Judge: David B. Gelfound, Case: 22CHCV00641, Date: 2024-12-12 Tentative Ruling

Counsel wishing to submit on a tentative ruling may inform the clerk or courtroom assistant in North Valley Department F49, 9425 Penfield Ave., Chatsworth, CA 91311, at (818) 407-2249.  Please be aware that unless all parties submit, the matter will still be called for hearing and may be argued by any appearing/non-submitting parties. If the matter is submitted on the court's tentative ruling by all parties, counsel for moving party shall give notice of ruling. This may be done by incorporating verbatim the court's tentative ruling. The tentative ruling may be extracted verbatim by copying and pasting, as unformatted text, from the Los Angeles Superior Court’s website, http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org.
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Case Number: 22CHCV00641    Hearing Date: December 12, 2024    Dept: F49

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

DEPARTMENT F49

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES

Motion filed: 8/7/24

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Jose Carmen Aldape

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant General Motors, LLC

NOTICE: OK.

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order awarding attorney fees in the amount of $ 48,020.00, consisting of: (1) $28,680.00 in attorney fees; (2) a 0.5 multiplier enhancement in the amount of $ 14,340.00; and (3) $5,000.00 anticipated attorney fees for reviewing Defendant’s Opposition, drafting the Reply brief, and attending the hearing on the Motion.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED IN PART.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Jose Carmen Aldape (“Plaintiff” or “Aldape”) filed this Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act lawsuit over alleged defects in his 2020 Chevrolet Silverado, VIN 3GCUYGED3LG321531 (the “Subject Vehicle”), which was manufactured by Defendant General Motors, LLC (“Defendant” or “GM”). Plaintiff leased the Subject Vehicle on or about May 29, 2020, entering into an express written warranty contract with GM. (Compl. ¶¶ 6, 10.)

On August 15, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against GM and Does 1 through 50, alleging the following causes of action: (1) Violation of Subdivision (d) of Civil Code Section 1793.2; (2) Violation of Subdivision (b) of Civil Code Section 1793.2; (3) Violation of Subdivision (a)(3) of Civil Code Section 1793.2; (4) Breach of Express Written Warranty (Civil Code Section 17941.2 Subdivision (a), and Section 1794); and (5) Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability (Civil Code Section 1791.1, and Section 1794). Subsequently, on September 19, 2022, GM filed its Answer to the Complaint.

On March 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Settlement.

On August 7, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Attorney Fees. Subsequently, on November 27, 2024, GM filed an Opposition to the Motion, and Plaintiff filed a Reply on December 5, 2024.

ANALYSIS

Attorney fees are allowed as costs when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(B).)¿ In a lemon law action, costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees, may be recovered by a prevailing buyer under the Song-Beverly Act. (See Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).)¿

“If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794.)¿

Thus, the statute includes a “reasonable attorney’s fees” standard.¿ The attorney bears the burden of proof as to “reasonableness” of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5 subd. (c)(5).) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) “Testimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records.” (Ibid.)¿

A plaintiff’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. (See Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.) “In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488, quoting Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Ass’n (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.) The Court has discretion to reduce fees that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time. (Horsford v. Bd. of Trustees of California State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal. App. 4th 359, 395.)¿

In determining a reasonable attorney fees, the trial court begins with the lodestar, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 36.) The lodestar may then be adjusted based on factors specific to the case in order to fix the fee at the fair market value of the legal services provided. (Ibid.) These facts include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Ibid.)¿ 

A.    Motion for Attorney Fees

(1)   Prevailing Party

Plaintiff seeks an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to settlement agreement reached by the parties. (Wood Decl. ¶ 40.) It is undisputed that Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action and entitled to a reasonable amount in attorney fees.

(2)   Reasonableness of Hourly Rates

“The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in [her] court.” (Ibid.) 

Plaintiff seeks to recover attorney fees for five attorneys who worked on the case: (1) Carey Wood at $450 per hour through August 2022, $500 per hour from August 2022, and $520 per hour from January 4, 2024; (2) Lara Rogers at $350 per hour; (3) Crystle Caigoy at $380 per hour; (4) Jason Roberge at $400 per hour; and (5) Jessica Anvar at $515 per hour. Additionally, Plaintiff seeks to recover fees for paralegals that worked on the case, at a rate between $175-$200 per hour. (Mot. at p. 8.)

Plaintiff’s counsel demonstrates that the attorney’s rates are commonly accepted within their community of practice in the relevant area of law. (Wood Decl. ¶¶ 43-55.) Notably, GM does not dispute the reasonableness of these rates.

Accordingly, the Court finds the hourly rates for Plaintiff’s attorneys and paralegals to be reasonable.

(3)   Reasonableness of Hours Incurred

“A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney ... involved in the presentation of the case.” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.) “The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work.” (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.) 

Plaintiff seeks to recover attorney fees for 79.5 hours litigating this matter. Plaintiff has submitted billing records. (Mot. at pp. 8-9, Wood Decl. ¶ 56, Exs. 5, 6.)

GM objects to several of Plaintiff’s requested hours on the grounds that they are excessive and unreasonable based on Plaintiff’s counsel’s use of templates to create documents. (Opp’n. at p. 8.) GM further objects to several requested hours on the basis that these tasks are not compensable because they are routine business expenses or clerical work. (Id. at p. 9.)

First, GM objects to 2.7 hours ($945.00) billed on September 26 and December 5, 2022, to prepare discovery requests on the grounds that these requests and notice are templated. (Opp’n. at p. 8.)

Second, GM objects to 2.4 hours ($840.00) billed on November 14 and 18, 2022, to prepare Plaintiff’s discovery responses on the grounds that the responses are largely templated. (Opp’n. at p. 8.)

Third, GM objects to 9.6 hours ($3,360.00) billed on January 24, July 18 and 24, 2023, to draft the motion to compel further responses, prepare reply, and attend the hearings. GM argues that the motion and reply papers are essentially templated. (Opp’n. at p. 8.)

Fourth, GM objects to 2.6 hours ($1,047.50) billed on December 13, 2023, and January 4, 2024, to draft non-party deposition subpoena on the grounds that time spent is excessive as the subpoenas were 2-page, fill-in-blank forms, and that changing names and titles in a subpoena are purely clerical tasks thus not recoverable as attorney fees. (Opp’n. at p. 9.)

            Fifth, GM objects to 8.3 hours ($4,357.50) billed on July 24 and August 5, 2024, spent on the fee motion and memorandum of costs, on the grounds that they are excessive. (Opp’n. at p. 9.)

Sixth, GM objects to $5,000.00 anticipated fees to review GM’s Opposition and prepare a Reply brief in the instant Motion. GM contends that the fees are excessive and unreasonable. (Opp’n, at p. 9.)

Seventh, GM objects to 6 hours ($2,624.50) billed throughout the records in 0.1 increments for continual attorney status meetings and calendar reviews on the grounds that they are redundant and excessive. (Opp’n, at p. 9.)

Eighth, GM objects to 9.8 hours ($1,960.00) billed by paralegal David Gomez on the grounds that clerical work is not recoverable as attorney fees.

GM contends that Plaintiff’s demand should be reduced for a maximum award of $16,440.45. (Opp’n. at p. 4.)

Here, most of the hours spent on this matter are reasonable. However, the Court adjusts Plaintiff’s anticipated fees to review the Opposition and prepare Reply papers to 4 hours reasonably spent, at Mr. Wood’s current rate of $520.00 per hour.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s billing should be reduced to a total of $30,760. ($28,680 + ($520/hr. x 4 hrs.))

(4)   Multiplier

While the lodestar reflects the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community, it may be adjusted based on various factors, including “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; (3) the contingent nature of the fee award” and (4) the success achieved. (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.) 

Plaintiff requests a lodestar multiplier enhancement of 0. 5, arguing that the multiplier is reasonable due to the quality of representation and results obtained, complexity of the issues involved, and the risks of non-recovery posed due to the contingency nature of the representation. (Mot. at pp. 10-11.)

The Court finds that this case does not present any extraordinary circumstances warranting the application of a multiplier.

            Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Motion and awards Plaintiff $30, 760.00 in reasonable attorney fees.

CONCLUSION

The Motion for Attorney Fees is GRANTED IN PART. The Court awards $30,760.00 in reasonable attorney fees in favor of Plaintiff.

Moving party to give notice.