Judge: David A. Rosen, Case: 23GDCV00306, Date: 2023-09-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23GDCV00306    Hearing Date: September 8, 2023    Dept: E

Case No: 23GDC00306
Hearing Date: 09/08/2023 – 11:00am

Trial Date: UNSET

Case Name: BRIAN WHITAKER v. GOLDEN GRAIN BAKE HOUSE & CAFE, LLC, a California Limited Liability

 

[TENTATIVE RULING ON DEMURRER]

I.                   RELIEF REQUESTED

The Court notes that despite the fact that Defendant’s caption on its notice page states, “Notice of Demurrer,” the Notice page itself simply states in relevant part, “Defendant Golden Grain Bake House & Cafe, LLC will and hereby move the Court for dismissal of the action.

 

II.                BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed a Complaint on 02/14/2023 alleging two causes of action against Defendant for: (1) Violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (On behalf of Plaintiff and against all Defendants) Cal. Civ. Code §51-53 and (2)Violation of the California Disabled Persons Act (On behalf of Plaintiff and against all Defendants.) Cal. Civ. Code §54.1.

III.             LEGAL STANDARDS FOR DEMURRERS

A.    Demurrer – Sufficiency

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.  (Hahn v. Mirda, (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)  When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context.  (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.)  The court “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law ….”  (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.)  In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice.  (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)  A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters; therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.  (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.30, 430.70.)  The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.) 

The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts.  (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.)  “All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter of pleading … is that his complaint set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action.”  (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157.) 

On demurrer, a trial court has an independent duty to “determine whether or not the … complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.”  (Das v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 727, 734.)  Demurrers do not lie as to only parts of causes of action, where some valid claim is alleged but “must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained.”  (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.)  “Generally it is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.”  (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.)


B. Demurrer – Uncertainty

A special demurrer for uncertainty, CCP section 430.10(f), is disfavored and will only be sustained where the pleading is so bad that defendant cannot reasonably respond—i.e., cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him/her.  (Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)  Moreover, even if the pleading is somewhat vague, “ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Ibid.)

IV.             ANALYSIS

As a preliminary matter, Defendant’s demurrer contains many arguments that Defendant doesn’t attempt to support with legal citations.

Further, despite this allegedly being a demurrer, and despite Defendant arguing that Plaintiff fails to state a claim, Defendant does not once explain whether the various arguments asserted in the demurrer apply to the first or second cause of action. Defendant makes various arguments throughout its memorandum without explaining what arguments those causes of action apply to. Further, despite arguing that Plaintiff fails to state a claim, Defendant never once explains what the elements are to a particular cause of action.

Since Defendant randomly asserted arguments and made no indication as to what causes of action these arguments applied to, the Court will simply address the arguments the Defendant presented to the Court.

Under the Defendant’s section titled, “Plaintiff’s Complaint is Vague,” Defendant first states:

The standing required to pursue monetary relief under the Unruh Act is different from standing to seek injunctive relief under federal or state law. Reycraft v. Lee, 177 Cal. App. 4th 1211 (2009). Unlike the ADA, standing under the Unruh Act is established “where a disabled plaintiff can show he or she actually presented himself or herself to a business or public place with the intent of purchasing its products or utilizing its services in the manner in which those products and/or services are typically offered to the public and was actually denied equal access on a particular occasion.” Reycraft, 177 Cal. App. 4th at 1224. See also Antoninetti v. Chipotle Mexican Grill,Inc., 614 F.3d 971, 982 (9th Cir. 2010) (“On those visits when he was not seeking to purchase food [from the Defendant] . . . [Plaintiff] cannot recover money damages" under the Unruh Act.)

 

(Def. Mot. p. 4-5.)

 

Confusingly, after reciting case law on standing, Defendant doesn’t actually argue that Plaintiff didn’t sufficiently make the allegations required in Reycraft. However, the Court notes that even if Defendant had argued that Plaintiff did not allege standing under the Reycraft standard, Plaintiff did in fact sufficiently allege facts according to the  Reycraft standard in ¶¶ 8-17 of the Complaint.

 

Defendant then argues under the “Plaintiff’s Complaint is Vague” section that Plaintiff is under a duty to allege, in layman’s terms, the barriers that denied him full and equal access. Here, the Court notes that Defendant cited no legal support for this assertion. Defendant then goes on to argue that there is no such allegation in the Complaint. Here, the Defendant’s argument is unavailing. Plaintiff made those allegations in ¶¶10-13 of the Complaint.

 

Defendant next argues that the Complaint fails to provide facts sufficient to satisfy the requirements of CCP § 425.50.

 

As a preliminary matter, it is not entirely clear what subsections of § 425.50 Defendant is arguing Plaintiff did not sufficiently allege. For example, Defendant cites to 425.50 (a)(1)-(2). CCP §425.50(a)(1)-(2) states:

 

(a) An allegation of a construction-related accessibility claim in a complaint, as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 55.52 of the Civil Code, shall state facts sufficient to allow a reasonable person to identify the basis of the violation or violations supporting the claim, including all of the following:

(1) A plain language explanation of the specific access barrier or barriers the individual encountered, or by which the individual alleges he or she was deterred, with sufficient information about the location of the alleged barrier to enable a reasonable person to identify the access barrier.

(2) The way in which the barrier denied the individual full and equal use or access, or in which it deterred the individual, on each particular occasion.

 

(CCP §425.50(a)(1)-(2).)

 

Despite all the language cited 425.50(a)(1)-(2), Defendant simply argues that Plaintiff fails to allege his particular disability.

 

Defendant’s argument is unavailing. Plaintiff alleged his disability in ¶1 of the Complaint.

 

Further, even though Defendant didn’t argue that Plaintiff didn’t allege the requirements of 425.50(a)(1)-(2), even if Defendant did make that argument, it is unavailing because Plaintiff sufficiently alleged those elements in ¶¶1-18 of the Complaint.

 

Additionally, on page 7 of the demurrer, starting around line 5 and ending on page 8 around line 5, Defendant simply asks questions and makes assertions with no legal support. The Court is not inclined to entertain those issues.

 

Defendant next cites to CCP §425.50(4)(A)(ii)-(iv). Despite citing to § 425.50(4)(A)(ii), Defendant does not appear to argue that Plaintiff did not sufficiently allege this element. Defendant simply argues that Plaintiff didn’t allege 425.50(4)(A)(iii)-(iv). Here, Defendant’s arguments are unavailing. Plaintiff alleged those elements in ¶¶23-28 of the Complaint.

 

Lastly, Defendant has a section titled “Injunctive Relief.”

 

As a preliminary matter, it is unclear what Defendant is requesting with respect to injunctive relief. Injunctive relief is not a cause of action in the Complaint; therefore, the Court is confused as to how Defendant could be arguing that sufficient facts were not pled to allege a cause of action for injunctive relief.

 

If Defendant is arguing that injunctive relief should be stricken, Defendant did not file a motion to strike.

 

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436(b).)  A motion to strike cannot be based upon the grounds that a complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, but instead is properly based on grounds of superfluous or abusive allegations, or improprieties in form or procedure.  (Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 528-29.)   

 

Defendant then makes several confusing arguments about intent and that Plaintiff has no standing to bring this suit unless he alleges that he genuinely intended to patronize the business.

 

Here, Defendant’s argument is unavailing based on the allegations in ¶8 of the Complaint. Although Defendant argues that “tester” standing does not confer standing, Defendant provides no legal support for this argument. Further, even if Defendant did provide legal support for this argument, ¶8 does not allege that Plaintiff was there solely as a “tester.”

 

Defendant’s Reply is equally unavailing.

 

V.                TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant’s demurrer to the Complaint is OVERRULED.