Judge: David A. Rosen, Case: 23GDCV01457, Date: 2023-09-01 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23GDCV01457    Hearing Date: September 1, 2023    Dept: E

Case No:23GDCV01457
Hearing Date: 09/01/2023 – 10:00am

Trial Date: UNSET

Case Name: SILVER SPOON INVESTMENTS INC., v. PERFEKTHA WELLNESS AND AESTHETIC SPA LLC; JOSE REYES; DAYSI RAMIREZ DE REYES; MEELAD MOHAMMADI; AND MARIA F. RIVERA

 

Moving Party: Defendants, Meelad Mohammadi and Maria F. Rivera

Responding Party: Plaintiff, Silver Spoon Investments Inc.

RELIEF REQUESTED

The notice page indicates the Defendants, Meelad Mohammadi and Maria F. Rivera, demur to the Complaint on the ground that no cause of action has been stated by Plaintiffs. On page 3 of the demurrer, which is after the notice page, but before the memorandum, Defendants list 4 separate grounds for demurrer:

(1) Defendant generally demurs to the unlawful detainer complaint filed by Plaintiff pursuant to Delta Imports, Inc. v. Municipal Court (1983) 146 CA3d 1033, in which the court held that the landlord’s complaint failed to allege proper notice, which is a prerequisite to an unlawful detainer action.

(2) Defendant demurs to the unlawful detainer complaint filed by Plaintiff on the ground that Notice is defective Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1161 and 1946.1(h).

(3) Defendant generally demurs to the unlawful detainer complaint filed by Plaintiff on the grounds that pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10(e), the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

(4) Defendant demurs to the unlawful detainer complaint filed by Plaintiff on the ground that pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10(f), the pleading is uncertain. Because of its uncertainty, Defendants must speculate as to its meaning, which speculation leads to it being ambiguous and unintelligible.

BACKGROUND

The instant action was filed on 7/12/2023 and is a form Complaint pertaining to unlawful detainer.

PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS

The demurrer was timely filed and served.

LEGAL STANDARDS FOR DEMURRERS

Demurrer – Sufficiency

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.  (Hahn v. Mirda, (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)  When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context.  (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.)  The court “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law ….”  (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) 

In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice.  (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)  A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters; therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.  (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.30, 430.70.)  The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.) 

The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts.  (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.)  “All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter of pleading … is that his complaint set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action.”  (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157.) 

On demurrer, a trial court has an independent duty to “determine whether or not the … complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.”  (Das v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 727, 734.)  Demurrers do not lie as to only parts of causes of action, where some valid claim is alleged but “must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained.”  (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.)  “Generally it is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.”  (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.)

Demurrer – Uncertainty

A special demurrer for uncertainty, CCP section 430.10(f), is disfavored and will only be sustained where the pleading is so bad that defendant cannot reasonably respond—i.e., cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him/her.  (Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)  Moreover, even if the pleading is somewhat vague, “ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Ibid.)

TENTATIVE RULING

 

            This is an unlawful-detainer action for a commercial property.


Under CCP §1166(a):

The complaint shall:

(1) Be verified and include the typed or printed name of the person verifying the complaint.

(2) Set forth the facts on which the plaintiff seeks to recover.

(3) Describe the premises with reasonable certainty.

(4) If the action is based on paragraph (2) of Section 1161, state the amount of rent in default.

(5) State specifically the method used to serve the defendant with the notice or notices of termination upon which the complaint is based. This requirement may be satisfied by using and completing all items relating to service of the notice or notices in an appropriate Judicial Council form complaint, or by attaching a proof of service of the notice or notices of termination served on the defendant.

 

(CCP §1166(a)(1)-(5).)

 

“The basic elements of unlawful detainer for nonpayment of rent contained in Code of Civil Procedure section 1161, subdivision (2), are (1) the tenant is in possession of the premises; (2) that possession is without permission; (3) the tenant is in default for nonpayment of rent; (4) the tenant has been properly served with a written three-day notice; and (5) the default continues after the three-day notice period has elapsed.” (Kruger v. Reyes (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th Supp. 10, 17 citing Davidson v. Quinn (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d Supp. 9, 11, 188 Cal.Rptr. 421.)

 

            The Complaint appears to meet the basic requirements of CCP § 1166.  The Demurrer appears to be a boilerplate document, simply cut-and-pasted from a prior template.

 

Among other things, the Demurrer states at page 6, lines 10-12, the following:

 

Furthermore the 3-day notice alleged in complaint section 9a(6) [sic] is based under Civil Code §1946.2(c) Maintaining, committing, or permitting the maintenance or commission of a nuisance, the attached notice does not mention a nuisance or any other disturbance to that degree.

 

This statement is simply incorrect and borderline incomprehensible.  Plaintiff did not check box 9(a)(6) on the UD-100 form Complaint. The Court simply does not understand what the Defendants are referring to with this statement—unless, as the Court suspects, this is just text copied from some other pleading in some other case.

 

The Court can only conclude that defendants copied and pasted this language from a demurrer in some other action, or some general template, and filed that document here, which may suggest bad faith on the part of the defendants in filing this demurrer, causing the Court to try to decipher its entirely inapposite and irrelevant arguments.

 

The Demurrer is overruled and defendants are ordered to file and serve an answer within five days of this order.