Judge: David A. Rosen, Case: 23GDCV00311, Date: 2023-04-28 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23GDCV00311 Hearing Date: April 28, 2023 Dept: E
Hearing Date: 04/28/2023 – 1:30pm
Case No: 23GDCV00311
Trial Date: UNSET
Case Name: MARIA ROMERO v. FRONT PORCH COMMUNITIES AND SERVICES
TENTATIVE
RULING ON MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
Moving Party: Defendant, Front Porch Communities and
Services
Responding Party: Plaintiff, Maria Romero
Moving Papers: Motion; Proposed Order
Opposing Papers: Opposition; Lilia Molina Declaration;
Reply Papers: Reply; Objections to Lilia Molina
Declaration
Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC Rule 3.1300): Ok
16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP 1005(b)): Ok
Proper Address: Ok
CCP §1290.4 is not applicable hereto.
RELIEF REQUESTED
Defendant,
Front Porch Communities and Services, petitions to compel arbitration.
Defendant makes its petition pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9
U.S.C. Section 1 et seq., based on a valid, irrevocable, and enforceable
arbitration agreement between the parties.
Alternatively, Defendant
petitions the court pursuant to CCP §1281.2 for an order compelling Plaintiff
to arbitrate the controversy alleged against this moving Defendant.
Defendant seeks a stay of
this action pursuant to CCP §1281.4, Section 3 of the FAA, CCP §§1281.2 and
1292.8.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Maria Romero,
filed a Complaint on 02/14/2023 alleging three causes of action: (1) Elder
Abuse (Pursuant to the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act –
Welfare and Institutions Code §§15600, et seq.); (2) Negligence; and (3)
Assault & Battery.
Defendant moves to compel
arbitration of this action on the basis that Plaintiff’s alleged agent/power of
attorney, Lilly Molina, plaintiff’s daughter, signed an arbitration agreement
when Plaintiff decided to stay at Defendant’s skilled nursing facility.
Defendant argues that the claims in this Complaint are subject to the
arbitration agreement, and since Plaintiff’s power of attorney, Lilly Molina,
signed the arbitration agreement, this action should be compelled to
arbitration under Garrison v. Superior Court (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 253,
256 and Hogan v. Country Villa Health Serv. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 259,
262.
Opposition argues that arbitration
should not be compelled. Opposition argues that Logan v. Country Oaks
Partner (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 365 holds that arbitration should be denied
here. Opposition also argues that Lilly Molina only had power of attorney for
health care decisions and that Lilly Molina did not have power of attorney to
bind Ms. Romero to arbitration since arbitration is not a health care
decision. Opposition argues that this
Court should exercise its discretion and follow Logan even though the
case was granted review by and is now pending before the California Supreme
Court.
Opposition argues in the
alternative that Plaintiff does not possess the funds to pay for the costs of
arbitration and thus the defense must be ordered to pay all such costs or forego
arbitration. Opposition also argues in the alternative that if the Court orders
arbitration, Defendant should make the election mandated by the Roldan,
Weiler, Hang and Aranow, and appoint an arbitrator at the time of the
hearing on the Petition to Compel Arbitration, in order not to cause any
further delay in moving this case forward.
Reply argues that Logan
has no binding effect based on California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(e)(3).
Reply thus argues that Garrison and Hogan are controlling, and
arbitration must be compelled here.
Reply also argues in the
alternative that even if the Court finds that the Advance Healthcare Directive
did not provide authority to Lilly Molina, Lilly Molina had ostensible
authority to enter into the arbitration agreement. Further in Reply, Defendant
argues that Plaintiff should be ordered to pay her pro rata share of fees and
costs for the arbitration.
LEGAL STANDARD – MOTION TO COMPEL
ARBITRATION
CCP
§1281.2, governing orders to arbitrate controversies, provides in pertinent
part:
On petition of a
party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement
to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to
arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the
respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to
arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that:
(a)
The
right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or
(b)
Grounds
exist for recission of the agreement.
(CCP
§1281.2(a)-(b).
Under
the Federal Arbitration Act, arbitration agreements “shall be valid,
irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such grounds that exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of a contract.”
(9 U.S.C. section 2.)
There
is a strong public policy in favor of arbitration of disputes and any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable disputes should be resolved in favor of
arbitration. (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 9
(“courts will ‘indulge every intendment to give effect to such proceedings.’”)
(quotation omitted)). (See also AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion
(2011) 563 U.S. 333, 339.)
ANALYSIS
In the instant case, the issue is
whether the arbitration agreement signed by Lilly Molina compels this case to
arbitration based on the fact that Lilly Molina signed an Advance Health Care
Directive to act as an agent for Plaintiff Maria Romero.
In relevant
part, the Advance Health Care Directive that Lilly Molina signed states:
Unless you state otherwise in this form, your agent will
have the right to:
1. Consent or refuse consent to any care, treatment,
service, or procedure to maintain, diagnose, or otherwise affect a physical or
mental condition.
2. Select or discharge health care providers and
institutions.
(Def. Mot. Ex. 3.)
Opposition
argues that although Lilly Molina signed the arbitration agreement, Lilly
Molina did not have the authority to sign the arbitration agreement because the
Advance Health Care Directive only gave Lilly the authority to make health care
decisions.
Here, the
Court finds Plaintiff’s arguments availing that Lilly Molina did not have the
authority to bind Plaintiff to arbitration. Therefore, there was no agreement
to arbitrate here between Plaintiff and Defendant.
Reply
accurately points out that Logan v. Country Oaks Partners, LLC (2022) 82
Cal.App.5th 365 (rev. grtd.) is not binding authority because the Supreme Court
granted review. Reply also accurately points out that Hogan would seem
to compel arbitration here. However, the Court is persuaded on the facts of
this case to follow the reasoning, and binding authority of Young v. Horizon
West, Inc (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1129, as well as the persuasive
authority of Logan v. Country Oaks Partners, LLC (2022) 82
Cal.App.5th 365 (rev. grtd.), to find that Plaintiff gave Lilly Molina power of attorney for health care decisions
only, and the signing of the instant arbitration agreement that was not
required to be signed as a condition of admission to the facility was not a
health care decision. Further, the instant Advance Health Care Directive
provided the ability for Lilly Molina to select or discharge health care
providers and institutions. The instant arbitration agreement was not required
to be signed as a condition of admission to this facility. This Court therefore
finds that based on the specific language of the Advance Health Directive, the
reasoning of Young at page 1129, and the reasoning of Logan,
that Plaintiff did not give Lilly Molina the power of attorney to waive
Plaintiff’s right to a jury trial.
Defendant’s
perfunctory ostensible authority argument is not persuasive. Further, Defendant fails to show that the
four elements required for the imposition of equitable estoppel are met
here. Young, supra, 220 Cal. App.
4th at 1120; DRG/Beverly Hills v. Chopsticks Dim Sum Café and
take out III, Ltd. (1994) 30 Cal. App. 4th 54, 59.
The Court
does not reach Defendant’s argument as to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting Plaintiff’s claim that she cannot afford to pay for an arbitration
process.
TENTATIVE
RULING
Defendant’s
motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings is DENIED.