintiff to arbitrate its claims when the causes of action against the
nonsignatory are “intimately founded in and intertwined” with the underlying
contract obligations. By relying on contract terms in a claim against a
nonsignatory defendant, even if not exclusively, a plaintiff may be equitably
estopped from repudiating the arbitration clause contained in that
agreement. The focus is on the nature of the claims asserted by the
plaintiff against the nonsignatory defendant. That the claims are cast in tort
rather than contract does not avoid the arbitration clause. Moreover, the
federal decisional authority is not limited, as plaintiff suggests, to cases in
which a contract with a subsidiary corporation is relied upon to compel
arbitration with a parent entity. The fundamental point is that a party may not
make use of a contract containing an arbitration clause and then attempt to
avoid the duty to arbitrate by defining the forum in which the dispute will be
resolved.
(Boucher
v. Alliance Title Co., Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 262, 271-272 [internal
citations omitted].)
Defendant
argues it can compel arbitration despite being a nonparty to the RISC based on
the theory of equitable estoppel. Defendant appears to mainly rely on: (1) MS
Dealer Service Corp. v. Franklin (11th Cir. 1999) 177 F.3d 942, 947,
abrogated on other grounds in Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle (2009) 556
U.S. 624, 631; (2) Mance v. Mercedes-Benz USA (N.D. Cal. 2012) 901
F.Supp.2d 1147, 1155; and Felisilda v. FCA US LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th
486.
Defendant
argues that Plaintiff’s Complaint not only presumes the existence of the RISC,
but in fact necessarily relies on its existence in order to maintain the cause
of actions alleged under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, as there would
be no claims under Song-Beverly but for the existence of the sale transaction
which was created by and through the RISC.
The
Court does not find Defendant’s argument convincing that equitable estoppel
allows non-party Defendant, MBUSA, the ability to compel Plaintiff(s) to
arbitration.
In
Felisilda, the Court of Appeal upheld an order compelling the plaintiffs
to arbitration with the manufacturer of the alleged lemon vehicle even though
it was not a signatory to the contract. The Felisilda court stated:
In
signing the sales contract, the Felisildas agreed that “[a]ny claim or dispute,
whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise ... between you and us
... which arises out of or relates to ... [the] condition
of this vehicle ... shall ... be resolved by neutral, binding
arbitration and not by a court action.” (Italics added.) Here, the
Felisildas’ claim against FCA relates directly to the condition of the vehicle.
In
their complaint, the Felisildas alleged that “express warranties accompanied
the sale of the vehicle to [them] by which FCA ... undertook to preserve or
maintain the utility or performance of [their] vehicle or provide compensation
if there was a failure in such utility or performance.” Thus, the sales
contract was the source of the warranties at the heart of **648 this
case. The Felisildas noted they “delivered the vehicle to an authorized FCA ...
repair facility for repair of the nonconformities.” However, “FCA ... has
failed to *497 either promptly replace the new motor vehicle
or promptly make restitution in accordance with the Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act.”
The
Felisildas’ claim against FCA directly relates to the condition of the vehicle
that they allege to have violated warranties they received as a consequence of
the sales contract. Because the Felisildas expressly agreed to arbitrate claims
arising out of the condition of the vehicle – even against third party
nonsignatories to the sales contract – they are estopped from refusing to
arbitrate their claim against FCA. Consequently, the trial court properly
ordered the Felisildas to arbitrate their claim against FCA.
(Felisilda
v. FCA US LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 486, 496-496.)
Plaintiffs
in Opposition argue that their claims against MBUSA do not arise out of the
RISC. The Court finds Plaintiffs’ argument convincing.
As
the court stated in the Ngo case, “Lastly, BMW’s standing argument
fails. It is the retail sale – the fact that Ngo bought a BMW – not the
purchase agreement, that gives a plaintiff standing to bring claims under the
Song-Beverly Act…Because Ngo’s standing to bring these claims against BMW does
not derive from the purchase agreement, BMW cannot establish that Ngo’s claims
are “inextricably tied up” with the purchase agreement.” (Ngo v. BMW of
North America, LLC (9th Cir. 2022) 23 F.4th 942, 950.) Further,
“As an initial matter, under California law, warranties from a manufacturer
that is not a party to a sales contract are ‘not part of [the] contract of
sale.” (Ngo v. BMW of North America, LLC (9th Cir. 2022) 23
F.4th 942, 949 citing Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Cavanaugh (1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 492, 514.)
While
Defendant is correct to note that the causes of action against Defendant here do
concern the condition of the subject vehicle, Plaintiffs distinguished Felisilda.
In Felisilda the plaintiffs sued a dealership and the
manufacturer. Here, Plaintiff only sued the manufacturer (and a repair center
not at issue in this motion and not a signatory to the RISC.). Further, in Felisilda,
the motion to compel arbitration was brought by the seller-dealer/signer of the
arbitration agreement with the motion seeking to include the manufacturer. (Felisilda,
supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at 498.) Here, moving Defendant was not named the
seller-creditor in the RISC. Further here, Seller-Creditor is not even a named
party in the action.
Further,
Plaintiff cited Ochoa v. Ford Motor Co. (2023 WL 2768484). [The Court
notes that the appropriate citation is now Ford Motor Warranty Cases (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 1324.] The Court notes that this ruling has not yet become
final. The Court also notes that to the extent that Felisilda and Ford
Motor Warranty Cases are in conflict, this Court follows Ford Motor
Warranty Cases as it follows the well-reasoned Ninth Circuit opinion in Ngo
and limited Felisilda.
Defendant
also argues that the Plaintiffs’ claims are inextricably intertwined with the
RISC because it furnishes them with standing under the Song-Beverly Act.
Defendant cites Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 905, 926;
however, Defendant’s argument is unavailing because Defendant’s own quotation
states nothing about how the standing arises from the contract with the
Seller-Creditor as the Defendant implies.
Further
stated in Ngo, “Like Ngo's purchase agreement, the contracts in Kramer “expressly
differentiate[d] dealer warranties from manufacturer warranties” and disclaimed
any effect on the manufacturer's warranties. Id. We held that
warranty claims against the manufacturer “arise[ ] independently from the
Purchase Agreements, rather than intimately relying on them.” Id.” (Ngo
v. BMW of North America, LLC (9th Cir. 2022) 23 F.4th 942, 950.)
Here,
the seller also differentiated and disclaimed warranties as indicated in
Paragraph 4 of page 5 of the RISC:
WARRANTIES SELLER DISCLAIMS
If you do not get a written warranty, and the Seller does
not enter into a service contract within 90 days from the date of this
contract, the Seller makes no warranties, express or implied, on the vehicle,
and there will be no implied warranties of merchantability or of fitness for a
particular purpose.
This provision does not affect any warranties covering the
vehicle that the vehicle manufacturer may provide. If the Seller has sold you a
certified used vehicle, the warranty of merchantability is not disclaimed.
(Ameripour Decl. Ex. 2)
Therefore,
this would not support Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s claims under the
Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act are all premised on and arise out of the
RISC and the resultant purchase of the vehicle. Plaintiff’s claims under the
Song-Beverly are separate from and do not arise from the RISC.
Third-Party
Beneficiary
Defendant
also seeks to compel arbitration on the theory that it is a third-party
beneficiary.
The
California Supreme Court has set forth the following test for determining if a
party may be recognized as a third-party beneficiary:
Instead,
a review of this court's third party beneficiary decisions reveals that
our court has carefully examined the express provisions of the contract at
issue, as well as all of the relevant circumstances under which the contract
was agreed to, in order to determine not only (1) whether the third party would
in fact benefit from the contract, but also (2) whether a motivating purpose of
the contracting parties was to provide a benefit to the third party, and (3)
whether permitting a third party to bring its own breach of contract action
against a contracting party is consistent with the objectives of the contract
and the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties. All three elements
must be satisfied to permit the third party action to go forward.
(Goonewardene
v. ADP, LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5th 817, 829-830.)
Defendant
argues that its third-party beneficiary argument succeeds because MBUSA is an
intended third-party beneficiary.
Here,
the Court does not find Defendant’s argument convincing. “All three elements
must be satisfied to permit the third party action to go forward.” (Goonewardene
v. ADP, LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5th 817, 830.) The Court will only address the
second element, because if one of the elements is not satisfied, then Defendant
cannot move forward under this theory.
As
stated in Ngo when addressing the second element:
Unlike
agreements to draft wills or to manage trusts or mutual funds—arrangements
inherently formed with third parties in mind—the vehicle purchase agreement in
question was drafted with the primary purpose of securing benefits for the
contracting parties themselves. In such an agreement, the purchaser seeks to
buy a car, and the dealership and assignees seek to profit by selling and
financing the car. Third parties are not purposeful beneficiaries of such an
undertaking.
The
text of the arbitration clause supports this conclusion. It provides that
claims and disputes “which arise[ ] out of or relate[ ] to your credit
application, purchase or condition of this Vehicle, this contract or any
resulting transaction or relationship (including any such relationship with
third parties who do not sign this contract) ... shall, at your or our election,
be resolved by neutral, binding arbitration.” (emphasis added). Though the
language allows for arbitration of certain claims concerning third parties, it
still gives only Ngo, the dealership, and the assignee the power to compel
arbitration. Nothing in the clause or, for that matter, in the purchase
agreement reflects any intention to benefit BMW by allowing it to take advantage
of the arbitration provision.
(Ngo
v. BMW of North America, LLC (9th Cir. 2022) 23 F.4th 942,
947-948.)
Here,
as previously mentioned, the Arbitration Agreement in relevant part states:
1.
EITHER YOU OR WE MAY CHOOSE TO HAVE ANY DISPUTE BETWEEN US DECIDED
BY ARBITRATION AND NOT IN COURT OR BY JURY TRIAL…
Any
claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise (including
the interpretation and scope of this Arbitration Provision, and the
arbitrability of the claim or dispute), between you and us or our employees,
agents, successors or assigns, which arises out of or relates to your credit
application, purchase or condition of this vehicle, this contract or any
resulting transaction or relationship (including any such relationship with third
parties who do not sign this contract) shall, at your or our
election, be resolved by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court
action.
(Def.
Mot. Ex. B, [Emph added.].)
This
language does not indicate a motivating purpose of the contracting parties was
to provide a benefit to the third party. The language explicitly states that
“you” or “we” and “your” or “our” can elect to arbitrate. Here, MBUSA is
neither “you,” “we”, “your,” or “our.” Therefore, it does not appear that a
motivating purpose of the contracting parties was to provide a benefit to the
third party, MBUSA.
Collateral
Estoppel
Plaintiff’s
collateral estoppel argument is simply not on point.
FAA
Does Not Apply
Plaintiffs argue in Opposition that
the FAA does not apply. In Reply, Defendant argues that the FAA does apply. The
disagreement on this point is superfluous.
Plaintiff
Caroline Mangasarian Cannot Be Compelled to Arbitration
Plaintiffs
note how the buyer is listed as Plaintiff, Arsen Mangasarian and how Caroline
is not a signatory to the RISC. Plaintiff argues that since Caroline did not
sign the RISC, she cannot be compelled to arbitrate her claims.
In
Reply, Defendant argues both that Plaintiffs thus concede that Caroline has no
standing to have brought this action, and then argues in the inconsistent
alternative that the arbitration provision in the RISC expressly allows for the
inclusion of Caroline. These arguments, too, are superfluous; as there is no
arbitration agreement between Plaintiff(s) and Defendant.
TENTATIVE
RULING
Defendant’s
motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings is DENIED.
REQUEST
FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Under Evidence Code §452:
Judicial notice
may be taken of the following matters to the extent that they are not embraced
within Section 451:
(a) The
decisional, constitutional, and statutory law of any state of the United States
and the resolutions and private acts of the Congress of the United States and
of the Legislature of this state.
(b) Regulations
and legislative enactments issued by or under the authority of the United
States or any public entity in the United States.
(c) Official
acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United
States and of any state of the United States.
(d) Records
of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States
or of any state of the United States.
(e) Rules of
court of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United
States or of any state of the United States.
(f) The law
of an organization of nations and of foreign nations and public entities in
foreign nations.
(g) Facts and
propositions that are of such common knowledge within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court that they cannot reasonably be the subject of
dispute.
(h) Facts and
propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of
immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably
indisputable accuracy.
(Ibid..)
Under Evidence Code 453:
The trial court
shall take judicial notice of any matter specified in Section 452 if a party
requests it and:
(a) Gives
each adverse party sufficient notice of the request, through the pleadings or
otherwise, to enable such adverse party to prepare to meet the request; and
(b) Furnishes
the court with sufficient information to enable it to take judicial notice of
the matter.
(Ibid.)
In the moving papers, Defendant requested judicial
notice of Exhibit 1 under Evidence Code 452(d). Exhibit 1 is the Complaint in
the instant action. Judicial notice is GRANTED.
In the Opposition papers, Plaintiffs requested
judicial notice of 17 Exhibits under Evidence Code 452 and 453. Plaintiffs
listed the records it wants judicially noticed as:
1. Safley v. BMW of North America, LLC (S.D. Cal.,
Feb. 5, 2021, No. 20-CV-00366), Docket No. 33: Order denying Defendant’s Motion
to Compel Arbitration.
2. Safley v. BMW of North America, LLC (S.D. Cal.,
Feb. 5, 2021, No. 20-CV-00366), Docket No. 16-2: RISC.
3. In re Toyota Motor Corp. Hybrid Brake Mktg., Sales,
Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 10ml2172 CJC (RNB) (C.D. Cal. Oct. 10,
2011, a.k.a., Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision in Kramer v. Toyota Motor
Corp. (9th Cir. 2013) 705 F.3d 1122), Docket No. 133- 3: RISC.
4. In re Toyota Motor Corp. Hybrid Brake Mktg., Sales,
Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 10ml2172 CJC (RNB) (C.D. Cal. Oct. 10,
2011, a.k.a., Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision in Kramer v. Toyota Motor
Corp. (9th Cir. 2013) 705 F.3d 1122), Docket No. 133- 4: Second RISC.
5. Hervey v. Mercedes-Benz USA LLC, et al. (Superior
Court of California, County of Los Angeles, No. 21STCV03490): Notice of Ruling
on Defendant MBUSA’s Motion to Compel Arbitration.
6. Hervey v. Mercedes-Benz USA LLC, et al. (Superior
Court of California, County of Los Angeles, No. 21STCV03490): Declaration of
Soheyl Tahsildoost in Support of MBUSA’s Motion to Compel Arbitration, with
Retail Installment Sales Contract (“RISC”).
7. Messih v. Mercedes-Benz USA LLC, et al. (N.D. Cal.,
June 24, 2021, No. 21-cv-03032- WHO), Docket No. 24: Order Denying Motion to
Remand and Denying Motion to Compel Arbitration.
8. Messih v. Mercedes-Benz USA LLC, et al. (N.D. Cal.,
June 24, 2021, No. 21-cv-03032- WHO), Docket Nos. 6-1, 6-3: Declaration of
Soheyl Tahsildoost in Support of MBUSA’s Motion to Compel Arbitration, with
RISC.
9. Hopp v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, et al. (Superior Court
of California, County of Los Angeles, No. 20STCV34682: Order Denying MBUSA’s
Motion to Compel Arbitration.
10. Hopp v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, et al. (Superior
Court of California, County of Los Angeles, No. 20STCV34682): Declaration of
Mollie Heitzig in Support of MBUSA’s Motion to Compel Arbitration, with Lease.
11. Friedman Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, et al. (C.D.
Cal., January 31, 2013, No. CV 12-7204 GAF (CWx): Order Denying MBUSA’s Motion
to Compel Arbitration
12. Friedman Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, et al. (C.D.
Cal., January 31, 2013, No. CV 12-7204 GAF (CWx): Exhibit 1 to declaration in
support, including Lease.
13. Noori v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, et al. (Superior
Court of California, County of Alameda, No. RG21105331): Order Denying MBUSA’s
Motion to Compel Arbitration.
14. Noori v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, et al. (Superior
Court of California, County of Alameda, No. RG21105331): Declaration of Soheyl
Tahsildoost in Support of MBUSA’s Motion to Compel Arbitration, with RISC.
15. Ngo v. BMW of North America, LLC, et al. (9th Cir.
2022) 23 F.4th 942 (appealed from Central District of Cal., Case No.
2:20-cv-06197).
16. Ngo v. BMW of America, LLC, et al. (C.D. Cal.)
2:20-cv-06197, Docket No. 11-2: Declaration of Jim Cyr in Support of BMW of
North America, LLC’s Motion to Compel Arbitration, with RISC.
17. FORD MOTOR WARRANTY CASES, Ochoa v. Ford Motor Co.
(2013 2d Dist., Div. 8) 2013 WL 2768484: Order Denying Ford’s Motion to Compel
Arbitration.
The Court GRANTS judicial notice.
In Reply, Defendant requests judicial notice under
Evidence Code 452 and 453 of the following records:
1. Minute Order and Ruling in Rhonda Mayer vs Hyundai
Motor America, (LASC Case No. 21STCV00836), granting Hyundai Motor America’s
Motion to Compel Arbitration, a true and correct copy of which is attached to
the Second Declaration of Ali Ameripour as Exhibit “3”.
2. Minute Order in Marco Plaza vs Mercedes-Benz USA,
LLC, (LASC Case No. 21STCV11857), granting Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC’s Motion to
Compel Arbitration, a true and correct copy of which is attached to the Second
Declaration of Ali Ameripour as Exhibit “4”
3. Minute Order in Sandra Carranza v. Mercedes-Benz
USA, LLC, (United States District Court, Central District of California Case
No. CV 21-2669-MWF (MARx)), granting Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC’s Motion to Compel
Arbitration, a true and correct copy of which is attached to the Second
Declaration of Ali Ameripour as Exhibit “5”.
Judicial Notice GRANTED.
Evidentiary Objections
In Opposition, Plaintiffs submitted evidentiary
objections to the Declaration of Ameripour.
These objections are OVERRULED.