Judge David A. Rosen, Case Number: 23GDCV01309, Date: 2023-09-08 Tentative Ruling

Judge: David A. Rosen, Case: 23GDCV01309, Date: 2023-09-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23GDCV01309 Hearing Date: September 8, 2023 Dept: E

Case No: 23GDCV01309
Hearing Date: 09/08/2023 – 10:00am

Trial Date: UNSET

Case Name: DAVIT HOVHANNISYAN & SIRANUSH HOVHANNISYAN v. BOXTON INVESTMENTS, LLC, a California Limited Liability Corporation; GLEN WEST REALTY SERVICES, INC., a California Corporation; and DOES 1-25 inclusive

I. RELIEF REQUESTED

Defendants, Boxton Investments, LLC and Glen West Realty Services, Inc, demur to Plaintiffs’ first, sixth, and eighth causes of action on the basis of failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and uncertainty. The demurrer is made pursuant to CCP §430.10(e) and (f).

For the reasons set out below, the Defendants’ Demurrer is OVERRULED their Motion to Strike is DENIED.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Defendants on 06/21/2023 alleging eight causes of action:

(1) Violation of Civil Code Section 1942.4;

(2) Tortious Breach of Warranty of Habitability;

(3) Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment;

(4) Negligent Maintenance of the Premises;

(5) Maintenance of Nuisance;

(6) Violation of Business & Professions Code Section 17200 et seq.;

(7) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; and

(8) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

Plaintiffs allege they are tenants of the subject Premises. (Compl ¶1.) Plaintiffs allege that Boxton Investments, LLC owns, manages, and controls the Premises and that Glen West Realty Services, Inc. manages and controls the Premises. (Compl. ¶¶2-3.) Plaintiffs allege that they were subject to cockroach infestation, widespread leaks/chronic mold, and physical defects. (Compl. ¶10.) Plaintiffs allege they notified Defendants orally, in writing and/or person through their agents and representatives regarding the various issues and defects. (Compl. ¶12.)

III. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR DEMURRERS

A. Demurrer – Sufficiency

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda, (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) The court “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law ….” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)

A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters; therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.30, 430.70.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) “All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter of pleading … is that his complaint set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action.” (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157.)

On demurrer, a trial court has an independent duty to “determine whether or not the … complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.” (Das v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 727, 734.) Demurrers do not lie as to only parts of causes of action, where some valid claim is alleged but “must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained.” (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.) “Generally it is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.” (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.)

B. Demurrer – Uncertainty

A special demurrer for uncertainty, CCP section 430.10(f), is disfavored and will only be sustained where the pleading is so bad that defendant cannot reasonably respond—i.e., where the defendant cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him/her. (Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Moreover, even if the pleading is somewhat vague, “ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Ibid.)

IV. ANALYSIS ON DEMURRERS

A. First Cause of Action – Violation of Civil Code §1942.4

Defendants cite to Civil Code §1942.4(a)(1)-(4), which states as follows:

(1) The dwelling substantially lacks any of the affirmative standard characteristics listed in Section 1941.1 or violates Section 17920.10 of the Health and Safety Code, or is deemed and declared substandard as set forth in Section 17920.3 of the Health and Safety Code because conditions listed in that section exist to an extent that endangers the life, limb, health, property, safety, or welfare of the public or the occupants of the dwelling.

(2) A public officer or employee who is responsible for the enforcement of any housing law, after inspecting the premises, has notified the landlord or the landlord’s agent in writing of his or her obligations to abate the nuisance or repair the substandard conditions.

(3) The conditions have existed and have not been abated 35 days beyond the date of service of the notice specified in paragraph (2) and the delay is without good cause. For purposes of this subdivision, service shall be complete at the time of deposit in the United States mail.

(4) The conditions were not caused by an act or omission of the tenant or lessee in violation of Section 1929 or 1941.2.

(Civil Code §1942.4(a)(1)-(4).)

Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to allege § 1942.4(a)(2). In particular, Defendants argue:

Plaintiffs merely allege “on information and belief,” on some unspecified date, the Subject Property was “subject to at least one inspection” resulting in citation, at some unspecified time, for unspecified “violations of the Municipal Code and the California Health and Safety Code,” by one or multiple listed agencies. (Complaint ¶ 14) This allegation is patently ambiguous under C.C.P. § 430.10 as it is uncertain as to who conducted an inspection, what kind of notice was issued and amounts to an improper contention of fact.

(Def. Mot. p. 8-9.)

In Opposition, Plaintiffs argue they pled this element in ¶14 of the Complaint. In particular, Plaintiffs argue:

Plaintiffs do not have a copy of the violation notice, and as such, do not have the specific pieces of information Defendants are demanding from Plaintiff. Plaintiffs only know that the Department of Public Health of the County of Los Angeles provided a compliance notice to Defendants in the month of March 2023. Moreover, Defendants are or should be in receipt of the notice of violation and it is only through discovery that Plaintiffs can acquire a copy of the notice of violation. Presumably, Defense counsel should have a copy of the notice of violation.

(Oppo. p. 5.)

1. TENTATIVE RULING – FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION – VIOLATION OF CIVIL CODE § 1942.4

Defendants argue § 1942.4(a)(2) was not alleged.

Civil Code §1942.4(a)(2)states:

(a) A landlord of a dwelling may not demand rent, collect rent, issue a notice of a rent increase, or issue a three-day notice to pay rent or quit pursuant to subdivision (2) of Section 1161 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if all of the following conditions exist prior to the landlord’s demand or notice:(2) A public officer or employee who is responsible for the enforcement of any housing law, after inspecting the premises, has notified the landlord or the landlord’s agent in writing of his or her obligations to abate the nuisance or repair the substandard conditions.

Problematic with evaluating both parties’ arguments is that neither cite case law as to what is required at the pleading stage. Therefore, the Court is left with analyzing both parties’ arguments simply by the plain language of the statute.

Plaintiffs argued they pled this element at ¶14 in the Complaint. Paragraph 14 states:

On information and belief, the Premises have been subject to at least one inspection by the County Department of Building and Safety, the County Department of Public Health, the Southern California Gas Company, and/or the County Housing Community Investment Department Code Enforcement Division, that has resulted in citation for violations of the Municipal Code and the California Health and Safety Code.

(Compl. ¶14.)

Notably absent from these allegations is that the Complaint does not mention the landlord or the landlord’s agent was notified in writing to abate the nuisance or repair the substandard conditions. While Plaintiffs argue they do not have a copy of the violation notice, that Defendants should be in receipt of the notice, and that it is only through discovery that Plaintiffs can acquire a copy of the notice, Plaintiffs do not cite any case law or statute as to these set of facts excusing them from the standard mentioned in 1942.4(a)(2). Further, the Court notes that Plaintiff does not plead what it argues in its Opposition on page 5 with respect to this argument.

As to Defendant’s arguments as to the allegation being patently ambiguous as it is uncertain as to who conducted an inspection, what kind of notice was issued, the unspecified date, unspecified time, and unspecified violation, the Court does not find these arguments availing because Defendants cited no case law or statute that those allegations are required to be alleged.

At this pleading stage, and given that pleadings are to be liberally construed, the Court OVERRULES the Defendants’ demurrer as to the first cause of action.

B. Sixth Cause of Action – Violation of Business & Professions Code §17200

Defendants argue as follows:

Here, Plaintiffs fail to plead an essential element for this claim, specifically, facts showing how Defendants’ alleged actions are tethered to some legislatively declared policy or proof of some actual or threatened impact on competition, or how Defendants’ alleged actions are likely to deceive the public to thereby be “fraudulent” within the meaning of Business and Professions Code §§ 17200.

Additionally, Plaintiffs’ merely allege that Defendants engaged in unfair business practices by virtue of Defendants’ alleged “acts and omissions.” (Complaint ¶ 52). These allegations are simply insufficient in that they are not stated with the reasonable particularity required to support this claim.

In sum, the Complaint is deficient and fails to meet multiple pleading requirements for this claim in its failure to plead an essential element of the alleged violation and its failure to state facts with reasonable particularity as required.

(Def. Mot. p. 9-10.)

Although Defendants cited case law on page 9 of its motion, it is unclear how Defendants are connecting their arguments to the law they cited.

Equally unhelpful is Plaintiffs’ Opposition. Plaintiffs offer no legal support to back up their arguments in Opposition. Plaintiffs simply argue:

Establishing that a “fraudulent” business practice has been committed under UCL Section 17200 is not subject to the same requirements as common law fraud. Rather, a Plaintiff need only show that the practice is likely to deceive members of the public. Intent is not a requirement as it is with fraud, and mere negligence can be sufficient to establish a violation.

Here, Plaintiffs were promised a residence that is habitable and free from deficiencies. However, this turned out not to be the case. The Plaintiffs suffered from habitability issues from the onset of their residency at the Subject Location. Defendants deceived Plaintiffs by promising a habitable apartment unit free from cockroach infestations, chronic mold and physical defects. The purpose of the California Business and Professions Code § 17200 is to prevent similar fraudulent business acts from taking place.

(Oppo. p. 6.)

Since neither Defendants’ nor Plaintiffs’ papers are helpful to the Court, the Court will cite the research it found on this cause of action below and its resultant analysis.

The purpose of the UCL “is to protect both consumers and competitors by promoting fair competition in commercial markets for goods and services.” (Drum v. San Fernando Valley Bar Assn. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 247, 252 citing Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 949.) Business and Professions Code section 17200 provides, “[a]s used in this chapter, unfair competition shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code.” (Progressive West Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 263, 284.)

Because the UCL is written in the disjunctive, it establishes three varieties of unfair competition – acts or practices which are (1) unlawful, (2) unfair, or (3) fraudulent. (Adhav v. Midway Rent a Car, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 954, 970 citing Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180.)

Here, Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not indicate in any clear manner which prong – unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent – it is basing its cause of action under. For instance, Plaintiffs simply alleged, “Defendant, and each of them, engaged in unlawful and unfair business practices prohibited by California Business & Professions Code Section 17200, et seq. by virtue of the foregoing acts and omissions.” (Compl. ¶52.)

Therefore, to some degree it appears as if Plaintiffs are not basing their cause of action on the fraudulent prong because the Complaint only mentions unlawful and unfair, and it does not mention fraudulent. Confusingly, the Opposition appears to make arguments about fraud.

Since it is not clear what prong Plaintiffs bring their cause of action under, the Court will analyze all three prongs.

1. Unlawful

“‘The “unlawful” practices prohibited by … section 17200 are any practices forbidden by law, be it civil or criminal, federal, state, or municipal, statutory, regulatory, or court-made. [Citation.] It is not necessary that the predicate law provide for private civil enforcement. [Citation.] As our Supreme Court put it, section 17200 “borrows” violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices independently actionable under section 17200 et seq.’” (South Bay Chevrolet v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 861, 880 citing Hewlett v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 499, 531-532.) “A plaintiff alleging unfair business practices under these statutes must state with reasonable particularity the facts supporting the statutory elements of the violation.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 619; “Demurrer was properly sustained as to this cause of action because the second amended complaint identifies no particular section of the statutory scheme which was violated and fails to describe with any reasonable particularity the facts supporting violation.” (Id.).)

Here, Plaintiffs have not identified with any reasonable particularity nor have Plaintiffs identified the section of the statutory scheme which forms the basis for this cause of action. Further, if Plaintiffs are basing this cause of action on its common law counts in the Complaint, Plaintiffs do not indicate this.

Therefore, Plaintiffs have not satisfied the “unlawful” prong of the UCL.

2. Unfairness

There is authority that the test to determine whether a business practice is unfair differs depending on whether the plaintiff in a UCL case is a competitor of the defendant or a consumer. (Drum v. San Fernando Valley Bar Assn. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 247, 253.) In competitor cases, a business practice is “unfair” only if it “threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens of harms competition.” (Id. citing Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at 187.)

Here, the Complaint does not seem to indicate Defendants are competitors of Plaintiffs in any straightforward way, and the Complaint makes no allegations pertaining to competition; therefore, the Court will not analyze this as a UCL competitor case.

In consumer cases, the Supreme Court has not established a definitive test to determine whether a business practice is unfair. (Drum, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at 246 citing Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at 187, fn. 12.)

Several definitions of “unfair” under the UCL have been formulated, and they are:

1. “An act or practice is unfair if the consumer injury is substantial, is not outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition, and is not an injury the consumers themselves could reasonably have avoided.” (Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 839.)

2. “’[A]n “unfair business practice occurs when that practice “offends an established public policy or when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Smith v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 700, 719.)

3. An unfair business practice means the “ ‘the public policy which is a predicate to the action must be “tethered” to specific constitutional, statutory or regulatory provisions.’” (Scripps Clinic v. Superior Court (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 917, 940.)

(West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 806.)

“The balancing test required by the unfair business practice prong of section 17200 is fact intensive and is not conducive to resolution at the demurrer stage. ‘[U]nfairness’ is an equitable concept that cannot be mechanistically determined under the relatively rigid legal rules applicable to the sustaining or overruling of a demurrer.” (Progressive West Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 263, 287 citing Schnall v. Hertz Corp. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1144, 1167.)

Since there is no definitive test for “unfairness” at the demurrer stage, this Court will assume that all three definitions apply. Since the court in Progressive West Ins. Co. used the first definition listed above, and since that court stated that the balancing test for unfairness is fact intensive and not conducive to resolution at the demurrer stage, this Court has found that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the “unfairness” prong of the UCL and thus has sufficiently stated a cause of action under the UCL.

3. Fraudulent

“A fraudulent business practice under section 17200 ‘is not based upon proof of the common law tort of deceit or deception, but is instead premised on whether the public is likely to be deceived.’” (Progressive West Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 263, 284 citing Pastoria v. Nationwide Ins. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1498.) Stated another way, “In order to state a cause of action under the fraud prong of [section 17200] a plaintiff need not show that he or others were actually deceived or confused by the conduct or business practice in question. ‘The “fraud” prong of [section 17200] is unlike common law fraud or deception. A violation can be shown even if no one was actually deceived, relied upon the fraudulent practice, or sustained any damage. Instead, it is only necessary to show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.’ [Citations.]” (Progressive West Ins. Co., supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at 284 citing Schnall v. Hertz Corp. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1144, 1167.)

Here, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged a cause of action under the “fraud” prong of the UCL. Plaintiff’s Complaint makes no reference to fraudulent business practices in ¶51-55 of the Complaint.

4. TENTATIVE RULING – SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION – VIOLATION OF BUSINESS & PROFESSIONS CODE §17200 et seq.

Defendants’ demurrer to the sixth cause of action is OVERRULED, as the Court has concluded that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a claim under the “unfairness” prong of the UCL.

C. Eighth Cause of Action – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

On pages 10-11 of the demurrer, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs did not allege the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress. According to the citation provided by Defendants that contain the elements for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged those elements in ¶63-67 of the Complaint.

Further, Defendants’ arguments with respect to Kiseskey and Pitman are unavailing. Plaintiffs met the pleading requirements of Kiseskey and Pitman in ¶¶63-67, especially in light of the context of ¶¶1-16 which were incorporated into the eighth cause of action.

1. TENTATIVE RULING – EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION – INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

Defendant’s demurrer to the eighth cause of action is OVERRULED.

V. MOTION TO STRIKE

A. RELIEF REQUESTED

Defendants move the Court for an order to strike the following portion of the Complaint for which there is no support:

1. The portion of paragraph 30, lines 14-15 reading “made a conscious decision to subject.”

2. The entirety of paragraph 45.

3. The portion of paragraph 50, line 19 reading “oppressive and malicious.”

4. The portion of paragraph 50, lines 20-21 reading “cruel and unjust hardship in willful conscious disregard of Plaintiffs’ right and safety thereby entitling Plaintiffs to an award of punitive damages.”

5. The portion of paragraph 61, lines 16-17 reading “intentional, despicable and was initiated with malice and intent to knowingly take advantage of, oppress, and injure.”

6. The portion of paragraph 61, lines 21-22 reading “Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an award of punitive and exemplary damages.”

7. The portion of paragraph 64, lines 6-7 reading “outrageous and beyond all boundaries of decency and reasonable civilized conduct.”

8. The portion of paragraph 66, lines 23-24 reading “intentional, despicable and was conducted with the intent to oppress and injure Plaintiffs.”

9. The portion of paragraph 66, lines 1-2 reading “Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an award of punitive and exemplary damages.”

10. Item 4 in the Prayer for Relief.

11. All other references of intentional and malicious conduct and any other reference to punitive damages in the Complaint.

Defendants move pursuant to CCP §§435.5, 436, and 437.

B. Legal Standard Motion to Strike

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436(b).) A motion to strike cannot be based upon the grounds that a complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, but instead is properly based on grounds of superfluous or abusive allegations, or improprieties in form or procedure. (Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 528-29.)

The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code. Civ. Proc. § 437; Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63 [“judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth”].)

Further, CCP §431.10(a)-(c) states as follows:

(a) A material allegation in a pleading is one essential to the claim or defense and which could not be stricken from the pleading without leaving it insufficient as to that claim or defense.

(b) An immaterial allegation in a pleading is any of the following:

(1) An allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense.

(2) An allegation that is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense.

(3) A demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint.

(CCP §431.10(a)-(c).)

C. ANALYSIS

i. Punitive Damages

In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example by way of punishing the defendant. (Cal. Civ. Code §3294(a).) “‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (CCP §3294(c)(1).) “‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights. (CCP §3294(c)(2).) “‘Fraud’ means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. (CCP §3294(c)(3).)

“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal. App. 4th 1253, 1255.) Conclusory allegations, devoid of any factual assertions, are insufficient to support a conclusion that parties acted with oppression, fraud or malice. (Smith v. Sup. Ct. (1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1042.)

Further, as stated in Monge v. Superior Court, which helps explain the case law behind alleging punitive damages:

In determining whether a complaint states facts sufficient to sustain punitive damages, the challenged allegations must be read in context with the other facts alleged in the complaint. Further, even though certain language pleads ultimate facts or conclusions of law, such language when read in context with the facts alleged as to defendants' conduct may adequately plead the evil motive requisite to recovery of punitive damages. (Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6–7, 172 Cal.Rptr. 427.)

Perkins provides the highly pertinent example of this standard in the context of a motion to strike punitive damage allegations. There the complaint alleged that defendants “wrongfully and intentionally” invaded plaintiff's privacy and terminated his telephone service “in retaliation” for prior complaints lodged by plaintiff. The complaint also generally alleged that defendants were guilty of “oppression, fraud and malice.” Perkins read the complaint as a whole and held that the alleged conclusions of fact or law considered in the context of alleged wrongful conduct “in retaliation” pleaded an evil injurious motive sufficient **68 to establish malice and sustain a plea for punitive damages.

In G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 27–32, 122 Cal.Rptr. 218, it was pointed out that there exists an uncertainty in the case law as to just what terms adequately describe the necessary elements of “oppression, fraud or malice” under Civil Code section 3294. Searle suggests that different types of injurious conduct allow different formulations in pleading oppression or malice, but that the critical element is an “evil motive” of the defendant. (Id., at pp. 29–31, 122 Cal.Rptr. 218.)

*511 The meanings of “oppression” and “malice” with regard to Civil Code section 3294 are explained in Richardson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp. (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 232, 245–246, 102 Cal.Rptr. 547. “Malice” means a wrongful intent to vex or annoy. “Oppression” means “subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of his rights.” Malice and oppression may be inferred from the circumstances of a defendant's conduct.

(Monge v. Superior Court (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 503, 510-11.)

Defendants move to strike several portions of Plaintiffs’ Complaint. Despite Defendants’ requesting 11 portions be stricken, Defendants’ merely generally discuss the standard for what must be alleged for punitive damages. Defendants do not make any arguments as to why each portion should be stricken, and the Court will not attempt to read Defendants’ minds as to why each portion should be stricken.

Defendants generally argue that the Complaint is silent to intentional, willful, or fraudulent conduct and offers nothing meeting the threshold for pleading an award of punitive damages. Defendants also argue the Complaint lacks supporting specificity. Defendants also argue the Complaint is replete with conclusory statements.

Defendants’ arguments are unavailing.

D. TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants’ motion to strike is DENIED.