Judge: David B. Gelfound, Case: 20STCV43052, Date: 2025-05-27 Tentative Ruling

Counsel wishing to submit on a tentative ruling may inform the clerk or courtroom assistant in North Valley Department F49, 9425 Penfield Ave., Chatsworth, CA 91311, at (818) 407-2249.  Please be aware that unless all parties submit, the matter will still be called for hearing and may be argued by any appearing/non-submitting parties. If the matter is submitted on the court's tentative ruling by all parties, counsel for moving party shall give notice of ruling. This may be done by incorporating verbatim the court's tentative ruling. The tentative ruling may be extracted verbatim by copying and pasting, as unformatted text, from the Los Angeles Superior Court’s website, http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org.
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Case Number: 20STCV43052    Hearing Date: May 27, 2025    Dept: F49

Dept. F49

Date: 5/27/25

Case Name: Ronald Kari v. Dennis Mortensen, Jay Guerero Urbina, The Estate of Kevin Gerrity, and Does 1 to 10.

Case No. 20STCV43052

 

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F49

 

MAY 27, 2025

 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 20STCV43052

 

Motion filed: 1/24/25

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Dennis Mortensen

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Ronald Kari

NOTICE: OK.

 

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order granting the Moving Defendant Dennis Mortensen’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

 

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is DENIED.

 

BACKGROUND

 

This case arises from personal injuries sustained by Plaintiff that were allegedly caused by Defendants on or about July 27, 2018, at EnergiX Martial Arts Center, Chatsworth, California. 

 

On November 10, 2020, Plaintiff Ronald Kari (“Plaintiff” or “Kari”) filed a Complaint against Defendants Dennis Mortensen (“Mortensen”), Jay Guerero Urbina (“Urbina”), the Estate of Kevin Gerrity (collectively, “Defendants”) and Does 1 to 10, alleging four causes of action: (1) Battery, (2) Assault, (3) Negligence, and (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. Subsequently, Defendants Mortensen and Urbina filed their respective Answers on April 12, 2021. Defendant the Estate of Kevin Gerrity filed its Answer on February 9, 2023.  

 

On January 24, 2025, Defendant Mortensen filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Motion”). Subsequently, on May 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed his Opposition.

 

No Reply papers have been filed to date.

 

ANALYSIS

 

“A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(1).)

 

“The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In determining if the papers show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact, the court shall consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except the evidence to which objections have been made and sustained by the court, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence, except summary judgment shall not be granted by the court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence if contradicted by other inferences or evidence that raise a triable issue as to any material fact.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) 

 

“[I]f the moving papers establish a prima facie showing that justifies a [ruling] in the [their] favor, the burden then shifts to the [opposing party] to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable material factual issue. (Citation.)" (See's Candy Shops, Inc. v. Superior Court (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 889, 900, quoting Rehmani v. Superior Court (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 945, 950.) “The defendant or cross-defendant shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) 

 

A.    Moving Party’s Initial Burden

 

In a motion for summary judgment proceeding, the moving defendant must satisfy the initial burden to show that one or more elements cannot be established by “presenting evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action or by relying on the plaintiff’s factually devoid discovery response to show that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, evidence to establish that element.” (Schmidt v. Citibank, N.A. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1109, 1119.)

 

Here, Defendant Mortensen argues that summary judgment is proper on the grounds of (1) Plaintiff cannot satisfy the requirements to show causation for his alleged injuries, and (2) Mortensen denies that he commanded co-defendant Urbina to kick Plaintiff as alleged. (Mot. at pp. 4-6.)

 

The Court addressed these two arguments in turn.

 

(1)   Causation Argument

 

It is well established that “‘Causation’ is an essential element of a tort action. Defendants are not liable unless their conduct … was a ‘legal cause’ of plaintiff’s injury. [Citations.]” (Whiteley v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 635, 696.)

 

“[I]n a personal injury action causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony. Mere possibility alone is insufficient to establish a prima facie case. [Citations.].... There can be many possible ‘causes,’ indeed, an infinite number of circumstances which can produce an injury or disease. A possible cause only becomes ‘probable’ when, in the absence of other reasonable causal explanations, it becomes more likely than not that the injury was a result of its action.” (Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 396, 402-403.)

 

Here, Defendant Mortensen relies primarily on the declaration of his expert witness, Dr. Michael Kirk, M.D., M.P.H., F.A.C.E.P. (“Kirk”) who opines that “trauma to testicles is not a contributing cause of testicular cancer” based on his review of Plaintiff’s “relevant medical history” and “[b]ased upon [his] education, training and experience.” (Kirk Decl. ¶¶ 12-13; Undisputed Material Facts (“UMF”), No. 26.)

 

However, the Court finds that Mortensen has not satisfied his initial burden for the following reasons:

 

(a)   Admissibility Issues with Dr. Kirk’s Declaration

 

In California, trial courts have substantial “gatekeeping” responsibility to ensure that an expert’s opinion is “based on both reliable material and sound reasoning.” (Bader v. Johnson & Johnson (2002) 86 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1104.) “[T]he court must simply determine whether the matter relied on can provide a reasonable basis for the opinion or whether that opinion is based on a leap of logic or conjecture. (Id. at p. 1105.)

 

 In Garibay v. Hemmat (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 735, the court held that without including the relied-upon medical records and without testimony providing for authentication of such records, a physician’s expert opinion had no evidentiary basis (id. at p. 742), reasoning that “[o]nly after the facts [from the medical records] were properly before the trial court could the expert form an opinion, and could the defendant moving for summary judgment meet his burden of production.” (Id. at p. 738.)

 

 As to the requirement of sound reasoning, courts have held that “[a]n expert’s opinion ‘unaccompanied by a reasoned explanation connecting the factual predicates to the ultimate conclusion’ lacks evidentiary value and may be deemed conclusory.” (Pipitone v. Williams (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1456 (Pipitone).)

 

Here, Dr. Kirk’s declaration expressly premises his opinion on “Mr. Kari’s relevant medical history,” including records from UCLA and City of Hope. (Kirk Decl. ¶ 12.) However, none of the medical records he relied on were attached to the declaration. This omission renders Dr. Kirk’s testimony inadmissible. In Garibay, supra, the court held that an expert opinion relying on unattached medical records lacks evidentiary basis. (Id. at p. 742.) Dr. Kirk’s failure to include these records means his testimony lacks the necessary foundation, as he has no personal knowledge of Plaintiff’s medical history.

 

Moreover, Dr. Kirk’s declaration concludes that “there is absolutely no causative effect of any form of testicular cancer resulting from testicular trauma” but provides no methodology or statistical analysis to support this claim. (Kirk Decl., ¶ 12.) An expert opinion unaccompanied by a reasoned explanation connecting factual predicates to the ultimate conclusion is conclusory and lacks evidentiary value. (Pipitone, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1456.) Dr. Kirk’s bullet-point assertion does not employ a recognized scientific methodology, further undermining its admissibility.

 

(b)   Narrow Scope of Mortensen’s Argument

 

The Complaint alleges a broad range of damages, including physical pain and suffering, wage loss, hospital and medical expenses, loss of earning capacity, emotional distress, and permanent life-altering injury. (Compl., at p. 3, ¶ 11.) Plaintiff’s opposition clarifies that these damages encompass not only the loss of his testicle but also emotional distress, medical bills, and loss of work. (Opp’n., at p. 3.) Mortensen’s Motion, however, focuses narrowly on negating causation for testicular cancer, relying on Dr. Kirk’s inadmissible declaration. (UMF, No. 26.)

 

Even if Dr. Kirk’s testimony were admissible, it does not address causation for non-cancer-related damages, such as pain, emotional distress, or wage loss, which are material to Plaintiff’s claims. By failing to negate causation for all alleged damages, Mortensen does not meet his initial burden. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).)

 

Due to these admissibility issues—lack of foundation, absence of reasoned explanation—Dr. Kirk’s declaration is inadmissible and cannot support Mortensen’s causation argument.

 

(2)   Denial of Occurrence

 

Defendant Mortensen asserts that he “den[ies] having been at the dojo with plaintiff as alleged” and “further den[ies] ever commanding him to do anything or at any time kicking plaintiff as alleged.” (Mot. at p. 6.) This denial directly contradicts the Complaint’s detailed narrative, which alleges that on July 27, 2018, Mortensen instructed Plaintiff to take a fighting stance, directed co-defendant Urbina to kick Plaintiff, and conspired with defendants to cause harm. (Compl., at pp. 4-7.)

 

To meet his initial burden, Mortensen must present evidence that conclusively negates the occurrence of the incident or show that Plaintiff lacks evidence to support it. (Schmidt v. Citibank, N.A. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1109, 1119.) However, Mortensen provides no supporting evidence to substantiate his denial.

 

The Motion’s UMF references Plaintiff’s uncertainty about the exact date and time of the incident (UMF, Nos. 2-3), but this does not negate the occurrence of the incident, as Plaintiff’s Complaint provides a specific date (July 27, 2018) and location (EnergiX Martial Arts Center). (Compl. at p. 4.) Mortensen’s unsupported assertion is insufficient to meet the standard for negating the incident’s occurrence. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 855.)

 

Moreover, Plaintiff’s Opposition includes a declaration affirming the incident’s occurrence under penalty of perjury, detailing the actions of Mortensen, Urbina, and Gerrity. (Kari Decl. ¶¶ 2-3.) This highlights that Mortensen’s bare denial does not conclusively negate Plaintiff’s allegations.

Accordingly, Mortensen fails to meet his initial burden on the occurrence of the incident.

The Motion is therefore DENIED.

 

CONCLUSION

 

Defendant Dennis Mortensen’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED as to all causes of action.

 

Moving party to provide notice.

 





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