Judge: David A. Rosen, Case: 22STCV25269, Date: 2023-04-21 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV25269 Hearing Date: April 21, 2023 Dept: E
Case No: 22STCV25269
Hearing Date: 04/21/2023 – 1:45pm
Trial Date: 02/02/2024
Case Name: CHERYL OLLISON v. PASADENA HOSPITAL
ASSOCIATION, LTD, dba Huntington Hospital
TENTATIVE RULING ON
DEMURRER
Moving Party: Defendant, Huntington Hospital [as noted in the moving papers
“erroneously sued and served herein as Pasadena Hospital Association dba
Huntington Hospital”]
Responding Party: Plaintiff,
Cheryl Ollison
(Oppo and Reply
Submitted)
Moving Papers: Motion
Opposing Papers:
Opposition
Reply Papers: Reply
Proof of Service
Timely Filed (CRC Rule 3.1300): Ok
16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP 1005(b)): Ok
Proper Address: Yes/No –
The email address on eCourt does not match the email address on the proof of
service; however, Opposition was submitted so it appears that Plaintiff
received Notice and the moving papers.
RELIEF REQUESTED
Defendant, Huntington Hospital, demurs to Plaintiff’s Complaint on the
following grounds:
1.
That the First Cause of Action alleged in plaintiff's Complaint
for "General Negligence" is uncertain and fails to allege facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action against this demurring defendant.
(Code of Civil Procedure §430.10(e)(f).)
2.
That the Second Cause of Action alleged in plaintiff's Complaint
for "Premises Liability” is uncertain and fails to allege facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action against this demurring defendant. (Code of
Civil Procedure §430.10(e)(f).)
This
Demurrer will be based on CCP §430.10 (a), this Notice, the attached Memorandum
of Points and Authorities, the Declaration of Cecille L. Hester filed
concurrently herewith, the records, pleadings, documents and papers on file
herein, and upon such further oral and documentary evidence as may be presented
at the time of the hearing on this Demurrer.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a form
complaint on 08/05/2022 alleging two causes of action: (1) General Negligence
and (2) Premises Liability. This action pertains to injuries that Plaintiff
allegedly suffered at Huntington Hospital when Plaintiff was left alone after a
knee surgery and was injured when she fell getting dressed.
PROCEDURAL
Meet
and Confer
A party filing a
demurrer “shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who
filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining
whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be
raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ.
Proc., §430.41, subd. (a).) “The parties
shall meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive
pleading is due. If the parties are not able to meet and confer at least five
days prior to the date the responsive pleading is due, the demurring party
shall be granted an automatic 30-day extension of time within which to file a
responsive pleading, by filing and serving, on or before the date on which a
demurrer would be due, a declaration stating under penalty of perjury that a
good faith attempt to meet and confer was made and explaining the reasons why
the parties could not meet and confer.”
(Code Civ. Proc., §430.41, subd. (a)(2).) Failure to sufficiently meet
and confer is not grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. (Id., §430.41(a)(4).)
Here,
there was no declaration with the demurrer. There was a declaration of Cecille
Hester filed on 10/26/2022 that was filed before the demurrer was filed. This
declaration stated how Plaintiff was unavailable to meet and confer and it
stated that the time for Defendant to file its responsive pleading was extended
by 30 days. This declaration stated that Defendant’s response to Plaintiff’s
Complaint is therefore not due to be filed and served until on or before
November 27, 2022.
LEGAL STANDARDS FOR DEMURRERS
Demurrer
– Sufficiency
A demurrer for
sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda, (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th
740, 747.) When considering demurrers,
courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of
Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) The court “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting
all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or
conclusions of fact or law ….” (Berkley
v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.)
In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of
the pleading or via proper judicial notice.
(Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968,
994.) A demurrer tests the pleadings
alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters; therefore, it lies only
where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially
noticed. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.30,
430.70.) The only issue involved in a
demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with
extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147
Cal.App.4th at 747.)
The
general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not
evidentiary facts. (Doe v. City of
Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.)
“All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter of pleading … is that
his complaint set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable
precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the
nature, source and extent of his cause of action.” (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.
(1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157.)
On
demurrer, a trial court has an independent duty to “determine whether or not
the … complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any
legal theory.” (Das v. Bank of
America, N.A. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 727, 734.) “A demurrer does not lie to a portion of a
cause of action.” (PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th
1680, 1682.) “Generally
it is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if
there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by
amendment.” (Goodman v. Kennedy
(1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.)
Demurrer – Uncertainty
A special demurrer for uncertainty, CCP section 430.10(f), is disfavored
and will only be sustained where the pleading is so bad that defendant cannot
reasonably respond—i.e., cannot reasonably determine what issues must be
admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against
him/her. (Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Moreover, even if the pleading is somewhat vague,
“ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Ibid.)
ANALYSIS
First Cause of Action – General Negligence
“To
state a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must allege (1) the
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, (2) the defendant breached that
duty, and (3) the breach proximately caused the plaintiff's damages or
injuries. (Thomas v. Stenberg (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 654, 662, 142
Cal.Rptr.3d 24.) Whether a duty of care exists is a question of law to be
determined on a case-by-case basis. (Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co. (1997)
15 Cal.4th 456, 472, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 936 P.2d 70.)” (Lueras v. BAC Home
Loans Servicing, LP (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 49, 62.)
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s pleading must expressly
allege a medical or professional negligence action and not a general negligence
action. In Opposition, Plaintiff argues that Plaintiff was not receiving
professional services when she sustained her injury and that her injury did not
occur during the knee surgery but occurred after. Therefore, Plaintiff argues
that if her injury had occurred during her knee surgery, a medical malpractice
action would be appropriate, but since the fall occurred after the surgery, a
medical malpractice action is not appropriate.
The Court does not find either party’s arguments
persuasive.
Plaintiff’s general negligence action alleges as
follows:
Defendants, and
each of them, by their acts or omissions to act, negligently caused the
injuries to Plaintiff which occurred on August 23, 2021. Plaintiff was a
patient at Huntington Hospital located at 100 W. California Blvd., Pasadena, CA
91105. Plaintiff was left alone after undergoing knee surgery. As Plaintiff was
getting dressed, she fell on her right knee and shoulder. Plaintiff called for
assistance, but there was to no avail., Plaintiff dragged herself over to the
push the call button until an employee of the hospital attended to Plaintiff. Plaintiff
sustained serious injuries and incurred damages as a result of the negligence
of defendants in maintaining, inspecting, repairing, managing, supervising,
controlling and/or operating the premises. Defendants failed to properly hire,
train, supervise, control and/or monitor its employees, agents, representatives
to properly maintain, inspect, supervise Plaintiff. Defendants failed to
provide a safe, suitable and adequate premises for Plaintiff. Plaintiff is
informed and believes and thereon alleges that said dangerous condition(s) were
caused by Defendants and each of them and or existed for a sufficient time
prior to the incident for Defendants to have corrected and or warned Plaintiff
of the existence of a dangerous condition, which defendants negligently and
carelessly failed to do. Defendants also failed to warn plaintiff of the risks
and dangers of which Defendants knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care,
should have known, and which were unknown and not readily apparent to
Plaintiff. Defendants' failure to warn was a direct legal cause of Plaintiffs
injuries and damages. Defendants had actual and/or constructive notice of the
dangerous conditions.
(Compl. p.4.)
TENTATIVE RULING- FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
This
is a notice pleading state. See, e.g.,
Jacobs v. Coldwell Banker (2017) 14 Cal. App. 5th 438. and the allegations in the form complaint on
page 4 as to general negligence put the Defendant on sufficient notice of the
claims being made against it. The cases Defendant cites in its demurrer do not
support Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff must expressly plead professional
negligence and that Plaintiff must exclusively plead professional negligence.
However, the Court notes that the general negligence allegations are aimed at
the care provided to the Plaintiff when she was a patient at Huntington
Hospital, and therefore this case falls under MICRA. See, e.g., Larson v.
UHS of Rancho Springs (2014) 230 Cal. App. 4th 336, 347-350. The
Court construes the general negligence allegations in this Complaint as also
adequately pleading professional negligence given the alleged facts.
Defendant’s demurrer to the first cause of action for general negligence is
OVERRULED.
Second Cause of Action – Premises
Liability
Defendant
argues that Plaintiff cannot plead a premises liability cause of action and
that Plaintiff must exclusively plead medical negligence/professional
negligence. In Opposition, Plaintiff argues that the premises liability claim
is different from the general negligence claim because it arises from a
condition of real property. Plaintiff argues that elements of a cause of action
for premises liability are the same as those for negligence.
Here, Plaintiff alleged as follows in her Complaint:
Plaintiff
sustained injuries when she fell at defendants premises located at 100 W.
California Blvd., Pasadena, CA 91 105. The incident caused injuries and damages
to be proven at the time of trial. Defendants and each of them are responsible
for their failure to provide a safe, suitable and adequate premises to
plaintiff. Defendants negligently and carelessly failed to warn and or remove
the dangerous condition causing Plaintiffs injuries. Defendants had actual and/or
constructive notice of the said dangerous condition.
(Compl. p. 5.)
TENTATIVE RULING-SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Here,
Plaintiff is correct to state that premises liability has the same elements as
general negligence. Problematic is that Plaintiff also argues that premises
liability is different than general negligence in that premises liability
arises from a condition of real property. Here, the Complaint has fails to
indicate in any way, much less makes any allegations as to, the identity or
nature of the alleged dangerous condition of real property.
Defendant’s demurrer to the second cause
of action is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend.