Judge: David A. Rosen, Case: 23GDCV00595, Date: 2023-08-25 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23GDCV00595 Hearing Date: August 25, 2023 Dept: E
Case No: 23GDCV00595 Hearing Date: 08/25/2023 – 10:00am
Case Name: ANTONIO LUJAK, an individual; v. FCA US LLC; a limited liability company; ALFA ROMEO USA; a business entity; ALFA ROMEO OF GLENDALE; a California business entity; FIAT AND ALFA ROMEO OF SANTA MONICA; a California business entity; and DOES 1-100 inclusive
TENTATIVE RULING ON MOTION TO STRIKE
RELIEF REQUESTED
Defendant, FCA US, LLC (FCA) (“Movant”) moves to strike the following portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint:
1. The request for punitive damages stated within ¶31: 11-19
2. Prayer for Relief as to item number 3, which states, “For punitive damages, according to proof”
This motion to Strike ("Motion") is made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §§ 435 and 436, as well as California Civil Code § 3294, on the grounds that Plaintiff has not pled specific facts that would entitle him to recover punitive damages against a corporate defendant.
Movant argues that Plaintiff has failed to plead specific facts detailing, among other things, which individuals associated with FCA acquired knowledge that its conduct would harm Plaintiff; how the knowledge was concealed; and which individuals associated with FCA engaged in, ratified, or approved the alleged conduct. Additionally, Movant argues that Plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages for the second cause of action, Strict Liability.
BACKGROUND
The Complaint in this action was filed on 03/23/2023 and alleges two causes of action: (1) Negligence, and (2) Strict Liability.
The instant action arises from allegations that, due to Defendants’ negligence and defects in the automobile, when Plaintiff parked his car with the parking brake set and then walked around the automobile, the parking brake failed and the automobile rolled into Plaintiff, crushing Plaintiff against a wall and causing injuries. (See Compl. ¶14.)
Legal Standard Motion to Strike
The Court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436(a).)
The Court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436(b).)
A motion to strike cannot be based upon the grounds that a complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, but instead is properly based on grounds of superfluous or abusive allegations, or improprieties in form or procedure. (Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 528-29.)
The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code. Civ. Proc. § 437; Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63 [“judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth”].)1
ANALYSIS
Movant argues that Plaintiff has not pled specific facts which would entitle him to recover punitive damages against a corporate defendant.
Punitive Damages
In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example by way of punishing the defendant. (Cal. Civ. Code §3294(a).)
“‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (CCP §3294(c)(1).)
“‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights. (CCP §3294(c)(2).)
“‘Fraud’ means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. (CCP §3294(c)(3).)
As to the requirement of pleading punitive damages with respect to a corporate defendant, Civil Code §3294(b) states:
An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.
(Civil Code §3294(b).)
The court agrees that the Complaint, as currently drafted, does not meet the pleading requirements to support a claim of punitive damages.
Plaintiff alleges as following in ¶31 of the Complaint:
On the basis of all of the facts alleged hereinabove, Defendants' conduct and actions were despicable, and were done maliciously, oppressively and/or fraudulently, with a willful and conscious disregard of Plaintiff's rights, due to Defendants' knowledge of said defects and intentional failure to remedy or provide adequate warning, entitling plaintiff to punitive damages under California Civil Code Section 3294. As to all Defendants, the officers, directors and managing agents were personally involved in the decision-making process with respect to the misconduct alleged herein and to be proven at trial and/or authorized and/or ratified each and every act on which Plaintiffs allegations of punitive damages herein are based.
(Compl. ¶31.)
“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal. App. 4th 1253, 1255.)
Conclusory allegations, devoid of any factual assertions, are insufficient to support a conclusion that parties acted with oppression, fraud or malice. (Smith v. Sup. Ct. (1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1042.)
“Further, even though certain language pleads ultimate facts or conclusions of law, such language when read in context with the facts alleged as to defendants' conduct may adequately plead the evil motive requisite to recovery of punitive damages. (Monge v. Superior Court (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 503, 510 citing Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6–7.)
Paragraph 31 contains essentially conclusory allegations. Even when these allegations are read together context with ¶¶23-31 and ¶¶1-22 of the Complaint (which were incorporated into the second cause of action), it appears to the Court that Plaintiff has failed to plead its punitive damages request for its strict liability cause of action with sufficient particularity.
Broadly, as the Court understands it, the Complaint alleges that plaintiff bought a used vehicle and took it for servicing, including servicing for the vehicles’ brakes. Several weeks after this, the Complaint alleges, the parking brake failed, resulting in plaintiff’s injuries. (Compl. ¶¶ 12-14.) On its face, it is difficult to see the support for a punitive-damages claims from the general nature of the claim or the overall thrust of the Complaint.
While it is true that ¶ 31 of the Complaint recites or paraphrases the statutory language of Civil Code § 3294(b), it is the Court’s view that something more is required—specifically, sufficient facts to support the punitive-damages claim.
TENTATIVE RULING
Movant’s motion is GRANTED, with leave to amend given to the Plaintiff. Plaintiff to file an amended complaint within 30 days of this ruling.